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Preface
I first became interested in the questions pursued in this dissertation in 2007, in a
metaphysics course with Boris Kment. The project as I then conceived it was a vin-
dication of van Fraassen (1980) against the triviality critique of Kitcher and Salmon
(1987). I made my first serious attempt to approach explanation through a theory of
‘why’-questions in my 2010 M.Sc. thesis, where I developed a rich notion of a context
that was supposed to permit a plausible exhaustive treatment of ‘why’-questions via
a contextual notion of completeness for their answers. I subsequently attempted to
find something systematic and illuminating to say about the relationship between
contexts, contrasts, and answers. But an eventual increase in semantic sophistication
led me to the approach pursued here. It thus represents one phase of my attempt to
chip away at the problem of explanation.
The dissertation investigates the semantic contribution of the individual words ‘why’
and ‘because’, attempting to get clear on whether and how some of our central ex-
planatory terminology gets disambiguated, and thereby to make some progress on
a theory of ‘why’-questions that can tell us something substantive about explana-
tion. Chapter 1 presents some previous theories of ‘why’-questions and situates my
account relative to them. Chapter 2 argues that ‘why’ and ‘because’ are, indeed,
polysemous. In particular, I argue that why and because have literal causal senses,
as well as distinct senses that we use to communicate metaphysical explanations.
Chapter 3 considers some uses of ‘because’ that are commonly supposed to be dis-
tinct from its causal uses, and shows how to understand them as involving the causal
sense of ‘because’ after all. That is, it shows that apparent semantic variations in the
meaning of ‘because’ in its so-called epistemic and metalinguistic uses are illusory,
and gives a full explanation of those variations in terms of syntactic ambiguities.
Chapter 4 offers an explanation of the polysemy observed in chapter 2, and investi-
gates to what extent polysemy can tell us about metaphysics. I argue that a causal
metaphor unifies the senses of ’why’ and ’because’ at issue in metaphysical explana-
tions with their literal causal senses. This semantic investigation turns out to offer
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CHAPTER 1
The Context of Inquiry
‘Why’-questions present a special opportunity for philosophers. If we could develop
an adequate, substantive, and illuminating theory of them, we would be well on our
way to understanding explanation as a human practice. But developing a general
theory of ‘why’-questions can seem intractable. For one thing, they’re recalcitrant
to semantic analysis (§1.1). Two noteworthy approaches to this challenge have been
taken. The first imposes artificial order on the phenomena by adopting established
theories of explanation to find an account of answerhood for ‘why’-questions (§1.2).
The second gives up on informative semantic analysis in favor of empty or opaque
pragmatic considerations (§1.3). The present study can be understood as injecting
some semantic complexity into more purely pragmatic accounts, and then trying to
divine something about explanation itself from the resulting theory.
1.1 Recalcitrance of ‘Why’-Questions to Semantic
Analysis
Semanticists typically identify a question with the set of its possible answers, fol-
lowing the second postulate of Hamblin (1958), a foundational work in the logic of
questions.1
Postulate 2 (Hamblin) Knowing what counts as an answer is equivalent to know-
ing the question.
For certain classes of questions, the typical identification is unproblematic. Yes/no
and ‘whether’ questions have straightforward answers. Even constituent questions
like ‘who went to the party?’, which query the extension of a property or relation,
1See the discussion of “set-of-answers methodology” in Harrah (2002).
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have clearly definable answers.2 But it is not easy to say what the possible answers
of a ‘why’-question are. The space of possible answers is messy. Further, for yes/no,
‘whether’, and constituent questions, it’s possible to treat answers as providing ex-
haustive answers, so that each answer is complete and any two answers mutually
exclude one another. Doing so is the very basis for partition semantics, one of the
major approaches to the logic of questions.3 But it’s typically doubted that there
is such a thing as a complete answer to a ‘why’-question, or that nothing short of
the entirety of what Peter Railton calls an ideal explanatory text could give a com-
plete answer.4 But if the answers we actually give are never complete, they can never
properly be read exhaustively, and can never mutually exclude all other answers from
being correct. This would flatly rule out adapting a major approach to questions to
the case of ‘why’-questions.5
Sylvain Bromberger, who produced perhaps the earliest treatment of answerhood
for ‘why’-questions as part of his work on science and ignorance, doubts that Ham-
blin’s second postulate can be respected when it comes to a particular class of ‘why’-
questions.6 He thinks scientists often ask ‘why’-questions when they are at a loss, not
when they are just trying to decide between a well-understood collection of possible
answers. So the role of ‘why’-questions in scientific practice sometimes requires that
we can understand them without knowing what would count as answering them.
The search for and discovery of scientific explanations, we think, is essen-
tially the search for and discovery of answers to questions that are unan-
swerable relative to prevailing beliefs and concepts. It is not, therefore,
merely a quest for evidence to settle which available answer is correct, it
is a quest for the unthought-of.7
There is doubtless something right about this idea, but I’m not sure it precludes
respecting Hamblin’s second postulate. First, the role of ‘why’-questions in scien-
tific research does not require that ‘why’-questions in general receive an esoteric
semantics. When a test asks why a projectile traveled m meters after being fired
from the ground at angle θ, we know perfectly well what the possible answers are,
2In the case of properties, the answers just say, of various subsets of the domain, that the
members of that subset have the property. In the case of n-ary relations, the answers identify
different subsets of the n-ary cross product of the domain.
3See Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984).
4See Railton (1981).
5I speak in the subjunctive here because it is not obvious that a notion of completeness relative
to a context cannot be isolated.
6The survey of work on ‘why’-questions in Harrah (2002), §7.1 supports the ‘earliest’ hypothesis.
7Bromberger (1992d), 81-82.
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and need only employ the equation for projectile motion to answer it. Second, we
can distinguish between the semantic value of a question—say, the set of its pos-
sible answers—and the interrogative used to ask it.8 Insofar as scientific research
involves looking for an answer to a ‘why’-interrogative without knowing what the
answer might look like, there is a perfectly good sense in which we do not know what
question we are trying to answer.
1.2 Hempelian Accounts of ‘Why’-Questions
One way to impose order on the space of possible answers of ‘why’-questions is via a
pre-existing account of scientific explanation. The main problem with this approach
to providing an account of ‘why’-questions is that it eliminates the possibility of
learning something novel about explanation. The erotetic (i.e., question-based) ap-
proach to explanation promised to illuminate explanation via a theory of questions.9
It presents an opportunity to understand explanation not merely as a part of sci-
entific practice, but as one of the functions of our common language, a part of the
diverse social practice of jointly coming to grips with the world. But some of the
most prominent accounts of ‘why’-questions build Hempel’s deductive-nomological
theory of scientific explanation into their account of the answerhood conditions for
‘why’-questions. I will discuss the accounts of Bromberger (1992d) and Hintikka
and Halonen (1995) in some detail here. The apparent presupposition of such ac-
counts is not that explanations are answers to ‘why’-questions, but that answers to
‘why’-questions are explanations.10 We first find out what an explanation is, and
then use the right theory of explanation to produce a theory of the semantics of
‘why’-questions.
1.2.1 Sylvain Bromberger’s Account
Bromberger’s goal is to identify a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a
true proposition a to be the answer to the question ‘why b?’, where b is another
true proposition. Now, Bromberger is responsible for the class of examples, typified
by the flagpole and its shadow, that shows Hempel’s deductive-nomological account
of explanation is too permissive.11 But he accepts that the D-N account provides
8‘Interrogative’ is a syntactic classification: see Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), 260ff. and
Harrah (2002), §1.1.
9See Hempel (1965a), van Fraassen (1980), Achinstein (1971, 1983), Salmon (1984b), and Koura
(1988).
10See Hintikka (1976), 24.
11On the standard understanding of this class of examples, they exploit the fact that, given
an equation that counts as a law, filling in values on either side of the equation will permit a
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necessary conditions on answers to ‘why’-questions, and restricts the scope of his ac-
count to exclude plausible counterexamples to its necessity, including ‘why’-questions
about “human acts or intentions or mental states” and ‘why’-questions that receive
answers using what I discuss under the label epistemic ‘because’ in chapter 3.12 The
set of conditions he identifies, then, is intended to strengthen the requirements of
the D-N account in order to yield a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a
restricted class of ‘why’-questions.
He first introduces the notion of a general rule. General rules are lawlike gener-
alizations of the form represented in (1).
(1) (∀x)[(F1x& . . .&Fjx)→ (S1x& . . .&Skx)] where j, k ≥ 1.
(1) looks more complicated than it is: it’s just a first-order representation of the
proposition that there’s some class of objects (the ones with all the F properties)
that have some cluster of properties (namely, S1, . . . , Sk). We can think here of state-
ments like ‘All Ps are Qs’, and I’ll take that as my sample general rule throughout the
next few paragraphs. Bromberger holds that ‘why’-questions arise when a departure
from a general rule occurs. The existence of such a departure means that the general
rule is false: some P isn’t a Q, after all. The departure can only be explained, in
the Hempelian spirit of the account, if we can replace the false general rule with a
true lawlike generalization—i.e., a law—that covers it. Given that the departure is
a departure from the general rule, it must be in the class of objects that the general
rule says something about: in our example, it’s a P. So we are in the market for a
law that says something about the Ps, but draws distinctions between the ones that
have the properties mentioned in the general rule and the ones that don’t.
Bromberger here introduces the notion of an abnormic law.13 An abnormic law
is a true, lawlike generalization that bears a certain relationship to a general rule.
It says that a class of objects mentioned in some general rule—in our example, the
Ps—divides up into more specific, mutually exclusive classes, where the members of
nomological deduction of the other side. But unlike equations, explanation is asymmetric: flagpole
heights explain shadow lengths, but shadow lengths do not explain flagpole heights.
12Bromberger (1992d), 75-76.
13The interested reader may consult Bromberger (1992d), §7 for formal renditions of this and the
other definitions mentioned here in first-order logic. Wi´sniewski (1999) presents a formalization of
an associated procedure for answering ‘why’-questions. Cross and Roelofsen (2014) give a simplified
presentation with a somewhat different focus than the present discussion. For example, their
discussion concludes with counterexamples to the account due to Teller (1974). But as I note
below, Bromberger subsequently revised his account to exclude those counterexamples; I discuss
his theory as it appears in Bromberger (1992d) rather than the original Bromberger (1966). Thanks
to Sylvain Bromberger for discussion here.
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all but one such class lack the cluster of properties mentioned by the general rule.
Sticking with our example, here we can think of ‘All Ps are exactly one of the fol-
lowing: Qs, Rs, Ss, or Ts’.14 The Rs, Ss, and Ts are the sole exceptions to the
norm mentioned in the general rule, so this is an abnormic law. It completes the
general rule. We can answer the question why an object fails to exemplify the suite
of properties mentioned in the general rule by appealing to its membership in one of
the more specific classes of objects that contains exceptions to the general rule: say,
that our P isn’t a Q because it’s an S. Note that its being a P and an S, together
with the abnormic law as described, entails that it is not a Q. So we have a deduction
of the explanandum. Further, the abnormic law is a law. So we have a deductive-
nomological explanation of the explanandum. The heart of the D-N account beats on.
Counterexamples to the D-N account are supposed to be blocked in part via a
restriction on general rules. Let’s try to apply the standard way of constructing
counterexamples to the D-N account to our example. We have a(n abnormic) law
that all Ps are exactly one of the following: Qs, Rs, Ss, or Ts. We explain a given
P’s not being a Q by appealing to its being an S. This accords with the D-N account:
the law together with the fact that our P is an S entails that it’s not a Q. But the
law together with the fact that our P is not a Q does not entail that it’s an S. It
might be an R or a T instead. If we can get rid of the Rs and the Ts, though, we’ll
have a law about a subclass of Ps that are Ss if and only if they aren’t Qs. That
law says that all Ps that aren’t Rs or Ts are either Ss or Qs, but not both. Consider
what this law entails. It entails that, if a non-R, non-T P is an S, it’s not a Q. It also
entails that, if a non-R, non-T P is a non-Q, it’s an S. This is the kind of symmetry
that undermines the D-N account of explanation, and it’s bad news for a theory of
answerhood conditions for ‘why’-questions. For if our non-R, non-T P is a non-Q
because it’s an S, it can’t be an S because it’s a non-Q.
Bromberger argues that he can avoid the counterexamples by imposing a formal
generality condition on general rules.15 Recall from (1) that the class of objects a
general rule is about is identified by a conjunction. General laws are required to be
as general as possible, without making it impossible for non-trivial abnormic laws to
complete them. The law currently causing trouble is that all Ps that aren’t Rs or Ts
14Q, R, S, and T in our example are what Bromberger calls antonymic predicates. An abnormic
law may specify properties that the Rs, Ss, and Ts exemplify instead of exemplifying Q. If it does,
Bromberger calls it a general abnormic law. If it doesn’t, he calls it a specific abnormic law.
15Teller (1974) gives a successful general strategy for turning counterexamples to the D-N ac-
count of explanation into counterexamples to the original version of Bromberger’s theory of ‘why’-
questions; Bromberger (1992d), 92 claims the generality condition has been fixed.
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are either Ss or Qs, but not both. There are only two general rules it can complete:
(i) all Ps that aren’t Rs or Ts are Qs and (ii) all Ps that aren’t Rs or Ts are Ss.
But neither (i) nor (ii) is sufficiently general. We can delete the conjuncts requiring
our Ps not to be Rs or Ts and still have a general rule that can be completed by an
abnormic law. After all, it’s a law that all Ps are exactly one of the following: Qs,
Rs, Ss, or Ts.16 The success of this maneuver, though, seems to depend on our being
lucky in what laws there are.17
Nothing stated so far actually requires general rules. The generality condition, for
example, might just as well have been imposed on abnormic laws themselves. But
the general rule does have a role in the answerhood conditions for ‘why’-questions.
It is required to be such that, were it true, it would be part of a deductive nomo-
logical explanation of some fact incompatible with our actual explanandum. In our
example, the general rule together with the fact that our P is a P entails that our
P is a Q, which is actually false. On Bromberger’s view, the contrast between what
the general rule says and what’s actually the case is what gives rise to ‘why’-questions.
This can make it seem like the class of ‘why’-questions characterized by the ac-
count is even more heavily restricted than the introductory comments suggested. It
provides answerhood conditions only for those ‘why’-questions that ask for an expla-
nation of an exception to a general pattern. If the would-be explanandum conforms
to a general pattern, the ‘why’-question is not to be answered, but rejected.
(2) A: Why does this live oak keep its leaves during the winter?
B: All live oaks do!18
(3) A: Why does this quail bob its head?
B: Because all quails bob their heads.19
Bromberger reads (2) as a rejection of the ‘why’-question: note the lack of ‘because’.20
It is not unnatural to include the ‘because’ in at least some contexts, though. (3)
16Note that the general rule that all Ps are Qs will only count as sufficiently general as long
as we’ve run out of conjuncts to delete. If being a P is really satisfying a conjunction of atomic
formulas, we might be able to keep generalizing.
17It also rules out lots of things that scientists actually treat as laws: see Lange (2000), Ch. 1,
Appendix 2 for examples.
18From Bromberger (1992d), 95.
19After Cartwright (1983), 70, who notes that the answer is “not. . . very explanatory.”
20The question is to be rejected because there is no general rule that can be completed by an
abnormic law that meets the criteria set forth above. So it has no answer, while a presupposition of
any question put forth is that it has an answer. See Belnap (1966), 610, Belnap and Steel (1976),
108-116, and van Fraassen (1980), 140, 144-145 on this presupposition of (‘why’-)questions.
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gives the response one might give a child who is worried that something is wrong
with the bird in question.21 The response implicitly corrects the question, though:
the ‘quail’ bit, not the ‘this’ bit, is to be emphasized. There are two nearby ‘why’-
questions that, even on Bromberger’s account, can be answered.
(4) A: Why does this animal bob its head?
B: Because it’s a quail.
(5) A: Why do quails bob their heads?
B: Because of the following nifty facts about quail anatomy: [insert your
favorite facts about quail anatomy here]
In order to see how Bromberger’s account applies to these questions, it suffices to
imagine general rules like ‘animals don’t bob their heads’ and corresponding abnormic
laws that mention being a quail or having a quailish anatomy as exceptions to the
general rule. As Bromberger says, general rules needn’t “be true or even plausible.”22
So there’s no prospect of the account being too strict to capture the phenomena by
requiring ‘why’-questions to be about something actually surprising.23
1.2.2 The Epistemic Tradition
Hintikka and Halonen (1995) attempt to account for ‘why’-questions within the
epistemic approach to questions inaugurated by A˚qvist (1965).24 Like Bromberger,
they build their theory of the answerhood conditions for ‘why’-questions around a
Hempelian theory of explanation. They claim, however, that the notion of answer-
hood thereby characterized is pragmatic, and adopt a deflationary approach to the
complexity of the semantics of ‘why’-questions. As will be seen, this is an extremely
radical way of imposing order on the semantics of ‘why’-questions.
The semantic account of answerhood for ‘why’-questions favored by Hintikka and
Halonen (1995) centers around the claim that ‘why’-questions are in a certain sense
degenerate. Because it is part of the epistemic tradition, the most basic definitions
necessary for a discussion of the logic of questions must be reformulated in terms of
epistemic logic before that sense can be elucidated. First, the desideratum of a ques-
tion is “the epistemic state of affairs that the questioner would like to have brought
21See Schurz and Lambert (1994), 110-111 for a discussion of this point in the context of a theory
of scientific understanding.
22Bromberger (1992d), 88.
23Cf. Kahneman and Miller (1986), 148-149 on surprise as the source of causal questions.
24Kubin´ski (1980) claims Bolzano and Loeser as forefathers of the approach.
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about (in the normal use of a wh-question).”25 That is, it is the statement that the
individual asking a question knows the information that he set out to get by asking
it. Next, the presupposition of a question is the statement (fronted by a knowledge
operator) that must be true in order for the questioner to be in a position to know
that the question has a correct answer. Hintikka and Halonen (1995) observe that
the presupposition of a question must have been established before the inquirer is
allowed to ask this question.26 A response to a question need only have the proper
form to count as a reply, but it is only an answer if it succeeds in providing the
necessary information to bring about the desideratum. A response can only provide
that information if the questioner is in a position to understand it; Hintikka and
Halonen (1995) formalize this requirement as a conclusiveness condition.
They provide two examples, meant to illustrate these notions as well as the differ-
ence between two types of questions. The first example, (6), is a constituent question,
which asks for the specification of the member of the singleton set {x|Mxr}.
(6) For the question ‘Who murdered Roger Ackroyd?’,
Desideratum I know who murdered Roger Ackroyd.
(Symbolically: ∃xKMxr.)
Presupposition I know Roger Ackroyd was murdered. (K∃xMxr.)
Reply pb murdered Roger Ackroyd.q (KMbr.)
Conclusiveness Condition pI know who b is.q (∃xKb = x.)
In general, constituent questions are queries that can be answered by truthfully fill-
ing in a missing grammatical constituent, which has been replaced in the question
by a wh-word.27 In (6), replies to the question supply the missing grammatical con-
stituent corresponding to ‘who’, as b does in the indicated reply.
The second example, (7), is a propositional question, which is supposed to ask for
the indication of the correct disjunct in its presupposition, rather than querying the
extension of some predicate or relation.
(7) For the question ‘In which continent is Luxembourg?’,
25Hintikka and Halonen (1995), 638.
26Hintikka and Halonen (1995), 639.
27This replacement is part of a syntactic account of the deep structure of questions: “the wh-word
represents, roughly speaking, the queried element that in the syntactical generation of the question
is moved to the beginning of the question from its original position in the clause, leaving a trace
where it originally was” (Hintikka and Halonen (1995), 645).
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Desideratum I know Luxembourg is in Europe, or I know Luxembourg
is in Africa, or I know Luxembourg is in North America, or I know
Luxembourg is in South America, or I know Luxembourg is in Asia,
or I know Luxembourg is in Antarctica, or I know Luxembourg is in
Australia.
(Symbolically: KE` ∨ KF` ∨ KN` ∨ KS` ∨ KA` ∨ KT` ∨ KU`.)28
Presupposition I know Luxembourg is in some continent.
(K(E` ∨ F` ∨N` ∨ S` ∨ A` ∨ T` ∨ U`).)
Reply Luxembourg is in Europe. (KE`.)
Conclusiveness Condition I know where Europe is.
(∃PKP = E.)
The example is perhaps not ideal, as a different first-order translation of each of these
statements could be chosen to render ‘In which continent is Luxembourg?’ itself
a constituent question.29 But the contrast between constituent and propositional
questions is clear in the case of yes-no questions.
(8) For the question ‘Is Luxembourg in Europe?’,
Desideratum I know Luxembourg is in Europe, or I know it is not the
case that Luxembourg is in Europe. (Symbolically: KE` ∨ K ∼ E`, or
KI`e ∨ K ∼ I`e.)
Presupposition I know Luxembourg is either in Europe or not in Europe.
(E.g., K(E`∨ ∼ E`).)
Reply Luxembourg is in Europe. (E.g., KE`.)
Conclusiveness Condition I know where Europe is.
(E.g., ∃xKe = x.)
There is no natural way, absent a truth predicate, to translate the desideratum, pre-
supposition, etc. of (8) into first-order logic such that what is being queried is the
extension of some property or relation.
With these preliminaries in place, the radically deflationary strategy for dealing
with the logical complexity of answerhood for ‘why’-questions favored by Hintikka
28Hintikka and Halonen (1995) do not specify a logical form for the items of knowledge here.
The translation I have chosen prevents us from interpreting (7) as a constituent question, but also
requires a second-order representation of the conclusiveness condition, below.
29For example, translating ‘Luxembourg is in Europe’ as ‘I`e’, the desideratum might be some-
thing like the following: KI`e∨KI`f ∨KI`n∨KI`s∨KI`a∨KI`t∨KI`u. Then the question asks
for the specification of the member of the singleton set {x|I`x}.
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and Halonen (1995) can be stated. ‘Why’-questions, they hold, are simply defective
propositional questions: their desiderata are composed of only one disjunct. Since the
difference between a question’s desideratum and its presupposition is the distribu-
tion of the knowledge operator over the disjunction, desideratum and presupposition
coincide for ‘why’-questions. What must be known in order for a questioner to ask
a why-question is precisely the information for which he is asking. (9) applies this
idea to a schematic why-question.30
(9) For the question pWhy is b P?q,
Desideratum pI know b is P .q (Symbolically: KPb.)
Presupposition pI know b is P .q (Again, KPb.)
Reply∗ pb is P .q (KPb.)
Conclusiveness Condition∗ pI know what b is.q
(∃xKb = x.)
According to Hintikka and Halonen (1995), as long as I know what b is, then pb is
P.q is the answer to my question pWhy is b P?q.
This seems clearly wrong. Hintikka and Halonen (1995) satisfy common sense by
distinguishing between the answer, in their technical sense, and a pragmatic sense of
answerhood that better accords with intuition.
. . . in ordinary usage the notion of answer is used in a logically different
way when it is applied to ‘why’-questions from the way it applies to other
kinds of questions.31
This disjunctive treatment is justified by another difference in presuppositions be-
tween ‘why’-questions and other kinds of questions founded on a rather technical
syntactic difference between them.32 But the logically very different notion of answer-
hood they offer for ‘why’-questions, like Bromberger’s, coincides with the Hempelian
notion of an explanation: “the covering law and/or its initial condition.”33 They em-
ploy Beth tableaux in their formal characterization of what exactly this answerhood
condition amounts to, but since the details don’t actually matter for my purposes, I
30The reply and conclusiveness condition in (9) are included for the sake of completeness; the
asterisks are to draw attention to the peculiarity of the Hintikka and Halonen (1995) account.
31Hintikka and Halonen (1995), 647. Italics theirs.
32Here they rely on Bromberger (1992c), §2.2, which shows that ‘why’, unlike other ‘wh’-
interrogatives, does not bind mid-sentence traces, and so does not have a queried element.




won’t introduce the formalism. I will, however, note that their pragmatic account,
like the semantic one, is a Procrustean bed. Sometimes the answer to a ‘why’-
question is that some potential defeater failed to occur. That is, an inquirer might
know the relevant laws and initial conditions, but fail to know that some background
condition relevant to the application of the laws obtains. Sometimes the answer to
the question why a match lit really is that oxygen was present.
Before leaving the epistemic tradition, Koura (1988) deserves some notice for of-
fering a non-degenerate semantics for ‘why’-questions. Like Hintikka and Halonen,
Koura interprets ‘why’-questions as requests for a particular bit of information. But
he offers a few different accounts of the information requested by ‘why’-questions
about the occurrence of events. By reading the why-question pWhy did e occur?q
as the what-question pWhat caused e?q, he is at least able to generate non-trivial
semantic accounts of ‘why’-questions by plugging in various theories of the causal
relation.34 He gives a similar treatment of ‘why’-questions of the form pWhy did
actor a do action b?q, which he interprets as requests for reasons.35
1.2.3 General Problems with this Approach
The approach taken by Bromberger (1992d) and Hintikka and Halonen (1995) puts
a particular theory of scientific explanation at the center of the meaning of ‘why’-
questions by fiat. But Hempel himself refers to his own notion of explanation as
“abstracted” from a “pragmatic” concept of explanation present in ordinary lan-
guage.36 So it seems unlikely that theories of ‘why’-questions as they exist in ordi-
nary language built on top of a Hempelian account of explanation could be adequate
to the phenomena.37 Nevertheless, the common presupposition of the literature on
explanation is that all genuine explanations “embody in a more or less inchoate way”
the features of scientific ones.38 This is probably something that ought to be left up
to empirical research rather than presupposed. If, for example, what humans do in
providing historical explanations is vastly different from what they do in providing
scientific explanations, then the semantics of ‘why’-questions cannot just be parasitic
34The first involves a necessitation relation (op. cit., §1); the second the connective involved in
counterfactual conditionals (ibid., §2); the third a probability-raising condition (ibid., §3).
35The theory plugged in involves a desire operator, a belief operator, and a necessitation relation
(ibid., §4).
36Hempel (1965a), 425-428.
37Indeed, Halonen and Hintikka (2005) offer a heavily modified view that is not just parasitic on
a Hempelian account of explanation.
38Woodward (2009), §1.
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on a theory of scientific explanation.39 Further, not only does taking this approach
expose the semantic theory to the shortcomings of the theory of explanation, but
it also just abandons the promise of the erotetic approach to explanation. Koura
(1988)’s paint-by-numbers approach, for example, fails, because it does not try, to
provide an illuminating account of ‘why’-questions. But the goal of an erotetic ac-
count of explanation is to learn something about explanation. It is not to massage
a pre-existing theory into an artificially regimented semantics.
1.3 Pragmatic Accounts of ‘Why’-Questions
There is something right about the idea of Hintikka and Halonen (1995) that the
semantics of ‘why’ leaves a lot up to pragmatics. Paul Teller pointed it out decades
ago, in a critical study of Bromberger’s account of ‘why’-questions:
. . . contextual considerations which have not yet been clearly isolated
must be taken into account before we can expect to have an adequate
account of explanation or answers to ‘why’-questions.40
At least since van Fraassen (1980) presented a context-sensitive theory of explana-
tions as answers to ‘why’-questions, the received view among philosophers of science
is that ‘why’ and ‘because’ are context-sensitive.41 Van Fraassen (1980) presents the
main pragmatic account of ‘why’-questions discussed here, and the one relative to
which the present work will be explicitly located, as the questions I am trying to
answer can be stated perspicuously relative to that theory.
1.3.1 Van Fraassen’s Contrastive Account
Van Fraassen provides a framework for a contrastive account of explanation that is as
unobjectionable as it is underspecified. According to van Fraassen (1980)’s account,
a ‘why’-question Q can be identified with a triple 〈Pk, X,R〉, where Pk is the topic of
the question; X, a set {P1, . . . , Pk, . . .} of propositions, is a contrast-class ; and R is a
39The relationship between historical and scientific explanations was once a central concern of
the explanation literature: see, e.g., Dray (1957); Hempel (1965a), §7; Hempel (1965c); and Salmon
(1989), §1.2. Readers familiar with Dray (1957) may think historical explanations have nothing to
do with ‘why’-questions but are rather concerned with ‘how possibly’-questions. No doubt for some
historical explanations that is correct. But we can also ask why historical figures acted as they did,
why certain battles occurred, and so on. It is not obvious that answers to these kinds of questions
should be expected to coincide with scientific explanations, but see, e.g., Hempel (1965a), §10 and
Weber et al. (2005), §4.1.
40Teller (1974), 379.
41In discussing van Fraassen’s treatment of explanations as answers to ‘why’-questions, Salmon
(1989) claims it is simply “obvious that various features of actual explanations depend upon context”
(146). But see Nickel (2010) for some limited dissent.
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relevance relation.42 The question “Why is the shadow 10 feet long?”, for example,
has as topic the proposition expressed by “the shadow is 10 feet long.” A useful way
to think of a contrast-class is as the set of possible answers to a question answered
by the topic. Thus the aforementioned question might have the set of answers to the
question “How long is the shadow?” as contrast-class, namely, the set of those propo-
sitions expressed by “the shadow is 8 feet long”, “the shadow is 9 feet long”, “the
shadow is 10 feet long”, “the shadow is 11 feet long”, etc. Alternatively it might have
the set of answers to the question “What is 10 feet long?” as contrast-class, namely,
the set of those propositions expressed by “the line is 10 feet long”, “the shadow is
10 feet long”, “the tape measure is 10 feet long”, etc.43 The relevance relation is
where the action is: it relates propositions to the pair 〈Pk, X〉, and any proposition
so related is the answer.44 Van Fraassen holds identification of the contrast-class and
the extension of the relevance relation to be contextual matters.45
Van Fraassen says only a little more about contexts or how they fix contrast-classes or
relevance relations. He does require that the canonical form of a ‘because’ sentence
should include an explicit specification of the contrast-class for the explanandum:
proper answers are sentences like ‘φ in contrast to (the rest of) X because ψ’. But
he allows that such answers can be—as, of course, they often are—abbreviated to
‘because ψ’.46 The contrast-class should nevertheless be composed of alternatives
somehow salient in the context, but this is not fleshed out at all. That’s not to say
that it couldn’t be. Sally Haslanger’s (as yet unpublished) work on social struc-
tural explanation, for example, could be thought of as offering (i) an account of
how social structures can fix the contrast-classes operative in shallow explanations
of, e.g., women’s choices to put their careers on hold, while also emphasizing (ii)
that relative to a contrast-class of what would look like more desirable choices in
the absence of prevailing social structures, the prevalence of a social structure itself
can be the answer to a question why a particular decision was made. The relevance
relation varies with contexts because, van Fraassen holds, relevance is pragmatic: it
depends upon such features of a context as “assumptions taken for granted, theories
42On contrastivity in explanation, see Dretske (1972), Schaffer (2005a), and Hitchcock (2013).
43In line with Hamblin (1958)’s first postulate, answers are expressed by full sentences, not mere
noun phrases.
44In his terminology, any proposition so related is the core of a direct answer, where a direct
answer is a proposition that’s true just in case the topic is true, none of the members of its contrast
class are true, and the core is true.
45What is given above is just van Fraassen’s account of what it is for something to be an answer
to a ‘why’-question. He has a further account (see op. cit., §4.4) of what it takes for an answer
to a ‘why’-question to be a good one. Insofar as my interest in this section is in semantics and
pragmatics rather than in philosophy of science, I neglect discussion of the further account.
46See op. cit., §4.3.
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accepted, world-pictures or paradigms adhered to, in that context.”47 Note that
the answerhood conditions for ‘why’-questions are thus sensitive to extra-linguistic
context: the contextual identification of the relevance relation, for example, is sen-
sitive to whether one’s interlocutor is a mechanic or a civic planner.48 He adverts
to a single feature of contexts that determines the relevance relation, which he calls
“the respect-in-which a reason is requested”.49 Without going in for an ontology
of respects in which reasons might be requested, we can at least say that, on van
Fraassen’s view, answerhood conditions are properly understood as relativized to the
interests, background theories, and other contextual idiosyncrasies of conversational
participants.
But none of this makes it into the formalization of the theory that he offers. No
constraints, beyond the definitional ones, are placed on contrast-classes or relevance
relations. Kitcher and Salmon (1987) are thus able to argue with some plausibility
that the theory is basically trivial, since nothing in the formalization prevents the
relevance relation from relating arbitrary propositions.
. . . the lack of any constraints on “relevance” relations allows just about
anything to count as the answer to just about any question.50
The moral is that, unless he imposes some conditions on relevance re-
lations, his theory is committed to the result that almost anything can
explain almost anything.51
As I discuss below, according to van Fraassen, the word ‘because’ communicates
that the relevance relation holds between a ‘why’-question’s topic and its answer.
An investigation into the semantics ‘because’ can, I think, provide some constraints
that would have helped to avoid Kitcher and Salmon’s trivialization charge. This
dissertation is devoted to such an investigation. Making headway will involve de-
parting from van Fraassen’s view of the semantics of ‘because’, but jumping off from
47van Fraassen (1980), 137. Achinstein (2010b) insists that this is not enough for an account
of explanation to be pragmatic, which according to him requires that explanation sentences and
their truth-conditions contain terms for explainers or audiences. This strikes me as insisting upon
importing a pragmatic black box into our semantics. Better if we can isolate the features of
explainers and their audiences that actually matter. Achinstein (2010b), 139 complains that such
maneuvers would ‘trivialize’ the non-pragmatist’s position; I agree that it undermines the debate,
but I see no cause for complaint.
48van Fraassen (1980), 126.
49Ibid., 142. Van Fraassen suggests that the fourfold Aristotelian typology of causes is a crude
typology of the different respects in which one might request an explanation.
50Kitcher and Salmon (1987), 319.
51Ibid., 322.
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his account nevertheless provides a nice way to characterize what I’ll be up to.
1.3.2 An Implementation of van Fraassen’s Account
In order to locate the discussion of ‘because’ as a lexical item relative to van Fraassen’s
view, it will help to provide a concrete implementation of his general description of
truth-conditions for ‘because’ sentences. The envisioned semantics is a context-
sensitive semantics for ‘why’ and ‘because’, insofar as extra-linguistic context is
claimed to supply otherwise underspecified semantic values. In particular, the truth-
values of ‘because’ sentences vary with extra-linguistic context. Several decisions
have to be made in order to implement the idea, but the details of the implemen-
tation to be discussed are not of great importance. The point is to get a plausible
version of the received view on the table. Part of what this dissertation shows is that,
in contrast to the received view, context-sensitivity does not provide the full story
about the semantic behavior of ‘why’ and ‘because’, and that it is necessary to posit,
in addition, some complexity in their lexical entries.52 The chosen implementation
should therefore clearly separate non-lexical sources of context-sensitivity from the
contributions of lexical entries themselves. This is accomplished by representing the
context-sensitive features of ‘why’ and ‘because’ in logical form with free variables
that represent contrast-classes and relevance relations. These free variables are sat-
urated by extra-linguistic context. The contextual saturation of the free variable
representing the relevance relation will be constrained by the lexical entry for either
‘why’ or ‘because’.53 One of the questions pursued below is whether the constraints
on the saturation of that variable are themselves context-invariant. If all of the se-
mantic context-sensitivity of ‘why’ and ‘because’ can be traced to the extra-linguistic
contextual saturation of free variables, then there is no need to posit any complexity
in the corresponding lexical entries.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show what the syntactic trees for a couple of examples might
look like under such an implementation.54 There are three things to notice about
52For those who would prefer to avoid commitment to lexical entries as theoretical entities,
complexity in the lexical entry can be thought of as complexity in the tacit knowledge that language
users must have in order to know what ‘why’ and ‘because’ mean. The latter sort of complexity will
have to be characterized in terms appropriate to tacit knowledge, but there is no reason to think
that this should present any obstacle.
53This implementation incorporates Stanley (2000)’s contention that all truth-conditional effects
of extra-linguistic context are traceable to logical form, but the incorporation is not essential to the
account. I will say more about this below.
54The trees are simplified for consumption by non-syntacticians in a few ways: ‘Adam’ is better
treated as a DP with a null determiner; tense should be represented by a separate element that
















Figure 1.1: Why did Adam eat the apple?
this implementation. The first is the use of Rooth (1992)’s representation of focus in
Figures 1.1 and 1.2: the focus feature F, the focus interpretation operator ∼, and the
set variable P. These are the mechanism by which context supplies contrast-classes:
in particular, P is the contrast-class. The details of Rooth’s treatment are unim-
portant.55 But, crucially, the mechanism by which context supplies contrast-classes
has nothing to do with the semantics of either ‘why’ or ‘because’. Contrast-classes
are supplied by extra-linguistic context, keyed by emphatic stress or focus in the
linguistic material expressing the topic of the why-question or, correspondingly, the
explanandum phrase of the ‘because’ sentence.56 This is precisely analogous to van
Fraassen’s treatment of contrast-classes: he requires the contrast-class to be made
‘Adam ate the apple’ to ‘did Adam eat the apple’ in the derivation of the interrogative of Figure
1.1 is left unrepresented. The simplifications (listed here or otherwise) do not affect the substance
of the present discussion. I am indebted to Ezra Keshet for help with the trees, as well as many
other parts of the present section.
55The focus feature F subscripted on the V in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 is the syntactic counterpart
of the emphatic stress represented with italicization in their captions. (The claimed relationship
between focus and emphatic stress is something like the received view, though it is not entirely
uncontroversial: see, e.g., Xu and Xu (2005) for criticism.) The semantic correlate of the syntactic
focus feature is the so-called focus semantic value. The focus semantic value of the explanandum
phrase of Figure 1.2, denoted J[S Adam [ate]F the apple]Kf , is the set of sentences of the form ‘Adam
X’d the apple’ for some transitive verb X. Oversimplifying, this set looks something like {X(a, b)|X :
E2 → P(W )} where a names Adam, b names the apple, E is the set of entities, W the set of worlds,
and so P(W ) the set of possible worlds propositions. The set variable P is the famed contrast-class,
and the focus interpretation operator ∼ simply requires that P⊆ J[S Adam [ate]F the apple]Kf .
That is, the focus interpretation operator ∼ requires that the contrast-class is a (contextually
supplied) subset of the mechanically generated focus semantic value of the explanandum sentence.
56In Rooth (1992), focus-free phrases receive degenerate focus semantic values. Thus, the imple-




















Figure 1.2: Adam ate the apple because he was hungry.
explicit in the canonical forms of both ‘why’-questions and answers, so that the deno-
tations of ‘why’ and ‘because’ can be given with reference to contrast-classes without
requiring that either word somehow introduces them.57 (Note that one could also
incorporate contrast-classes on the explanans side if so desired, using the same syn-
tactic and semantic machinery.58)
The second thing to notice is the free variable x associated with both ‘why’ and
‘because’: this is the syntactic correlate of the contextually supplied relevance rela-
tion. According to van Fraassen, supplying this variable is almost the whole of the
semantic contribution made by ‘because’:
And finally, there is that word ‘because’: [the ‘because’ sentence] claims
that [the explanans] is a reason.
This fourth point we have awaited with bated breath. Is this not
where the inextricably modal or counterfactual element comes in? But
not at all; in my opinion, the word ‘because’ here signifies only that [the
explanans] is relevant, in this context, to this question. Hence the claim
is merely that [the explanans] bears [the relevance relation] to [the topic
and its contrast-class].59
So the semantic contribution of [Conj because] is something like
57Recall the discussion of the canonical form of ‘because’ sentences above.
58I proposed a version of this incorporation in my masters thesis as a generalization of the causal
contrastivism of Schaffer (2005b). See Hitchcock (2013) for a recent defense of the possibility of
the appearance of contrasts on the explanans side of ‘because’ sentences.
59van Fraassen (1980), 143.
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(10) J[Conj because]K = λzλTλS.z(S,T)
where S and T are of type t. Further,
(11) J[ConjP because x]K = λzλTλS.z(S,T)(x)=λTλS.x(S,T).
If x is a relevance relation, this is again precisely analogous to van Fraassen’s account.
The conjunction phrase ‘because x’ first links up with the sentence expressing the
explanans. It then relates the explanans phrase to the focus phrase. Since the set
variable P in Figure 1.2 just is the contrast-class for the topic, this is but a decur-
rying or descho¨nfinkelization away from relating the explanantia to the ordered pair
of the topic and contrast-class. On this implementation of van Fraassen’s idea, ‘be-
cause’ makes a two-part semantic contribution. First, it introduces the free variable
x, which is contextually saturated as a relevance relation. Second, the lexical entry
for ‘because’ constrains how x can be saturated: according to the quote above, x has
to be a reason.60 A similar story applies to the interrogative word ‘why’ in Figure 1.1.
The third and final thing to notice is that the implementation incorporates the posi-
tion of Stanley (2000) by tracing all sources of truth-conditional context-dependence
to elements of logical form. In particular, it traces the context-dependence of ‘why’-
questions and their answers to free variables in their underlying logical forms that
get assigned contextually supplied values. The semantic questions investigated below
could just as well be framed in terms of lexical constraints on the contextual identifi-
cation of the denotations of ‘why’ and ‘because’, even if there were no free variables
in the relevant logical forms responsible for the context-sensitivity. It could just as
well be framed in terms of lexical constraints on the truth-conditional contributions
of unarticulated constituents analogous to the free variables that the implementation
posits. It could even be framed in terms of lexical constraints on the truth-conditional
contributions of unarticulated constituents not analogous to the free variables that
the implementation posits: maybe instead of the contrast-class being introduced
separately from the semantic contributions of ‘why’ or ‘because’ (as on the present
implementation), those terms instead introduce a two-place relation between propo-
sitions that varies contextually as if it were sensitive to additional relata like van
Fraassen’s contrast-classes and relevance relations.61
60But the question of what it takes to be a reason is apparently just the question of what it takes
to be explanatory: Wesley Salmon, in Salmon (1989) and elsewhere, emphasizes the poverty of the
van Fraassen’s account here.
61To get a sense of the options here, see Perry (1986), which introduces the notion of unarticulated
constituents, and Recanati (2002), which critically discusses the arguments against them in Stanley
(2000).
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Now, van Fraassen (1980) holds that all ‘why’-questions and because-sentences an-
swering them have canonical forms corresponding, under the present implementation,
to logical forms like Figures 1.1 and 1.2. These underlying logical forms are com-
monly supposed to be unambiguous: after all, any structural ambiguities had to be
disambiguated in order to draw the trees, and the terminal nodes are either labels
of lexical entries, contextually saturated free variables, or the unambiguous focus
interpretation operator ∼.62 So it ought to follow either that van Fraassen is wrong
about the canonical forms of ‘why’-questions and their answers, or that the imple-
mentation is mistaken, or that ‘why’ and ‘because’ are unambiguous. Nevertheless,
the alleged labels of lexical entries appearing at terminal nodes in Figures 1.1 and 1.2
are just words.63 If those words are themselves ambiguous, then their ambiguity is
inherited by the logical forms in which they appear. So the identification of allegedly
unambiguous logical forms, i.e., our concrete implementation of van Fraassen’s ac-
count of ‘why’-questions and their answers, does not settle the question of the proper
treatment of ‘why’ and ‘because’ as lexical items. But it does allow for a perspicuous
statement of the research question.
One of the main issues pursued below, which can now be located precisely relative
to the van Fraassenian account, is how the lexical entry (or entries) for ‘why’ and
‘because’ constrain(s) the values that their semantic values can take as arguments.
In the formalism provided by van Fraassen (1980), there is simply no constraint, as
suggested by the adverbs in the quotation above.64 But the implementation repre-
sented in Figure 1.2 does provide some constraint: the node labeled ‘because’ points
to its lexical entry. Per the quotation above, van Fraassen’s informal comments make
clear that the lexical entry for ‘because’ should require that the free variable x be
saturated with a relevance relation. Salmon has emphasized that this is just the
requirement that potential explanantia must be explanatory: whatever other virtues
the account may have, it leaves unspecified what kind of constraints there are on
would-be explanantia.65 But while Salmon has discussed the need to specify what a
62Cf. Stanley (2000), 399.
63Thus Gillon (1990), 401:
It is important to observe that standard linguistic notation is equivocal with respect
to the distinction between expression and syntactic analysis [i.e., logical form]. In
particular, it does not distinguish between words as phonic or graphic expressions, on
the one hand, and words as syntactic labels of terminal nodes of phrase markers, on the
other. While this practice is notationally convenient, it is theoretically misleading. . .
64This fact underlies the trivialization critique of Kitcher and Salmon (1987).
65Salmon (1989). Cf. also Kitcher (1989), §2.2.
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why-question is asking by identifying statistical sample spaces and relevant contrasts,
he neglects to consider whether ‘why’ and ‘because’ themselves require disambigua-
tion or other lexical specification.66 Without getting into the specific architecture of
lexical entries, we can fruitfully investigate whether the constraints on the pragmatic
saturation of the free variable corresponding to van Frasssen’s relevance relations are
the same across all uses of ‘why’ and ‘because’. Perhaps surprisingly, the evidence
to be considered suggests that they are not.
1.4 The Fruits of Inquiry
The theories described above have primarily focused on answerhood conditions for
interrogatives beginning with ‘why’. This study takes a different approach, investi-
gating the semantic contribution of the individual words ‘why’ and ‘because’. It is
not, however, an attempt to revive generative semantics or anything like it.67 It is
just an attempt to get clear on whether and how some of our central explanatory
terminology gets disambiguated, and thereby to make some progress on a theory of
‘why’-questions that can tell us something about explanation.
In the second chapter, I argue that ‘why’ and ‘because’ put additional semantic con-
straints on relevance relations. In particular, they have literal causal senses, as well
as non-literal metaphorical senses. The third chapter shows that apparent further
variations in the meaning of ‘because’ in its so-called epistemic and metalinguistic
uses are illusory. Syntactic differences fully explain the apparent differences in the
meaning of ‘because’ in these uses. One of the consequences here is that theories
of ‘why’-questions should be able to encompass cases that previous theorists have
merely set aside. The fourth and final chapter investigates further the unity of the
causal sense of ‘because’, its relationship to the metaphorical sense, and what, if
anything, this kind of semantic investigation can tell us about explanation. What
it turns out to offer us, I argue, is a new understanding of the centrality of causal
explanation to explanation in general.
66Cf. Salmon (1998b).





Philosophical interest in ‘because’ typically arises from one of two camps: philoso-
phers of science interested in explanation, and metaphysicians interested in ground-
ing relations.1 Many explanations can be characterized as answers to why-questions,
which are paradigmatically answered with ‘because’ clauses.2 So philosophers of sci-
ence have sometimes advanced claims about ‘why’ and ‘because’ in the course of
elaborating claims about explanation.3 Metaphysics, for its part, has recently seen
an explosion of interest in grounding and fundamentality relations, which are picked
out by terms like ‘in virtue of’, ‘due to’, ‘depends on’, ‘because’, ‘because of’, and
‘makes it the case that’.4 Since grounding and fundamentality relations back meta-
physical explanations in much the way causal relations back scientific explanations,
theorists have become interested in the semantics of ‘because’ here, too. In partic-
ular, the question raised by philosophical discussions of ‘because’ is whether or not
it is ambiguous between the causal sense expressed in many scientific explanations
1This paper has benefited enormously from the questions and comments received from audiences
in Ann Arbor, Amsterdam, and Bochum, and in particular from helpful exchanges with Dmitri
Gallow, Ezra Keshet, Eric Lormand, David Manley, Ishani Maitra, Floor Rombout, Charles Sebens,
Frank Veltman, Brian Weatherson, and Henk Zeevat. It would not be what it is without them. It
would not be at all without David Manley.
2‘Many’, because not all: one standard exception is explanations that are better characterized
as answers to other types of questions (cf. Bromberger (1992d), §4), with how-questions (e.g., Cross
(1991)) or even how-possibly-questions (see Dray (1957) and Hempel (1965b), 428-430) sometimes
receiving special emphasis. Another possible exception is why-questions that are answered with ‘in
order to’ clauses, although ‘A φ’d in order to X’ can be rewritten as ‘A φ’d because she wanted to
X’ when A is an agent, and the classic paper Wright (1973) analyzes the ‘in order to’ of teleological
explanations in biology partly in terms of ‘because’. Van Fraassen (1980) somewhat idiosyncratically
insists that all explanations are answers to why-questions, all of which can be given using ‘because’.
3All of the works cited in the previous footnote do this, but Jenkins (2008) and Nickel (2010)
are two recent examples.
4See Fine (2001), Schaffer (2009), and Rosen (2010), as well as the works discussed in Clark and
Liggins (2012) and the many essays in Correia and Schnieder (2012b) and Hoeltje et al. (2013).
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and the sense expressed in metaphysical explanations.5
To the extent that the ambiguity of words in the mental lexicon directly reflects
conceptual distinctions, understanding the meaning of ‘why’ and ‘because’ can help
us understand how we think about explanations, illuminating explanation as a human
practice.6 In particular, the account of ‘why’ and ‘because’ I begin to develop below
opens a semantic window into the structure of our explanatory concepts, bringing
into view the centrality of causal explanation. Despite the failure of univocality, the
causal senses of ‘why’ and ‘because’ are central, and the senses relevant to metaphys-
ical explanations are derivative from the causal senses.7 This yields a novel account
of the relation between causal explanation and explanation in general: causal ex-
planation does not exhaust explanation—pace Salmon (1984a), Lewis (1986a), and
others—but it is nevertheless the paradigm for explanation, a conclusion such philoso-
phers must surely welcome. Though the present paper is more concerned to establish
the semantic facts than to develop the lessons they offer, I will return to this point
at the end.
From a metaphysical perspective, the relationship between causation and grounding
would seem to be independent of our linguistic and conceptual apparatus. Ambigui-
ties and associated conceptual distinctions are not guaranteed to reflect metaphysical
differences, pace a plausible reading of early Wittgenstein.8 Nevertheless, particu-
lar theories of metaphysical explanation incur commitments about the semantics of
‘why’ and ‘because’. For example, if grounding relations are different in kind from
causal relations, the fact (if it is one) that ‘because’ can express explanatory connec-
tions backed by grounding relations itself requires explanation.9 An ambiguity posit,
according to which there are distinct causal and metaphysical senses of ‘because’,
5See Tatzel (2002), §3, Correia (2010), Schnieder (2011), 447-448, Correia and Schnieder (2012a),
§4.2, A. Wilson (2013), 6-7, and Schaffer (2014), 30 but cf. Mulligan (2006), 38 and Fine (2012),
46.
6See the discussion in Johnson (2004) of what he calls ‘the Isomorphism Assumption’ for more on
the relationship between semantic complexity and conceptual complexity. A parallel investigation
might focus on whether ‘explains’ and ‘explanation’ are ambiguous; much of the evidence presented
below with regard to ‘because’ can indeed be reproduced for ‘explains’ and ‘explanation’. Jenkins
(2008) considers ambiguity posits for these terms, but only with respect to ontological category:
see the discussion in §2.2 below.
7This should recall the Aristotelian notion of piρὸς ἓν or focal meaning: see Owen (1960) for the
classic discussion, as well as Irwin (1981).
8See Tractatus, 4.121 and 6.124, and cf. the rejection of any such guarantee at Rayo (2013),
§1.2.2. I discuss the situation here in detail in §4.4.
9Correia and Schnieder (2012a), §4.2 suggests this motivation for philosophical interest in ‘be-
cause’. Cf. the comments on the relationship between the context-sensitivity of ‘because’ claims
and the context-sensitivity of what counts as explanatory information at Nickel (2010), 325, fn. 15.
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could provide that explanation.
Insofar as particular theories of explanation incur commitments about the semantics
of ‘why’ and ‘because’, the semantic facts about ‘why’ and ‘because’ can even help
to adjudicate between particular theories of explanation. For example, if ‘why’ and
‘because’ turn out to be univocal, then all else equal we have reason to prefer a
theory according to which causation and grounding involve a single relation. Thus
the univocality thesis fits most naturally with the claim that grounding is “meta-
physical causation” in A. Wilson (2013) and Schaffer (2014).10 Inversely, if ‘why’
and ‘because’ turn out not to be univocal, as I argue below, then all else equal we
have reason to prefer a theory according to which causation and grounding involve
different relations.11
This paper investigates the causal-explanatory and metaphysical explanatory uses
of ‘because’.12 I hold, contra Bolzano, van Fraassen (1980), A. Wilson (2013), and
Schaffer (2014), that there is a second sense of ‘because’ relating to various grounding
or fundamentality relations and distinct from a causal sense of ‘because’.13 However,
the fact that ‘because’ is not univocal—or, to introduce this paper’s preferred ter-
minology, monosemous—does not mean that ‘because’ is homonymous. That is,
the two senses are not expressed by distinct words that happen to sound and look
alike. ‘Because’, rather, is polysemous. There is a single lexical entry for ‘because’
with some semantic structure that encodes the distinction between the senses. This
suggests a common core to the two meanings, the precise nature of which will be
indicated at the end of this paper and further examined in other work. The semantic
distinctness of the two senses of ‘because’ reflects the way in which speakers’ tacit
10This pairing is not however mandatory. ‘Jade’ is univocal—it means jade—though the two
types of jade, jadeite and nephrite, are rather different materials.
11A lesson reinforced by the semantic underdetermination literature—I am thinking of Putnam
(1980), Kripke (1982), Lewis (1983), Lewis (1984), and related works—is that meaning just ain’t
in the head. Pace skeptics like Kripke’s Wittgenstein, bullet biters like Boghossian, and internal
realists like middle Putnam, the world itself makes a contribution to help fix reference insofar as
some potential referents are more joint-cutting than others. If the most joint-cutting relation cor-
responding to our causal talk is also the most joint-cutting relation corresponding to our grounding
and fundamentality talk, polysemy in our explanatory discourse may amount to a distinction with-
out a difference. But the semantic facts of the matter are not inconsequential to the project of
regimenting that discourse as a step towards finding the joints.
12I use ‘causal-explanatory’ and ‘causal’ interchangeably when referring to the former category
of uses of ‘because’; likewise for ‘metaphysical explanatory’, and ‘metaphysical’ in reference to the
grounding and fundamentality-related uses of ‘because’. The latter category of uses must also be
distinguished from epistemic and metalinguistic uses. I argue elsewhere that these uses are in fact
all causal, with differences between them attributable to syntactic rather than semantic variation.
13Correia and Schnieder (2012b), 22-23 construe Bolzano and van Fraassen (1980) as opponents
to this claim; A. Wilson (2013) and Schaffer (2014) explicitly oppose it.
23
knowledge about ‘because’ has to be extended in order to acquire competence with
its metaphysical uses. For a speaker to know the meaning of ‘because’ as it occurs in
those uses, she has to develop the qualitatively novel tacit knowledge that ‘because’
can be used to express metaphysical explanations.14 The theoretical price of compli-
cating the lexical entry for ‘because’ must be paid here.15
This paper is set up as follows. §2.1 surveys the apparently distinct senses of ‘be-
cause’. §2.2 introduces the theoretical categories of lexical semantics in terms of
which the paper’s claims about ‘because’ will be posed. §2.3 discusses an ambigu-
ity test that exploits the differences between these categories, and §2.4 explores its
results when applied to ‘because’. The next two sections address arguments that
‘because’ is context-sensitive but monosemous (§2.5) and that so-called hybrid ex-
planations provide evidence for the monosemy of ‘because’ (§2.6). §2.7 returns to
the philosophical consequences of the view presented in the body of the paper, and
indicates the work that remains.
2.1 Causal and Metaphysical ‘Because’ Sentences
‘Because’ is etymologically transparent: it comes from the phrase ‘by cause’. It lives
up to its etymology in most of its uses.16
(1) Adam ate the apple because he was hungry.
(2) There’s a table here because we asked for one.
(3) Vixens visit here because rabbits visit here.
(1) expresses something like the claim that Adam’s hunger is a (partial) causal expla-
nation of his eating (rather than juggling, etc.) the apple. The ‘because’ of (1) thus
14In §2.6, slightly more will be said to refine what must be tacitly known to have competence
with this second sense of ‘because’.
15Ambiguity posits are theoretically costly because they predict an increased cognitive burden
on language users: see Bontly (2005). Grice (1989), 47 packaged the theoretical preference for
monosemy in slogan form, proffering a “modified Occam’s razor principle”—“do not multiply
senses beyond necessity”—which Ziff (1960), 44 before him called “Occam’s eraser”. The intu-
ition that neglecting the principle will lead to ‘endless atomisation of meanings’ (Weydt (1973),
576) is widespread, and Putnam (1965) gives a methodological justification for the principle along
these lines. The principle is not, of course, without its critics: see, e.g., Devitt (1997, 2004, 2013)
and Phillips (2012).
16It will become clear that I presuppose that the English word ‘cause’ means roughly efficient
cause. This presupposition is semantically defensible, notwithstanding the broader range of uses of
αἴτιον in ancient Greek. Cf. Vlastos (1969) and Hocutt (1974) on translating αἴτιον into English
as ‘because’ rather than ‘cause’. Thanks to David Manley for emphasizing the need to make this
explicit.
24
expresses a relation of broadly causal dependence. Similar comments apply to the
occurrences of ‘because’ in (2) and (3): the explanantia named in these sentences
are (partial) causal explanations of their explananda, and ‘because’ says so. But
‘because’ can also be used when specifically non-causal dependence relations are at
issue.
(4) The pious is pious because it is loved by the gods.17
(5) ‘Dog’ means dog because dog→animal is valid.18
(6) . . . we are infallible only because we are final.19
(7) There’s a table here because there are simples arranged tablewise here.20
(8) The power set of the integers exists because the power set axiom holds.
(9) Vixens visit here because female foxes visit here.21
(4) can be read as making not a causal claim, but rather a constitutive claim: what
makes the pious pious is that the gods love it. Likewise, (5) can express a commit-
ment of inferential role semantics, to the effect that the word ‘dog’ means what it
means (partly) in virtue of the validity of certain inferences. This commitment of
inferential role semantics is contentious, but the parallel causal claim is just false.
Again, (6) can be read as expressing the claim that the infallibility of the Supreme
Court is grounded in its finality. None of this is to say that (4)–(6) cannot be read
as expressing causal claims—maybe even true ones in the cases of (4) and (6)—but
rather that they can also be read as expressing non-causal dependence claims with
different truth conditions.22 Similar comments apply to (7)–(9).
This paper argues that ‘because’ is ambiguous: the distinction between causal and
grounding explanations is embedded even within our most commonplace explana-
tory idioms. But before the positive argument can be given, more preliminaries are
17Derived from Plato, Euthyphro 10a.
18The antecedent of a conditional at Fodor and Lepore (2002b), 90.
19Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
20Inspired by van Inwagen (1990).
21After Williamson (2007), 48ff.
22Pollock (1998), 251 rephrases (6) in a manner that suggests a causal understanding:
(i) Even if the court is perceived as infallible only because it is final, the perception of infalli-
bility, or something close to it, survives.
(i) construes the dependence relation as holding not between the court’s infallibility and its finality
but rather between perceptions of the former and the latter. Only the first pair of relata are
plausibly constitutively related.
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needed. The next section introduces the classificatory scheme in terms of which the
argument will be made.
2.2 Monosemy, Polysemy, Homonymy
It turns out that only some ambiguous words have multiple senses.23 Others have
doppelga¨ngers. The string of letters b-a-n-k and the corresponding phonological
item, for example, can each be used to articulate multiple words. But there is no
word ‘bank’ that has both a financial institution sense and a riverbank sense. The
two words ‘bank’ and ‘bank’ are merely univocal doppelga¨ngers.24 The plurality of
words articulated by the string b-a-n-k and the corresponding phonological item is
homonymous ; each word ‘bank’ is a homonym of the other word ‘bank’.
‘Healthy’ and ‘book’, however, do have multiple senses. The sense in which healthy
boys are healthy is distinct from the sense in which healthy meals are healthy, and
both of these again are distinct from the sense in which healthy cholesterol levels are
healthy. Likewise, ‘book’ has distinct senses: one for physical objects and one for
abstract texts. The words ‘healthy’ and ‘book’ are thus polysemous or polysemes.
Unambiguous words go by a lot of different names in the literature, but I call them
monosemous or monosemes.25 Monosemes can be extremely specific (‘electron’),
vague (‘glabrous’), or context-sensitive (‘big’).26 To further settle terminology, and
to make it clear that I have in mind lexical items rather than sounds, I call the bear-
ers of the properties of polysemy and monosemy terms, and the bearers of homonymy
23As will become clear, I use ‘ambiguity’ as an umbrella term that covers both polysemy and
homonomy.
24The univocality claim here should be taken with a grain of salt: the word ‘bank’ that has a
financial institution sense is plausibly ambiguous between a sense applying to entire corporations
and a sense applying to individual buildings. But the point is that there is no word that is ambiguous
between the financial institution sense of one word ‘bank’ and the riverbank sense of another word
‘bank’.
25Terminology here is messy. In addition to ‘monosemy’, preferred by Ruhl (1989), Sennet (2011)
uses ‘sense-general’; Lakoff (1970) and Tuggy (1993) (as usual in the cognitive linguistics literature,
though perversely relative to standard philosophical usage) ‘vague’. Zwicky and Sadock (1975)
report in addition ‘generality’, ‘indeterminacy’, ‘nondetermination’, ‘indefiniteness of reference’,
and further proffer ‘neutrality’, ‘unmarkedness’, and ‘lack of specification’. The messiness is such
that this extensive list fails to be exhaustive of the terminological idiosyncrasies even of the limited
selection of works cited in this paper. Moreover, some theorists use some of these labels to mark
subdivisions of monosemy: thus Falkum (2011) distinguishes ‘indeterminacy of meaning’ from ‘lack
of specification’.
26Thus my preference for ‘monosemous’ over several of the alternatives. Thanks to David Manley
for emphasizing the potential for misunderstanding of labels like ‘general’.
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pluralities of terms.27 I call the graphemic/phonetic objects that homonymous plu-
ralities of words have in common expressions, and I call them ambiguous when they
articulate polysemes or homonyms.28
A term is polysemous just in case it can literally express different, intuitively related
meanings in different contexts. A plurality of terms is homonymous just in case the
terms are homographic homophones that literally express different, intuitively un-
related meanings. (Intuitions of relatedness may seem theoretically suspect, though
brain imaging studies have been suggested to support the legitimacy of the distinc-
tion.29) So a term is monosemous just in case it expresses a single meaning across
the full range of its literal uses. This suffices to characterize monosemy tout court,
although monosemy with respect to individual features can also be defined. Terms
have the latter property with respect to features relative to which their meanings are
non-specific. In denotational terms, for a term to be monosemous with respect to
some feature is for its denotation to include members, relate relata, etc. regardless
of their status with respect to that feature. Thus when Jenkins (2008) opines that
‘explanation’ is ‘semantically general’ with respect to ontological category, what she
means is that facts, objects, and members of other ontological categories can be
explanations in precisely the same sense.30 So far as the meaning (or meanings)—
contextually determined or otherwise—of ‘explanation’ goes, ontological category is
irrelevant.
The following examples help illustrate the distinction between monosemy and poly-
semy.
27Sennet (2011), n. 2 observes that calling the carriers of these properties “words” (as he does)
is “philosophically somewhat suspect” but does not pursue the point. Bromberger (2012) explores
the question of the entities that can be monosemous or polysemous, favoring the view that it is
sounds which can be thus or so. It is good to be able to say, in the case of homonymy, that a single
thing actually serves as more than one word. Bromberger approximates this result in his analysis
by allowing that two sound-content pairs can be homonymous if both pairs include the same sound
element.
28My usage can be contrasted with that of John Lyons. My ‘terms’ are roughly his ‘lexemes’,
while my ‘expressions’ are his ‘forms’. He reserves ‘expression’ for the object underlying different
morphological realizations of the same term/lexeme. Cf. Lyons (1977), §1.5.
29Pylkka¨nen et al. (2006), a study by a group of NYU neurolinguists, uncovered distinct latency
effects in semantic priming experiments with homonyms and polysemes, by studying the timing of
the M350, a distinctive, MEG-measurable brain wave pattern thought to reflect lexical activation
that typically occurs around 350ms after visual exposure to a word. If the distinction between
polysemy and homonymy is legitimate, there should also be evidence involving related signals such
as the N400, an EEG-measurable brain wave pattern that is correlated with violations of lexical-level
semantic expectations, and indeed Klepousniotou et al. (2012) present such evidence.
30Cf. op. cit., 65.
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(10) Our philosophy teacher is on paternity leave.31
(11) This book is (musty / popular).
The usual illustrative example of a monosemous term is ‘teacher’. Sex is not specified
in the lexical entry for ‘teacher’, though the occurrence of ‘paternity’ in (10) requires
that the teacher referred to be male.32 (This is indeed obvious; monosemy is just a
foil for polysemy and homonymy.) So ‘teacher’ is monosemous with respect to sex.33
In fact, ‘teacher’ is monosemous tout court. But in (11) the occurrence of ‘musty’
would select the physical object sense of ‘book’, while the occurrence of ‘popular’
would select the abstract text sense of ‘book’.34
There are a number of tests for ambiguity that exploit the features of polysemy
and homonymy discussed above. The next section introduces one of these tests and
discusses its application to ‘because’.
2.3 Testing for Polysemy
The test on which this section focuses is Conjunction Reduction.
(12) Conjunction Reduction If an expression is ambiguous, a reduced con-
junction containing it can be constructed so that crossed readings are ruled
31Adapted from Cruse (1995), 33.
32The example allows us to see the inadequacy of another characterization of monosemy. The
idea of Roberts (1984) is that monosemous terms have disjunctive meanings. The distinction
between monosemy and ambiguity, on Roberts’s view, is just the scope of a disjunction: monosemes
have disjunctive meanings, while ambiguous expressions bring into play multiple meanings, each of
which is a candidate for contribution to the correct interpretation. But it is unclear how precisely
the scopal ambiguity is to be understood; Roberts seems to be committed to a meaning-forming
operator, a (potentially sub-)lexemic content stroke, that can interact scopally with a (presumably
unambiguous) disjunction operator. But consider the case of ‘teacher’, which is monosemous with
respect to gender. This does not mean that ‘teacher’ expresses the disjunctive sense male teacher or
female teacher, but that it expresses the atomic, non-disjunctive, gender-neutral sense teacher. Male
teachers and female teachers are (obviously) both teachers in precisely the same sense. Roberts’s
disjunctive analysis gets this fact right only extensionally. So it is not a plausible account of the
meanings of monosemes. (See the exchange across Roberts (1984), Zwicky and Sadock (1987),
and Roberts (1989) for discussion of a criticism of Roberts’s characterization distinct from that
suggested here.)
33Note that monosemy need not be preserved across languages; French ‘maˆıtre’ and ‘maˆıtresse’
are not monosemous with respect to sex. Thanks to Ezra Keshet for the example.
34Selection by context is a complex phenomenon. Presumably a feature of the meaning of the ad-
jective ‘musty’ requires the nouns it modifies to denote physical objects—something along the lines
of what linguists, following Katz and Fodor (1963), call a selectional restriction. But the adjective
‘popular’ presumably lacks a comparable mechanism that enforces its selection of the abstract text
sense of ‘book’. In that case, world knowledge mediates our recognition of the contextually selected
meaning.
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out (or heard as sylleptic).35
There are three new technical terms to be explained in the definition of this test. A
reduced conjunction is a conjunction that results from deleting repeated words (and
making the resulting sentence grammatical, e.g., by ensuring subject-verb agree-
ment).36
(13) The sky is light and the dumbbell is light.
(14) The sky and the dumbbell are light.
The reduced conjunction in (14) is formed by deleting the first occurrence of ‘is light’
and restoring subject-verb agreement. I will call the expressions deleted in order to
form a reduced conjunction (e.g., ‘is light’) the reduced material. A crossed read-
ing of a reduced conjunction is an understanding on which the reduced material is
interpreted differently for each conjunct. (13) is likely to be interpreted as saying
that the sky is light in color and the dumbbell is not heavy. (It might also be inter-
preted as saying that both are light in color. And to hear it as saying that neither
is heavy, imagine a conversation among the gods.) But (14) lacks the corresponding
crossed reading.37 Note that Conjunction Reduction does allow punning: it is
not evidence of monosemy if crossed readings are available as puns or plays on the
multiple meanings of the reduced material. The crossed reading of (14) is available if
the sentence is heard as sylleptic, i.e., as this kind of pun.38 The explanation for the
punniness is that the expression ‘light’ has no core meaning that allows both color-
and weight-related uses.39
Compare the behavior of the homonyms in (13) and (14) with the behavior of a
35Apresjan (1974), §1.1.6 gestures at this test. Zwicky and Sadock (1975), 21ff. is the canonical
discussion. While I take Conjunction Reduction to be a test for lexical ambiguity in general
(which includes, on my usage, polysemy), Kempson (1980), 8-9 implicitly and Fodor and Lep-
ore (2002b), 107, fn. 17 explicitly claim it to be a test specifically for homonymy, though Tuggy
(1993), §3.4.4 correctly notes that the clearly polysemous term ‘paint’ allows for sylleptic pun-
ning, and Lascarides et al. (1996) provide a formalization of pragmatic discourse principles that
predicts/explains sylleptic punning with both homonyms and polysemes via the same mechanism.
Cappelen and Lepore (2005), 99-104 take a version of Conjunction Reduction that they call
“the Collective Descriptions Test” to be a test for context-sensitivity. I discuss a worry about
interference from the context-sensitivity of ‘because’ below.
36Chomsky (1957), 35-36 noted that such reduction is in general possible where constituents are
of the same type.
37Typically, acceptability judgments and judgments about how sentences can be read constitute
our data: see Ludlow (2011), §3.1.
38Pace Roberts (1989) and Ludlow (2011), syllepsis itself sometimes seems to be accessible to
direct intuition.
39Cruse (1986), 62 discusses a similar example and makes much the same point.
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polyseme like ‘healthy’.
(15) This meal is healthy and this urine is healthy.
(16) ??This meal and this urine are healthy.
(17) ??This meal is healthy, and so is this urine.
(15) says that the meal is conducive to health and the urine is reflective of it. If (16)
is to be understood, it must be understood this way, too. But accessing the crossed
reading has the phenomenology of hearing a pun. Analogous comments apply to
(17), which replaces deleted material with the pro-form ‘so’.40 While (16) and (17)
are punny, their crossed readings are not as inaccessible, or as strikingly punny, as
the crossed reading for (14). This is how polysemes behave in reduced conjunctions,
and I argue below that ‘because’ behaves the same way.
An interpretation of a sentence can involve only one meaning of any given expression
for each of its occurrences in the sentence.41 So the process of conjunction reduc-
tion eliminates crossed readings just in case the crossed readings of the unreduced
conjunctions depend on the availability of multiple occurrences of the target expres-
sion.42 The preceding sentence is a biconditional, though Conjunction Reduc-
tion as stated is a conditional. The weaker, merely conditional statement of the test
makes room for other sources of differences in meaning, namely, context-sensitivity.
§2.5 argues that context-sensitivity is a worse explanation of the data than polysemy.
Before applying Conjunction Reduction to the case of ‘because’, another type
of test for ambiguity deserves at least some comment. Cross-linguistic evidence, and
in particular how to translate various ‘because’ sentences into other languages, is
40Variants of Conjunction Reduction based on replacing repeated verb phrases with appro-
priate pro-forms like ‘so’ or ‘neither’ follow Lakoff (1970).
41Cf. Lascarides et al. (1996), §2.1. See also Cruse (1986), 61-62, on the “antagonism” of distinct
senses.
42The source of this dependence in the case of distinct lexical entries is that reduced conjunctions
have logical forms with one pointer to what Adger (2003), §4.6 calls the Conceptual-Intentional
System, i.e., with one pointer to the lexicon, so that only a single meaning can be accessed. If, in
the case of polysemous terms, logical form is understood to include a pointer to the entry for the term
without specifying which sense is being used, some pragmatic account of the correct identification
of that sense is necessary. Lascarides et al. (1996) offer such an account of the absence of crossed
readings. But for all that has so far been said, logical forms may well turn out to include pointers
directly to individual senses of polysemous terms. In that case, the explanation of the absence of
crossed readings in cases of polysemy would be identical to the explanation of the absence of crossed
readings in cases of homonymy.
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sometimes thought to be essential for ambiguity claims.43 While linguists have not
to my knowledge explored the translational facts about causal-explanatory versus
metaphysical explanatory uses of ‘because’—they have instead focused on distinc-
tions between causal and epistemic uses that I discuss elsewhere—in many of the
cases I will discuss, metaphysical uses of ‘because’ must be rendered in Dutch as
‘omdat’ rather than ‘doordat’.44 But making progress on cross-linguistic lines will
require more fine-grained data from native speakers of the relevant languages, and
plenty can be learned from Conjunction Reduction alone.
Note that the position that ‘because’ is homonymous, as opposed to merely polyse-
mous, is to my knowledge unwitnessed in the literature. The philosophy literature
is replete with unified accounts of explanation, why-questions, and ‘because’ clauses,
and includes argumentation that satisfactory accounts of explanation have to be fully
general.45 Very recent work even argues that grounding relations, the sorts of rela-
tions picked out by the second sense of ‘because’, just are causal relations.46 So I set
the thesis that ‘because’ is homonymous—that it expresses distinct and unrelated
senses—aside, and argue that ‘because’ is polysemous.
2.4 Applying Conjunction Reduction to ‘Because’
Suppose you were interested, for whatever reason, in both the causal history and
the non-causal or constitutive dependence facts about certain explananda. (Perhaps
you are trying to emphasize how explanation outruns information about the causal
history of explananda.) There is no syntactic obstacle to conjoining ‘because’ clauses
describing dependences of each type, in order to achieve some (albeit minimal) econ-
omy of language.
(18) There’s a table here because we asked for one and because there are simples
arranged tablewise here.
43Kripke (1977) is the source for these tests in the philosophical literature. Though Jason Stanley
(2004, 2005) claims that translational evidence is the only possible linguistic ground for ambiguity
claims, cross-linguistic evidence is just one piece of the puzzle.
44Thanks to Floor Rombout, my Dutch informant. Pit (2003) claims that ‘doordat’ prefers non-
agential causes, whereas its hypernym ‘omdat’ allows both non-agential and agential causes, but
equivalents of metaphysical explanatory uses of ‘because’ are not on her radar. The Dutch data are
intriguing, but further research would be required to shed light on the question of interest here.
45Replete: Hempel (1965b), van Fraassen (1980), Salmon (1984a), Kitcher (1989), Sweetser
(1990), Bromberger (1992a), Hintikka and Halonen (1995), Strevens (2008). Argumentation: Nickel
(2010). Cf. Woodward (2009), §6.3.
46See A. Wilson (2013) and Schaffer (2014).
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(19) Vixens visit here because rabbits visit here and because female foxes visit
here.
(18) and (19) admit causal, metaphysical, and crossed readings of their ‘because’
clauses. By ‘crossed readings’ here, I mean readings in which one conjunct is read
causally and the other is not. However, when the second occurrence of ‘because’ is
deleted, yielding the reduced conjunctions below, the crossed readings disappear.
(20) There’s a table here because we asked for one and ??there are simples ar-
ranged tablewise here.
(21) Vixens visit here because rabbits visit here and ??female foxes visit here.
Since both of the non-crossed readings of these reduced conjunctions are false, the
sentences are unacceptable. Since (18)-(20) and (19)-(21) are minimal pairs, the
difference in acceptability between them can only be attributed to the deletion of
the second ‘because’ in the pre-reduction conjunctions. The remaining occurrence
of ‘because’ in each of the latter group of sentences apparently cannot bear the se-
mantic weight needed to allow crossed readings. This is evidence of the ambiguity
of ‘because’, according to Conjunction Reduction.47
Despite its utility, Conjunction Reduction has been virtually ignored in the
philosophical literature on ‘because’ and related terms like ‘explanation’. Almost
the only reduced conjunction discussed in the literature, to my knowledge, is (22),
which is introduced as prima facie evidence against the hypothesis that ‘because’ is
monosemous with respect to ontological category.48
(22) One explanation of the car crash is the broken steering wheel and another
is the fact that the driver was drunk.49
47One obvious worry is that this claim affirms the consequent: Conjunction Reduction says
roughly that if an expression is ambiguous, then crossed readings of it are eliminated under re-
duction, not that if crossed readings of an expression are eliminated under reduction, then it is
ambiguous. But Conjunction Reduction does point us toward ambiguity as an explanation of
the elimination of crossed readings. In §2.5 below, I rule out context-sensitivity, the main potential
confounding factor, and that leaves ambiguity as the best explanation of the facts discussed in this
section.
48The only other reduced conjunction in the literature is (i).
(i) #(?)One explanation of the car crash is the broken steering wheel and another is the fact
that the steering wheel is broken.
As Jenkins (2008), 65 notes, its oddness can easily be explained away by its redundancy, so it is of
no evidential value.
49Suggested at Jenkins (2008), 65.
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If there were distinct senses of ‘explanation’, one of which applied to facts, the other
of which applied to objects, crossed readings of (22) would be eliminated, and the
sentence would be odd. That it is not odd shows, not that ‘explanation’ is unam-
biguous, but that the joints of its meaning do not lie here.50
Note that the minimal pairs (18)–(20) and (19)–(21) do not only provide evidence,
via Conjunction Reduction, that ‘because’ is ambiguous. They also rule out,
via Conjunction Reduction, the hypothesis that any ambiguity in these sen-
tences is in the explanandum phrase. For (18)–(19) are already reduced versions of
conjunctions like (23).
(23) Vixens visit here because rabbits visit here and vixens visit here because
female foxes visit here.
The fact that no readings are lost in moving from (23) to (19)—that is, no readings
are lost in deleting a second occurrence of ‘vixens visit here’—shows that there is
no need to disambiguate between the explananda of causal ‘because’ clauses and the
explananda of metaphysical ‘because’ clauses.51
Crossed readings are also eliminated, yielding further evidence of the ambiguity of
‘because’, when it is explananda rather than explanantia that are conjoined.
(24) Reynards visit here because female foxes visit here and vixens visit here
because female foxes visit here.
(25) ??Reynards visit here and vixens visit here because female foxes visit here.
Crossed readings are lost in the move from (24) to (25), as predicted by the ambi-
guity hypothesis. So it appears to make no difference to the judgments relevant for
50Analogous comments apply to most of the examples discussed in Nickel (2010), such as (i), in
the course of his arguments that the meaning of ‘because’ does not vary across scientific domains.
(i) The conductor warped because a strong current passed through it and because it was in the
Earth’s magnetic field.
(i) is partially reduced such that the explanandum phrase ‘the conductor warped’ occurs once, but
‘because’ occurs twice, as in (18)–(19) above. There are thus two reasons why Nickel does not
uncover the ambiguity of ‘because’: he is looking mostly in the wrong places, and he does not
reduce conjunctions like (i) far enough.
51Cf. Ylikoski (2013), §1, where it is claimed that ‘why’ questions have systematically ambiguous
explananda. The distinction Ylikoski identifies—between the causal question how a vase became
fragile and the metaphysical question what makes it fragile—is not a difference in explananda at
all. In both cases, the explanandum is that the vase is fragile. What differs, on my view, is the
sense of ‘why’ involved in the question asked about that shared explanandum.
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the application of Conjunction Reduction whether the reduction occurs on the
explanandum- or explanans-side of ‘because’ sentences.
The possibility of applying Conjunction Reduction to sentences with conjoined
explananda allows us to test whether the ‘because’ of mathematical explanation is
the causal ‘because’.52 First, we need a true sentence that uses a causal ‘because’
with a mathematical explanans.
(26) Jon is happy because the power set axiom holds.
I like the power set axiom, so we can imagine easily enough a context in which (26)
is true on a causal reading of its ‘because’. We can combine (26) with (8) and use
Conjunction Reduction to test for ambiguity.
(27) Jon is happy because the power set axiom holds and the power set of the
integers exists because the power set axiom holds.
(28) ??Jon is happy and the power set of the integers exists because the power
set axiom holds.
The absence of an accessible crossed reading of (28) is evidence that the ‘because’
of mathematical explanation is not the causal ‘because’. In fact, the ‘because’ of
mathematical explanation is just the ‘because’ of (4)–(9), etc.53
The discussion so far has concerned rather lengthy and unusual sentences, about
which somewhat delicate judgments have been reported. Fortunately, there are two
additional sources of data. Both cardinal determiners and examples from sports
contexts yield much more natural test sentences and clearer judgments.54 Suppose
52Open question: can purported explanations of mathematical theorems that use physical princi-
ples on the explanans side be expressed by ‘because’ sentences? See Skow (2013a). If so, what does
Conjunction Reduction say about reduced conjunctions with conjoined explanantia involving
them?
53I argue for this at greater length in other work, but applying Conjunction Reduction here
is not trivial.
(i) There’s a table here because the power set axiom holds.
The reader is invited to enumerate the acceptable readings of (i) as a first step; for my part I can only
make sense of the sentence as introducing a partial causal explanation that backgrounds a bizarrely
motivated carpenter. Readers who can recover, in spite of its obvious falsity, a metaphysical reading
of (i) will be able to apply Conjunction Reduction in the now familiar manner to draw their
own conclusions.
54Ideally, the examples would be witnessed in corpora. There are a number of witnessed examples
concerning what it takes for something to be a foul that can be used to make the same point, but
setting up the examples takes too much space to present them here.
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the local facilities management team brings in a chair whenever there are simples
arranged tablewise in a room. Then (29) will be true on both readings of ‘because’.
On the causal reading, the sentence is true because of the chair. On the metaphysical
reading, it’s true because of the table materially constituted by the simples.
(29) There’s a piece of furniture here because there are simples arranged tablewise
here.
(30) #There are two pieces of furniture here because there are simples arranged
tablewise here.
But (30) doesn’t allow a reading on which one piece of furniture’s being there is
explained causally and the other piece of furniture’s being there is explained meta-
physically.55 While (30) is not a reduced conjunction—it is not a conjunction at
all—it lacks this kind of mixed reading for precisely the same reason that reduced
conjunctions targeting ambiguous terms lack crossed readings. There is only one oc-
currence of the target term to be interpreted. This, too, is evidence of the ambiguity
of ‘because’.
Moving to sports contexts, the application of rules to determine the winner of a
contest lends itself to unambiguous ‘because’ sentences, in which the linguistic con-
text forces ‘because’ to take on a single reading.
(31) Germany beat Portugal because Pepe got a red card.
(32) Germany beat Portugal because they scored four more goals.
(33) Germany beat Portugal because they scored four more goals and because
Pepe got a red card.
(34) Germany beat Portugal because they scored four more goals and ??Pepe got
a red card.
Imagine a speaker uttering (32) in an attempt to disagree with another speaker’s
previous utterance of (31). A bystander might then attempt to clear the air by
uttering (33), but (34) sounds bad even in that context. So again we have evidence
that ‘because’ is polysemous, having two distinct explanatory senses.56
55Thanks to Brian Weatherson and Henk Zeevat for the idea here.
56Though there is not space to discuss it here, the same polysemy appears in ‘why’:
(i) ?#Why there’s a table here is that we asked for one and there are simples arranged table-
wise here.
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2.5 A Worry for Conjunction Reduction
The evidential import of the preceding discussion is predicated on the claim that
polysemy is the best explanation for the elimination of crossed readings in reduced
conjunctions. But Conjunction Reduction is stated as a conditional for a rea-
son: context-sensitivity can confound it as a test for ambiguity. And ‘because’ is
clearly context-sensitive. So the oddness of the reduced conjunctions and other ex-
amples discussed above—what was claimed to be evidence for the view that ‘because’
is polysemous—may just be a symptom of context-sensitivity.57
Consider how the financial sense of the context-sensitive adjective ‘rich’ behaves
in reduced conjunctions.
(35) Jane Smith is rich and Bill Gates is rich.
(36) Jane Smith and Bill Gates are rich.
An utterance of (35) might mean that Jane Smith is rich for a human (say, because
she lives in the United States) and Bill Gates is rich for an American.58 Call this
interpretation the crossed reading. Alternatively, it can mean that both are rich
relative to some single standard. If you don’t think (36) lacks the crossed reading,
you should be ready to endorse the polysemy thesis for ‘because’: context-sensitivity
doesn’t confound Conjunction Reduction for you. But if, on the other hand,
you think (36) lacks the crossed reading, then it only has the alternative reading on
which both Jane Smith and Bill Gates are rich relative to a single standard. Ac-
cording to Conjunction Reduction as it has been invoked above, this should
be evidence for the ambiguity of ‘rich’. But if that were right, then ‘rich’ would be
infinitely ambiguous, as it loses crossed readings involving richness for humans and
richness for Americans, as well as richness for 1%ers, richness for citizens of Detroit,
and so on ad infinitem. Since positing infinitely many senses of words like ‘rich’ is too
theoretically costly, we should prefer a treatment in terms of context-sensitivity.59
(ii) ?#Why vixens visit here is that there are rabbits here and female foxes visit here.
(iii) ?#Why Germany beat Portugal is that they scored four more goals and Pepe got a red
card.
57Other tests for polysemy cannot just be wheeled in to settle the issue here, because context-
sensitivity also confounds tests other than Conjunction Reduction: see Gillon (1990), 408-409
for an illustration of how to confound tests based on truth-conditional differences between senses
of ambiguous expressions.
58Cappelen and Lepore (2005) deny that (35) can have this meaning, though it is hoped that
most readers will discern it.
59See fn. 15 above.
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On that sort of treatment, a speaker only needs to learn a single meaning for ‘rich’,
which comes equipped with a mechanism for being modulated by a context’s opera-
tive standard (e.g., a variable that ranges over contrast-classes like the set of humans,
the set of Americans, the set of 1%ers, etc., or a variable that ranges over numbers
on a scale of monetary values that must be exceeded for something to count as rich
in the context). But if context-sensitivity can explain the loss of crossed-readings in
the case of ‘rich’, the worry goes, likewise in the case of ‘because’: the oddness of
the reduced conjunctions in §2.4 was not evidence of ambiguity after all.
The worry is right about one thing: Conjunction Reduction can be confounded
by context-sensitivity. But there are a variety of ways of fleshing out a context-
sensitivity semantics for ‘because’, and none of them explains the data better than
the polysemy thesis. Before we look at a couple of those ways, note that ‘because’ is
not precisely analogous to ‘rich’. In particular, while the gradability of ‘rich’ allows
arbitrarily lax contextual standards, counting as rich things as poor as you like, and
yielding true readings even of sentences like (36), there is no general sense of ‘be-
cause’ to which we can retreat when both causal and metaphysical explanantia of
a single explanandum are given in a reduced conjunction. There is simply no way
to hear the sentence ‘the table and the chair are here because simples are arranged
tablewise here’ as true (and non-punny). There is no general sense of ‘because’ that
applies regardless of causal status.60
Still, we can consider the following monosemous but context-sensitive account of
‘because’. Let us suppose that ‘because’ picks out different specific dependence re-
lations in different contexts. By ‘specific dependence relation’, I mean not only any
broadly causal relation suitable for backing causal explanations, but also any of the
variety of non-causal dependence relations appropriately characterized as ground-
ing or fundamentality relations and suitable for backing metaphysical explanations.
(Suppose for now that there is not a single grounding relation backing metaphys-
ical explanations; the other kind of context-sensitivity account, which we consider
below, will cover the case that there is just a single grounding relation.) To learn
the meaning of ‘because’, on this account, all that a speaker has to learn is that it
picks out different specific dependence relations. That there is no general sense of
‘because’ that covers both causal and non-causal relations is thus not evidence of
ambiguity as against this kind of account, which posits many specific, contextually
determined meanings for ‘ because’. But this kind of account has a serious problem:
60In the next section, I explain why allegedly ‘hybrid’ explanations involving both causal and
grounding links can be covered by the sense of ‘because’ at issue in its metaphysical uses.
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it overgenerates predictions of badness in reduced conjunctions.
Consider the metaphysical explanations in (37) and (38).
(37) This figure has a shape because it is a regular quadrilateral.
(38) This figure is a square because it is a regular quadrilateral.
The explanation in (37) is backed by the determinate/determinable relation: regular
quadrilaterality is a determinate of the determinable shapedness. But the expla-
nation in (38) is backed by the genus/species relation: being in the species square
just is being in the genus quadrilateral and having the differentia regularity. So
different specific dependence relations are involved in (37) and (38).61 But (39) is
acceptable.62
(39) This figure has a shape and this figure is a square because it is a regular
quadrilateral.
The present context-sensitive account of ‘because’ cannot accommodate the accept-
ability of (39). This set of facts can be reproduced for other specific dependence
relations, too.
(40) Holes in blocks of cheese and singletons of blocks of cheese both exist because
blocks of cheese exist.
Holes in blocks of cheese are feature dependent on blocks of cheese, while singletons
of blocks of cheese are constituent dependent on blocks of cheese.63 So the sentence
should be bad on the context-sensitivity theory we have been discussing, since feature
dependence and constituent dependence are different relations. But (40) is fine.64
61See Rosen (2010), §11 for more on the difference between the relations.
62The sentence as written is a bit stilted; (i) sounds more natural.
(i) This figure has a shape and is a square because it is a regular quadrilateral.
I retain (39) in the body to conform with the usual syntactic procedure for conjunction reductions
targeting ‘because’.
63See Koslicki (2012) for the distinction.
64The context-sensitivity theorist might object here that I am relying on examples with con-
joined explananda to the exclusion of examples with conjoined explanantia. I have relied on that
limited diet of examples because different specific dependence relations tend to back metaphysical
explanations of disjoint sets of explananda. Equivocation on the explanandum must be carefully
avoided. The context-sensitivity theorist thus needs examples of a very particular sort. The fully
reduced conjunctions in which ‘because’ occurs only once should be unacceptable, but the partially
reduced conjunctions that include a second occurrence of ‘because’ should be acceptable. (Recall
the discussion of (18)-(20) and (19)-(21) above.)
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This account’s overgeneration of unacceptability predictions is not essential to context-
sensitivity theories as such.65 Let us consider a second fleshing out of a context-
sensitive, monosemous account of ‘because’, one that says that the range of available
senses of ‘because’ is restricted to the distinct senses posited by the polysemy account.
This account will match the polysemy account’s predictions about the distribution
of crossed readings exactly. So there will be no empirical difference between the
accounts.
This kind of context-sensitivity account may seem to have the theoretical advantage
of simplicity, since it purports to avoid complicating the lexicon. But it actually
requires that the lexicon reflect that ‘because’ comes with a parameter that can take
one of only two values. If context-sensitivity that admits such a heavily restricted
range of meanings is to be preferred to polysemy here, context-sensitivity presumably
ought to supersede polysemy everywhere. ‘Healthy’, ‘paper’, and all other putative
polysemes could just as well be treated as context-sensitive terms ranging over just
the meanings posited by the standard polysemy accounts. But this is to wheel in
heavy machinery where elbow grease will do. In general, we only fall back to context-
sensitivity accounts when polysemy accounts become too cumbersome by positing
too many senses for it to be plausible that they are individually encoded. To prefer
the context-sensitivity account here is to prefer an existential quantifier that ranges
over a domain of two to a disjunction. The burden is on the context-sensitivity the-
orist to explain such an arbitrary—and revisionary—preference.
So, absent alternative explanations of the data adduced above, we should conclude
that ‘because’ is ambiguous. Further, since the distinct senses of ‘because’ are clearly
related—the competing views are context-sensitive monosemy accounts rather than
homonymy accounts—we can draw a more specific conclusion: ‘because’ is polyse-
mous. In the next section, we consider one final objection to this conclusion.
(i) There’s a red thing here because there’s a crimson thing here and because there are simples
arranged red-thing-wise here.
(ii) There’s a red thing here because there’s a crimson thing here and there are simples arranged
red-thing-wise here.
The relevant difference fails to emerge between (i) and (ii).
65Thanks to Ishani Maitra for pressing me here.
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2.6 The Objection from Hybrid Explanations
Jonathan Schaffer has recently argued that there is a general notion of contrastive
explanation univocally denoted by ‘because’.66 His argument for the general notion
is the alleged existence of ‘hybrid’ explanatory connections between an event and
the cause of its ground, as depicted in Figure 2.1. Call a gas’s having the mean
molecular motion it does at t0 ‘C ’; its having the mean molecular motion it does at
a later time t1 ‘E ’; and its having the temperature it does at t1 ‘T ’. I agree with
C: Mean molecular motion at t0 E: Mean molecular motion at t1




Figure 2.1: A Hybrid Explanatory Connection
Schaffer that C explains E and E explains T, and it even seems intuitive to say that
C explains T. But the explanatory relationship between C and T, Schaffer says, is
neither purely causal nor purely metaphysical; it is a hybrid explanation, proceeding
via both kinds of explanatory link.67
If hybrid explanations exist, explanations can’t just come in two flavors: causal and
metaphysical. We’d need a third, hybrid flavor in addition. But since, to the best
of my recollection, my childhood belief in the existence of chocolate and vanilla was
unshaken by my discovery of the twist, I do not see a knockdown argument against
the distinction between causal explanation and metaphysical explanation in the im-
mediate vicinity. Schaffer does not, however, need to deny that we can distinguish
the causal explanatory relation that holds between C and E from the metaphysical
explanatory relation that holds between E and T. He only needs to claim that there is
a third, general relation, univocally denoted by ‘because’, regardless of what further
conceptual distinctions we might make. And this is just his position. The univocality
of ‘because’ explains, on his view, the acceptability of (41), which communicates the
general explanatory relation between C and T depicted in Figure 2.1.
66Schaffer (2014), §4.3.
67Schaffer also notes that “mathematical elements” are involved in the explanation of T by C, but
presumably these are also involved in both the causal explanation of E by C and the metaphysical
explanation of T by E. The presence of “mathematical elements” had better not compromise either
the causal or the metaphysical status of an explanation.
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(41) The gas has the temperature that it does at t1 because it has the mean
molecular energy that it does at t0.
The explanatory relation between C and T denoted by the ‘because’ in (41) is
supposed to be the same relation denoted by the ‘because’s in (42) and (43).
(42) The gas has the mean molecular energy that it does at t1 because it has the
mean molecular energy that it does at t0.
(43) The gas has the temperature that it does at t1 because it has the mean
molecular energy that it does at t1.
But of course the position of the present paper is that the relation denoted by the
‘because’ of (42) is specifically causal, while the relation denoted by the ‘because’ of
(43) is not. But neither relation can be denoted by the ‘because’ of (41), if it is to
communicate a hybrid explanation.
The polysemy theorist has several avenues for response, though I will focus on just
two here.68 First, the polysemy theorist might insist that the allegedly hybrid ex-
planation is, in fact, causal.69 Schaffer’s rationale for claiming that the explanatory
relation is not “purely causal” is that causal explanations cannot “cross levels”.70
This is controversial.71 For one thing, there are metaphysical views on which there
are no levels, and temperature is a pretty good candidate to just be identified with
mean molecular energy, its alleged lower-level realizer.72 For another, level-crossing
causal explanations seem to be quite common in everyday discourse.
(44) The general died because she had a heart attack.73
(45) Cause of death: heart attack.74
68Here is another: following the suggestion at Kim (1999), 33 for abandoning cross-level causation
in order to save a notion of cross-level causal explanation, we might think of T as a higher-level
description of E. This move renders (41) true, as (41) then simply redescribes the more metaphys-
ically perspicuous (42). But Williamson (2007), Ch. 3 tries to dissuade us from this metalinguistic
maneuver, and Schaffer certainly will not accept it: grounding relations are to have metaphysically
distinct relata.
69Thanks to Dmitri Gallow and Charles Sebens for discussion of this issue.
70Schaffer (2014), 30.
71His rationale for holding that it is not “purely metaphysical” is that metaphysical explanations
cannot “cross times”. This is less controversial, as grounding is plausibly a synchronic relation: see,
e.g., Rosen (2010), 118, fn. 8.
72That Schaffer distinguishes temperature from mean molecular energy may be a consequence of
his ontological permissiveness: see Schaffer (2009), passim.
73After Craver and Bechtel (2006), 57.
74A Google search of this string in quotation marks yields, at the time of writing, 615,000 results.
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Craver and Bechtel (2006) tell us that (44) is not purely causal: the general’s heart
attack causes “a variety of physiological mechanisms [to] cease to function,” and the
non-functioning of that variety of physiological mechanisms constitutes her death.75
This is an instance of their general strategy for rewriting bottom-up explanations, in
which lower-level events explain higher-level ones, as Schaffer-style hybrid explana-
tions, but it is not an argument that they are not causal explanations.76 Suspicion
of top-down causation, that is, of higher-level causes of lower-level effects, is indeed
widespread.77 But the relation denoted by ‘because’ as it occurs in (41) and (44)
differs from that top-down relation in two ways: (i) it’s an explanatory rather than a
causal relation, and (ii) it is bottom-up, that is, the explanans is the lower-level event.
Even though intuitively causal explanations cross levels, perhaps there are still good
theoretical reasons for prohibiting bottom-up explanations. But it is hard to see
what these might be. Causal exclusion principles are usually understood to rule out
higher-level rather than lower-level causes. We might prefer to identify high-level
events as the causes of high-level effects, but that says nothing about the causal
sufficiency of lower-level events.78 And it is unclear why causal sufficiency could
not back causal explanations or make causal ‘because’ sentences true. But even if
it turns out that causation cannot cross levels, that what is meant by ‘cause’ is a
relation that cannot cross levels, or that causal ‘because’ sentences cannot be made
true by level-crossing explanations, the objection from hybrid explanations can still
be defeated by a second kind of response.
Second, then, the objection assumes that the sense of ‘because’ at issue in its meta-
physical uses is more restrictive than it actually is. Rather than being specifically
non-causal, the sense is merely not specifically causal. It admits causal elements,
but also requires some non-causal mediation. Compare ‘extract’: companies extract
75Is this a straw-man? The heart attack and the death are on different levels according to Craver
and Bechtel, but Schaffer needn’t accept that. The Google result mentioned in 74 would be rather
less impressive for ‘Cause of death: heart stopped’ (2,350 results), but (i) is still perfectly acceptable:
(i) The general died because her heart stopped.
The burden seems to me to be on those who take the layer-cake model to be sufficiently metaphys-
ically restrictive that causal relations cannot cross levels.
76Those who place weight on our actual explanatory practices (e.g., Burge (1993); see also Robb
and Heil (2013), §7.5) tend to countenance level-crossing causal relations in both upward and
downward directions.
77See Kim (1993) for a representative from the mental causation literature and Craver and Bechtel
(2006) for a representative from the philosophy of biology literature.
78See Yablo (1992)’s discussion of distinguishing between causally necessitating and being the
cause of on commensuration or proportionality grounds.
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gold from the earth in order to extract value from the gold. The latter extraction
is, of course, metaphorical. We can also say that companies extract value from
the earth, in virtue of the fact that we extract gold and then extract value from
the gold. The extraction of value from the earth is again metaphorical, but it is
not a ‘hybrid’ extraction. The metaphorical sense of ‘extract’ is just permissive.79
Likewise, perhaps, for what we have been calling the metaphysical sense of ‘because’.
Consider how polysemy arises in the first place. Often, a monosemous term gets
used metaphorically long enough for the extended meaning to become a standard
meaning of the term, at which point the metaphor dies and the originally metaphor-
ical meaning becomes literal. The metaphorically extended meaning is not likely to
have sharp borders, but it nevertheless remains conceptually distinguished from the
original, narrow meaning. A conceptual distinction, in the case of ‘because’, between
purely causal explanations and explanations that only count as explanatory insofar
as they fit the causal metaphor can thus accommodate the acceptability of (41). The
fact that the link between C and E is causal while the link between E and T merely
fits the causal metaphor is no reason to think that the connection between C and
T will fail to fit that metaphor. The conceptual distinction thus understood not
only explains the difference in the truth conditions of the causal versus metaphysical
readings of the sentences in §2.1, but also explains the oddness of the reduced con-
junctions in §2.4. What the reduced conjunctions attempt but fail to express is that
a specifically causal relation holds between (e.g.) an explanandum and its causal
explanans, on the one hand, and a metaphorically causal relation holds between that
explanandum and its metaphysical explanans, on the other.80 It is, moreover, un-
clear how Schaffer’s univocality thesis admits distinct truth conditions for different
readings of the sentences of §2.1 or the oddness of the reduced conjunctions of §2.4.81
We have now seen multiple ways the polysemy theorist might handle Schaffer’s hy-
brid explanations. I conclude that neither the existence of hybrid explanations nor
the acceptability of ‘because’ sentences like (41) defeats the polysemy hypothesis.
79Apresjan (1974), §2.2.1 gives a number of polysemous extraction-related verbs in Russian.
80I develop this view in the fourth chapter.
81The best option for the univocality theorist in the latter case would seem to be to appeal to
either the redundancy or the unnaturalness of the sentences. But that fails to explain why the
oddness arises only with the deletion of a second occurrence of ‘because’ (recall the discussion of
the minimal pairs (18)-(20) and (19)-(21) above) or why (34) remains odd in a context that makes
(33) natural. This would seem to leave the univocality theorist with little other than appeal to the
kinds of warranted assertability maneuvers DeRose (1999) convincingly criticizes. (Note that the
polysemy theorist could also retreat to warranted assertability maneuvers to deal with examples
like (41).) And it does not begin to address truth-conditional differences.
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2.7 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, I have argued for the hypothesis that ‘because’ is polysemous be-
tween a causal sense and a second, not specifically causal sense that encompasses
the explanatory relation or relations at issue in metaphysical explanations. Now,
although the causal sense of ‘because’ is psychologically, semantically, and meta-
physically natural, its second sense of ‘because’ is strikingly gerrymandered.82 It
applies to explanantia that variously make their explananda the case; materially
constitute their explananda; provide necessary or sufficient or INUS conditions for
their explananda; are that partially or fully in virtue of which their explananda are
true; and are that on which their explananda are feature or constituent dependent.83
But the latter sense of ‘because’ does not exhibit symptoms of polysemy between
this laundry list of potential senses. What unifies this variety of relations is the
metaphor of causal structure: the shared feature of all types of explanation is that
each provides information about the contextually relevant structure underneath or
behind an explanandum.84 The aptness of the metaphor distinguishes grounding
relations from other partial orders, and its existence explains how ‘because’, with its
causal etymology, has a distinct but unified second sense.85 I develop these views in
the fourth chapter.
Whether ‘because’ is subject to any other ambiguities is a natural further ques-
tion. I argue in the next chapter that the range of uses of ‘because’ studied by
linguists—including epistemological and metalinguistic uses as in (46) and (47)—are
semantically causal.
(46) He likes her, because he brought her moss for her terrarium.
(47) What are you doing tonight?—because there’s a movie on.86
82The naturalness or unity of the causal sense itself might be found suspect by those familiar with
the literature on causal pluralism (see Skyrms (1984), Sober (1984), Cartwright (1999, 2004), Hall
(2004), and Godfrey-Smith (2009)). It seems to me that the causal sense of ‘because’ encompasses
all of the causal notions distinguished in this debate; whatever the metaphysical facts, whatever
the conceptual distinctions we might make between different kinds of causal relations, there is a
single causal sense of ‘because’ and related terminology.
83For INUS conditions, see Mackie (1974). For feature dependence and constituent dependence,
see Koslicki (2012).
84A. Wilson (2013) and Schaffer (2014) go so far as to argue that grounding is a type of causation.
But this dissertation develops what A. Wilson (2013) calls ‘the challenge from metaphor’ against
this view.
85Note that I am not hereby committed to there being a single relation of grounding in all of
these cases; cf. J. Wilson (2014) and Koslicki (forthcoming).
86The example belongs to Sweetser (1990), 31.
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Causation lies behind much more of our explanatory discourse than has previously
been recognized. Even where the not specifically causal senses of our explanatory
terms come into play, a causal metaphor unifies and gives content to those senses.
Our practices of asking ‘why’ questions and answering them with ‘because’ sentences




How General Do Theories of ‘Why’ and ‘Because’
Need To Be?
The theories of ‘why’-questions presented in van Fraassen (1980), Bromberger (1992d),
and Hintikka and Halonen (1995) focus on ‘why’-questions that receive scientific ex-
planations as their answers. Insofar as scientific explanations are causal explana-
tions, this makes sense: the primary senses of ‘why’ and ‘because’ are, on my view,
causal. But insofar as ‘why’ and ‘because’ also function as terms of our metaphys-
ical explanatory discourse, a theory of ‘why’-questions or ‘because’ sentences is not
complete if it focuses only on causal ‘why’-questions and causal ‘because’ sentences.
Here the question arises whether accounting for causal and metaphysical explanation
is enough. In this paper, I argue that some kinds of cases that have been thought to
be outside that dichotomy in fact fall within it, on its causal side.
I focus in particular on the taxonomy investigated by linguists pursuing the proper
semantic treatment of ‘because’. That taxonomy distinguishes causal-explanatory,
epistemic, and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’, represented by (1), (2), and (3),
respectively.1
(1) He brought her moss for her terrarium because he likes her.
(2) He likes her, because he brought her moss for her terrarium.
(3) What are you doing tonight?—because there’s a movie on.2
1See, for example, Morreall (1979), Quirk et al. (1985), Sweetser (1990), Kanetani (2007), and
Kanetani (2012). Linguists discussing epistemic meanings in general (i.e., not specifically for ‘be-
cause’) sometimes make a further distinction between meanings having to do with the speaker’s
knowledge (or other propositional attitudes like belief) and evidential meanings, which have to do
with information sources or evidence: see Traugott (1989), 32-33 for citations and some discus-
sion. (A different distinction between epistemicity and evidentiality will play a role in an objection
considered in §3.5.)
2The example belongs to Sweetser (1990), 31. She sometimes presents the example with different
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Theorists, recognizing the distinction between these apparent senses of ‘because’,
commonly set epistemic and metalinguistic uses aside in order to focus on explana-
tory uses.3 But I argue below that these uses of ‘because’ require the same semantic
contribution of ‘because’ as its causal-explanatory uses.4 The difference between the
categories of uses lies in what is being explained rather than in the explanatory re-
lation at issue. That is, all differences between the uses are traceable to differences
in their explananda. Epistemic and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’, on my view,
introduce causal explanations of certain aspects of a speech act, such as how the
speaker was in a position to make an assertion or why she has made it. Thus for a
speaker who knows the causal meaning of ‘because’ to acquire competence with its
epistemic and metalinguistic meanings, she need only recognize that more kinds of
things—her own acts and their features—can be causally explained. Adopting this
perspective on epistemic and metalinguistic ‘because’-sentences allows us to avoid
positing excessive ambiguity for ‘because’, preserving semantic unity where we can.5
The benefit thereby gained strengthens an adequacy requirement for the theorist
who would give an account of ‘why’-questions: it undermines her justification for
excluding, e.g., ‘why’-questions that would be answered by metalinguistic ‘because’-
clauses.6
This paper is structured as follows. §3.1 investigates and enlarges the linguists’
stock of examples. §3.2 is devoted to a discussion of the evidence, such as it is, for an
punctuation, e.g., ‘What are you doing tonight, because there’s a good movie on.’ at ibid., 77.
3This is done explicitly for epistemic uses by Schnieder (2011), §1.2. Bromberger (1992d), 75
sets aside all ‘why’-questions that contain parenthetical verbs in the sense of Urmson (1952), some
of which I think are properly thought of as metalinguistic ‘why’-questions. But it is more common
to simply ignore epistemic and metalinguistic uses. Dakin (1970), 213-214 is the rare exception
who recognizes that epistemic ‘because’ sentences can be handled along the lines of causal ‘because’
sentences, but he doesn’t develop the idea, which this paper tries to do.
4I will use ‘causal’ and ‘causal-explanatory’ interchangeably when referring to this category of
uses.
5Sweetser (1990) is the most prominent proponent of the view that ‘because’ is essentially poly-
semous along the lines of the linguists’ taxonomy: she accounts for the epistemic and metalinguistic
uses via metaphorical sense extension. But I reserve that treatment for the metaphorical sense of
‘because’ that communicates metaphysical explanations: see chapter 4 below. Keep in mind that
ambiguity posits are to be avoided where possible, in accordance with the Occamist injunction: “do
not multiply senses beyond necessity.” See chapter 2, fn. 15 above for discussion.
6I do, however, join others in restricting my attention to indicative ‘why’-questions and indica-
tive ‘because’-sentences. Insofar as the strategy of the present paper is to adduce differences in
explananda to explain away apparent differences in the meaning of ‘because’ in various contexts, I
would seem to have a promising strategy for extending the treatment to sentences with subjunctive
explananda phrases. I think the strategy will work—I suspect it will say that ‘why should’-questions,
for example, receive answers that place the thing to be done in the context of a causal explanation
of some good outcome in the relevant possible worlds—but working out the details of that kind of
treatment is another project entirely.
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ambiguity posit that tracks the linguists’ taxonomy. But §3.3 argues that the best
explanation of the data adduced in §3.2 is to be given in terms of grammatical or syn-
tactic ambiguities. Syntactic account in hand, §3.4 shows how to unify the epistemic
and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ with the causal-explanatory use. Nevertheless,
it’s unclear whether all uses of ‘because’ can be unified with the causal ‘because’. In
particular, in addition to the metaphysical explanatory uses of ‘because’ discussed
in chapters 2 and 4, I inquire into whether there is a distinct class of non-causal
‘because’ sentences in §3.5, which I call evidential ‘because’ sentences. This class is
importantly different than epistemic uses of ‘because’ insofar as its relationship to the
causal ‘because’ is less obvious. Nevertheless, by the end of this paper, it will have
been shown, against established practice, that a theory of causal ‘why’-questions and
their answers should be expected to account for epistemic and metalinguistic uses of
‘why’ and ‘because’.
3.1 Evaluating and Enlarging the Stock of Examples
Epistemic and metalinguistic ‘because’ sentences are typically introduced by way of
contrast with causal ‘because’ sentences.
(1) He brought her moss for her terrarium because he likes her.
(4) The ice is melting because the temperature is rising.7
(5) Jon stopped because his brakes had jammed.8
(6) Joan doesn’t lend Ted money because he’d never pay her back.9
The explanans phrase—the part after the ‘because’—in each of these sentences ad-
duces part of a causal explanation of the event named in the explanandum phrase—
the part before the ‘because’, which I’ll also sometimes call the prejacent. This applies
even to (6), which explains Joan’s refusal to lend Ted money by giving the reason that
he’d never pay her back: the sentence would be false if the full causal explanation of
Joan’s refusal to lend Ted money didn’t somehow appeal to that reason. That said,
the label ‘causal’ for these uses of ‘because’ may strike you as dubious depending
on how you feel about examples like (1) and (6). If the distinction between causes
and reasons is important to you, you may want to find a more general label (e.g.,
7Morreall (1979)’s (1).
8Dakin (1970)’s (6) modulo pointless ‘h’.
9Morreall (1979)’s (5).
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‘narrative’).10 Still, I claim that the sense of ‘because’ at issue in (1) and (4)–(6)
is the same throughout.11 But you need not grant that claim: many of the argu-
ments of this paper will go through if you take them as attempting to unify epistemic
and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ with the sense of ‘because’ at issue in (1) and (6).
The epistemic ‘because’ sentences below appear to involve a non-causal sense of
‘because’.
(2) He likes her, because he brought her moss for her terrarium.
(7) His brakes failed, because there are no skid marks.
(8) Alma is probably sick, because she didn’t show up for work.12
The relationship between (1) and (2) is excellent prima facie evidence that the re-
lationship reported in (2) is not explanatory: if his liking her explains his bringing
her moss, then his bringing her moss cannot explain his liking her, on pain of vio-
lating a very intuitive anti-symmetry condition on explanation. But the fact that
his bringing her moss does not explain his liking her doesn’t mean that (2) cannot
communicate any explanatory relationship. Consider the reaction of many native
speakers confronted with written examples like (2), (7), and (8): they think they’re
ungrammatical, on paper at least. Despite widespread claims in the linguistics lit-
erature that there are epistemic readings of sentences like (2), many native speakers
claim that something like ‘I know’ is just missing from them.13 (Thus the label ‘epis-
temic’ for these kinds of ‘because’ sentences.) Nevertheless, we can hear utterances
of (2), (7), (8), and the like as felicitous if they are spoken with a special kind of
prosody, often called comma intonation.14 By uttering, with appropriate prosody,
10Sweetser (1990) uses the label ‘content’ where I use ‘causal’. The problem with that label
is that, given how she categorizes uses of ‘because’, uses of the metaphorical sense of ‘because’
that convey metaphysical explanations fall in her category of content uses of ‘because’, while I
want to show that epistemic and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ involve a sense distinct from the
metaphorical sense. Analogous comments apply to the label ‘explanatory’.
11I say this without committing myself to the view of Davidson (1963) that what he calls rational-
izations, the sort of things reported by (1) and (6), are causal explanations. Morreall (1977) is not
sanguine about the possibility of providing an adequate account of explanation that runs roughshod
over these kinds of distinctions, but see §4.2 for an implementation, in a different context, of the
strategy I’d favor for arguing that all of (1) and (4)–(6) involve the same sense of ‘because’.
12Morreall (1979)’s (6).
13The standard English grammar, Quirk et al. (1985), claims that ‘because’ has an epistemic use:
see the discussion of “style disjunct because” at §15.21.
14Sweetser (1990), §4.1.2 follows Chafe (1984) in explaining the need for comma intonation by
appealing to presuppositional differences between causal and epistemic ‘because’ sentences: the
sentences with comma intonation do not presuppose their prejacents, whereas the sentences with-
out comma intonation do. I won’t dwell on it, but my account has the resources to explain the
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the ‘because’ clause of (2), the speaker is most readily interpreted as justifying her
assertion of the main clause. To see the importance of prosody here, compare (2)
with (9).
(9) #He likes her because he brought her moss for her terrarium.
An utterance of (9)—without comma intonation—would only be true if, due to some
psychological quirk, the reason he likes her really is that he brought her the moss.
(2), uttered with comma intonation, has a causal reading with this truth-condition,
in addition to its epistemic reading. But (9) has only the causal reading.
Previous analyses by linguists have accommodated the intuition that something like
‘I know’ is missing from sentences like (2), (7), and (8) straightforwardly, by writ-
ing epistemic operators directly into the meanings assigned to them.15 The results
approximate—but only approximate—the account presented in this paper. They do
not, for example, show that or explain why epistemic uses of ‘because’ involve the
same lexical contribution of ‘because’ as (1) and (4)–(6).
The third category of uses of ‘because’ to be treated here is somewhat diverse.
Sweetser (1990) focuses on what she calls ‘speech-act because’, typified by (3).
(3) What are you doing tonight?—because there’s a movie on.
The speech-act ‘because’ clause in (3) explains the speech-act performed in asking
about the addressee’s plans, but speech-act ‘because’ clauses can also explain other
kinds of speech-acts.
(10) Don’t bring her here, because Mum will be very upset and Dad will be
furious.16
The ‘because’ clause in (10) explains the imperative in its prejacent. ‘Because’
clauses can also perform the full range of metalinguistic functions characterized by
Horn (1985).
(11) He managed to solve some of the problems, because he didn’t manage to
solve all of the problems.
presuppositional difference itself.
15They treat them variously as making claims about what must be the case (Kanetani (2007)),
or about what the speaker judges (Morreall (1979)), concludes (Sweetser (1990), Dancygier and
Sweetser (2000), Declerck et al. (2006)), or thinks (Kanetani (2007) again).
16An example reportedly found in the wild, reproduced from Declerck et al. (2006), 553, who
calls its ‘because’ clause an ‘utterance-explaining because-clause’.
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(12) You managed to solve the problem, because it was hard.
(13) ‘Mongeese’, because it sounds better than ‘mongooses ’.
(14) ‘Indisposed’ rather than ‘feeling lousy’, because it’s more polite.
Utterers of the above sentences explain conversational implicatures ((11)), phonetic
representation ((12)), inflectional morphology ((13)), and stylistic choices ((14)).
Notice that each of these examples requires comma intonation. An interesting, and
ultimately revealing, feature of metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ is that the sentences
in which they appear do not also have distinct causal readings. The prejacent of,
e.g., (12) would have to be uttered with a phonetic realization other than that rep-
resented by the italicization pattern of the example as written for the utterance to
have a causal reading. But the resulting utterance would not have a metalinguistic
reading on which it explains the (now non-existent) emphatic stress on ‘managed’.
(Later, I will put this kind of point in terms of a use/mention distinction.)
I think of speech-act ‘because’ sentences like (3) and (10) and metalinguistic ‘be-
cause’ sentences like (11)–(14) as part of a larger class of cases where the speaker
explains something about what just happened.
(15) (After knocking softly) Because I don’t want to wake their baby.
As the felicity of (15) shows, what the speaker explains with a ‘because’ clause
needn’t involve anything linguistic. While I retain Horn’s familiar ‘metalinguistic’
label, the essential feature, shared by all of these examples, is that the ‘because’
clause comments on some salient act or representation.17 In what follows, I give
a unified treatment of epistemic uses of ‘because’ and of this whole class of cases:
whatever differences might be discerned between (2), (3), (10), (11)–(14), and (15),
they don’t turn out to require different semantic contributions from ‘because’ itself.
None of this is to say that a theory of ‘why’-questions or ‘because’ sentences must
be fully general. For one thing, ‘why’-questions are only felicitously answered with
epistemic or metalinguistic ‘because’ sentences in echoic contexts. (See the brief
discussions of (36-g) and (37-g) below.) For another, in this paper, I set aside non-
17On narrow construals of ‘metalinguistic’, metalinguistic uses are plausibly essentially echoic, as
Carston (1996) argued, in a way that (3) does not seem to be and (15) cannot possibly be. Barbara
Dancygier (1992, 1999) argues, partially on cross-linguistic grounds, that the speech-act ‘because’
of (3) can be distinguished from the ‘because’ of (11), and both of these again from the properly
metalinguistic ‘because’ of (12)–(14), which introduces clauses commenting specifically on linguistic
form. In any case, I use ‘metalinguistic’ as broadly as Dancygier (1992), 71 uses ‘conversational’
and Carston (1999) and Noh (2000) use ‘metarepresentational’.
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indicative ‘why’-questions and ‘because’ sentences.18 I also set aside, for the time
being, the class of metaphorical uses of ‘because’ that I discuss at length in chapters
2 and 4. Finally, I postpone discussion of what might properly be called evidential
uses of ‘because’, where what is expressed is an evidential connection between two
propositions, until §3.5. In the meantime, I turn to a more pressing matter: putative
evidence that ‘because’ is ambiguous between causal, epistemic, and metalinguistic
meanings.
3.2 Evidence for the Ambiguity of ‘Because’
The tests for ambiguity are equivocal about whether ‘because’ is ambiguous between
the senses of the linguists’ taxonomy. The failure of the tests to return a clear
answer is a consequence of the fact that epistemic and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’
require comma intonation. This section summarizes some of the cross-linguistic,
truth-conditional, and transformational evidence via a discussion of the following
three tests:
(16) Lexical Encoding If other natural languages actually use different words
for the different senses of a word, then the word is likely homonymous.
Otherwise, it may be monosemous.19
(17) Contradiction If a word is ambiguous, it is possible to simultaneously
assert and deny expressions containing the word without contradiction.20
(18) Conjunction Reduction If an expression is ambiguous, a reduced con-
junction containing it can be constructed so that crossed readings are ruled
out (or heard as sylleptic).21
The relevant data for Lexical Encoding are controversial, while Contradic-
tion seems to support the ambiguity hypothesis. But Conjunction Reductiion
returns unexpected results. A brief review of the data will put us in position to see
what’s happening.
Consider the cross-linguistic evidence relating to Lexical Encoding first. It cor-
rectly diagnoses the ambiguity of homonyms like ‘bank’. The ‘bank’ that denotes
18See fn. 6 above.
19The source for this test is Kripke (1977).
20The formulation in terms of simultaneous assertion and denial is indebted to Zwicky and Sadock
(1975), 7-8. Quine (1960), 131 discusses ambiguous terms giving rise to a variation in truth-value
from utterance to utterance.
21See §2.3 above for discussion of this test in standard cases.
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financial institutions translates into French as ‘banque’, while the ‘bank’ that de-
notes riverbanks translates as ‘rive’. Other natural languages are sometimes claimed
to have different words for the causal-explanatory and epistemic senses of ‘because’.
Sweetser (1990) cites the French linguist Ducrot in claiming that the French word
‘puisque’ translates epistemic ‘because’, while the French ‘parce que’ translates causal
‘because’.22 (Something like these senses are also claimed to be lexically distinguished
in Dutch and German.23) One serious problem with this data is that ‘puisque’ is not
obviously equivalent to epistemic ‘because’: the former arguably has to do specifically
with reasons, whereas the latter (as I argue below) introduces a causal explanation
of how the speaker is in a position to make the assertion being explained.24 So it
would need to be shown that ‘puisque’ corresponds to epistemic ‘because’. The pres-
ence of ‘since’ in English, which is sometimes suggested to prefer the epistemic and
metalinguistic senses of ‘because’, further complicates the dialectic here: if ‘puisque’
just translates ‘since’, then it needs to be shown that ‘since’ and epistemic (and
metalinguistic) ‘because’ are interchangeable.25 There are at least some differences
between them: ‘since’ doesn’t require comma intonation, for example. The semantic
importance of these differences requires investigation. But more importantly, Zuffery
(forthcoming) shows that ‘parce que’, like ‘because’, has epistemic and metalinguistic
uses, especially in spoken French, and that ‘because’ is only very rarely translated
with ‘puisque’.26
Even if there is no clear cross-linguistic support for the claim that ‘because’ is ambigu-
ous between causal, epistemic, and metalinguistic uses, other tests should be able to
diagnose the ambiguity. Set aside the controversial cross-linguistic data and consider
Contradiction. The intuition behind Contradiction is that truth-conditions
are semantic, so words that are responsible for truth-conditionally distinct inter-
pretations of the sentences in which they occur must be susceptible of semantically
distinct interpretations, i.e., they must be ambiguous. (19) gives a clear example of a
22Op. cit., 155-156, n. 5.
23‘Something like’, because there is a recent tendency in some of the linguistics literature—see
Degand and Maat (2003) and Pit (2003)—to differentiate epistemic and causal-explanatory senses
by some difference on a scale of ‘speaker involvement’ or ‘subjectivity’, rather than differentiating
between epistemic and causal senses specifically.
24Consult the French children’s song “Lundi matin”, introduced to me by David Manley, for
support for the idea that ‘puisque’ also has to do with reasons, but is not specifically epis-
temic/metalinguistic.
25See Kanetani (2006) for the suggestion.
26Zuffery argues that ‘puisque’ marks echoic use. Incidentally, in her translation corpus, epistemic
and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ tended to be translated with ‘car’ rather than ‘parce que’,
but she also found that ‘car’ is practically nonexistent in spoken French, having been replaced in
contemporary spoken French by ‘parce que’. (This highlights a drawback of Lexical Encoding:
diachronic language change affects what it says.)
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sentence that can be used to simultaneously assert and deny expressions containing
the ambiguous word ‘light’ (namely, ‘the dumbbell is light’) without contradiction.
(19) The dumbbell is light, but the dumbbell is not light.
To see the non-contradictory reading of (19), it suffices to interpret one of the two
occurrences of ‘light’ as saying something about the dumbbell’s color, and the other
as saying something about its weight. Contradiction tells us to expect to find an
available non-contradictory reading of a sentence like (20) if ‘because’ is, like ‘light’,
ambiguous.
(20) You went to the doctor, because I saw you go by; but you went to the doctor
because you were sick, not because I saw you go by.
The most natural reading of (20) is indeed non-contradictory. This is the clearest
evidence that ‘because’ is ambiguous between causal and epistemic senses yet. Simi-
lar examples abound for checking metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ against causal and
epistemic uses.
(21) You managed to solve the problem, because it was hard, but you managed
to solve the problem because you worked hard, not because it was hard.
(22) You managed to solve the problem, because you’re smiling, but you managed
to solve the problem, because it was hard, not because you’re smiling.
We can grant that the availability of non-contradictory readings of (21) and (22) is
further evidence that ‘because’ is ambiguous between causal, epistemic, and metalin-
guistic senses.
But evidence that ‘because’ is ambiguous in that way fails to accumulate as expected
when we turn to our last test, Conjunction Reduction. When Conjunction
Reduction works as expected, a conjunction with four readings is reduced to a
conjunction with two readings through the deletion of a repeated ambiguous expres-
sion.
(23) Morton tossed down his lunch.
(24) Morton tossed down his lunch and Oliver tossed down his lunch.
(25) Morton and Oliver tossed down their lunches.27
27Zwicky and Sadock (1975)’s (61).
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Given that ‘tossed down his lunch’ can mean either that the subject ate his lunch
quickly or that the subject threw his lunch on the floor, (23) has two readings. (24)
has four readings, two of which are crossed in the sense that the two occurrences
of ‘tossed down his lunch’ are not both interpreted to have the same meaning. On
the crossed readings of (24), one of Morton and Oliver ate his lunch quickly and
the other threw his lunch on the floor. (25), however, has only two readings, as the
crossed readings are both eliminated by the reduction of (24) to (25). When the
targeted expression is not actually ambiguous, all four readings remain available.
But using Conjunction Reduction to test the present ambiguity hypothesis for
‘because’ does not work as we would expect it to, if ‘because’ were in fact ambiguous.
To begin with, we have to be careful to find examples that, like (23), have mul-
tiple readings. The standard causal uses of ‘because’ do not lend themselves to
epistemic or metaphysical readings.
(26) He likes her because she’s nice to him.
(27) It’s reputed to be valuable because estimates of its worth exceed $10m.
Both of (26) and (27) are causal, in the sense explained in §3.1. (26) is true just in
case her being nice to him is (part of) the reason he likes her. (27) is true just in
case the estimates of its worth are (part of) the reason it’s reputed to be valuable.
(If the object in question is reputed to be valuable only because its owner lies to
gossips about its value, the sentence is false.) But since (26) and (27) lack comma
intonation, they do not have epistemic or metalinguistic readings. Unlike (23), then,
they don’t themselves have two readings, and so we cannot use them to compare a
conjunction with four readings like (24) to a reduced conjunction like (25), to see if
the reduced conjunction has the expected two readings.
The situation is more promising with respect to epistemic uses of ‘because’.
(28) He likes her, because he brought her moss.
The natural reading of (28) is epistemic, in the sense explained in §3.1: his bringing
her moss is offered as the justification for the speaker’s saying that he likes her. But
it does also have a causal reading, even when uttered with comma intonation, which
is much the same as the sole reading of (26).28 Further, the conjunction in (29) has
28‘Much the same’ because not exactly the same: aside from the differing explanantia, the causal
reading of (28) and the sole reading of (26) plausibly differ on whether the proposition expressed
by the prejacent is presupposed. (Recall fn. 14 above.)
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four readings and its reduction, (30), has the expected two readings, neither of which
is crossed.
(29) He likes her, because she’s nice to him, and he likes her, because he brought
her moss.29
(30) He likes her, because she’s nice to him and he brought her moss.
To avoid any potential difficulties related to hearing obviously false readings, focus
on the quite natural crossed reading of (29) where the first ‘because’ is interpreted
causally and the second ‘because’ is interpreted epistemically. Such an interpreta-
tion will be true where her being nice to him is (partially) causally responsible for
his liking her, and where the speaker’s justification for asserting that he likes her is
that he brought her moss. (30) does not have this crossed reading, nor the crossed
reading that interprets the first ‘because’ epistemically and the second causally. (30)
does have a very natural epistemic reading, on which the ‘because’ clause says that
the speaker’s justification for asserting the prejacent is that she’s nice to him and
he brought her moss. (30) also has a causal reading, though of course it’s false in
any psychologically ordinary scenario. So (30) has two meanings where (29) had
four, which is what Conjunction Reduction tells us to look for as evidence of
ambiguity.
But there’s a rub. There are differences between (29) and (30) aside from how many
times ‘because’ occurs. The prejacent also has to be reduced to get (30). If the
elimination of crossed readings in (30) were traceable to an ambiguity in ‘because’,
then the partially reduced conjunction (31) should still have four readings.
(31) He likes her, because she’s nice to him and because he brought her moss.
But it does not. (31) has a natural epistemic reading, according to which her being
nice to him and his bringing her moss are both offered as justifying the speaker’s
assertion that he likes her. It also has a causal reading, according to which her being
nice to him and his bringing her moss explain his liking her. As with the causal
reading of (30), the causal reading of (31) can only be true if the sentence’s subject
is somewhat psychologically peculiar. The absence of crossed readings of (31) sug-
29If the explanation of the necessity of comma intonation in terms of presuppositional differences
(see again fn. 14 above) is correct, (29) should only be felicitous if the second utterance of ‘he likes
her’ is intoned in a way that doesn’t require it to be presupposed, despite the fact that it’s already
been said earlier in the sentence. I think this is actually the only way to intone (29) so that it is
felicitous: try reading it aloud with the second occurrence of ‘he likes her’ uttered in a knowing but
confidential tone, as if only then to try to convince your audience that he really does like her.
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gests that the ambiguity exposed by (30) is not an ambiguity of ‘because’, but rather
an ambiguity elsewhere in the sentence. In particular, Conjunction Reduction
tells us to suspect an ambiguity in the material reduced to produce (31). This is
effectively what those theories that tell us that the prejacents in epistemic uses of
‘because’ have hidden operators like ‘it must be the case that’ or ‘I know’ in them say,
but I think their conclusion is not quite the right one to draw. Rather, I think the
right conclusion to draw is that we are dealing here with a syntactic ambiguity: the
crossed readings of (29) arise from interpretations of its ‘because’ clauses on which
they are not coordinate. I spell this claim out in §3.3.
But for now, we can add to our stock of evidence that Conjunction Reduction
fails to predict that ‘because’ is ambiguous between the meanings of the linguists’
taxonomy when we look at metalinguistic and causal uses of ‘because’. Here it is
fairly obvious that apparent ambiguities can be explained without attributing any
ambiguity to the word ‘because’ itself. I take it that nobody will dispute that ma-
nipulating the sentences in (3) and (10) so that they have causal readings involves
substantial syntactic rearrangement of the sentences. I also take it that nobody will
be able to hear a causal reading of (15). But consider (32), an example along the
lines of (11)–(14).
(32) ‘It’s reputed to be valuable’, because nobody knows its actual value.30
The natural reading of (32) is metalinguistic, in the sense explained in §3.1: it
offers the fact that nobody knows the object’s actual value as an explanation of the
mentioned phrase in the prejacent. (Note that the mentioned phrase has to have
been used previously for (32) to be felicitous—the mention is an echo.) In fact,
it only has a metalinguistic reading, because the explanandum is just a mentioned
expression. If we use the explanandum phrase instead of mentioning it, we get a
sentence with a causal reading but without a metalinguistic reading, like (33). (It
does have an epistemic reading, but we can safely ignore that here.)
(33) It’s reputed to be valuable, because estimates of its worth exceed $10m.
As far as I can tell, there is just no overlap between the prejacents of metalinguistic
uses of ‘because’ and the prejacents of causal uses of ‘because’. So non-reduced
conjunctions like (34) have only one relevant reading to begin with. (Again, we
should here set aside any epistemic readings as irrelevant to the present discussion.)
(34) It’s reputed to be valuable, because estimates of its worth exceed §10m, and
30Adapted from an example of Yukio Hirose discussed in Kanetani (2012).
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‘it’s reputed to be valuable’, because nobody knows its actual value.
The obvious use/mention difference between the occurrences of the phrase ‘it’s re-
puted to be valuable’ in (34) means that we can’t form a grammatical reduced
conjunction targeting the prejacent, much less a grammatical reduced conjunction
targeting ‘because’. So we can’t even try to apply Conjunction Reduction here.
Let’s take stock. The cross-linguistic evidence for the ambiguity of ‘because’, con-
sidered in connection with Lexical Encoding, is controversial. Most importantly,
even French, which is often claimed to have distinct words for the different uses of
‘because’, has a single word, ‘parce que’, that itself has the same range of causal,
epistemic, and metalinguistic uses as ‘because’. The truth-conditional evidence that
the different uses of ‘because’ reflect differences in the semantic contribution of the
word itself, considered in connection with Contradiction, fails to be confirmed by
a careful consideration of reduced conjunctions. What Conjunction Reduction
rather suggests is that we should take a closer look at the prejacents of ‘because’
sentences and their relationship with ‘because’ clauses. The next section takes that
closer look.
3.3 Syntactic Differences
When we consider the relationship between ‘because’ clauses and their prejacents in
causal, epistemic, and metalinguistic uses, we find that the different cases are marked
by different grammatical or syntactic relations.31 There are two different sources of
evidence for this claim. The first source of evidence is uncovered by considering
the range of constructions in which epistemic and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’
can occur. The second source of evidence involves ordering restrictions on stacked
‘because’ clauses. Once we understand the differences in the syntactic roles of the
‘because’ clause in its causal, epistemic, and metalinguistic uses, we’ll be ready for
the arguments of §3.4 to the effect that ‘because’ makes the same semantic contri-
bution in all of them.
First for the constructions. I focus here on six kinds of constructions—represented
by (35-b)–(35-g) below—in which causal-explanatory ‘because’ can appear, some of
which do not admit epistemic or metalinguistic readings.32 The possibility of ap-
31Copious thanks are due to Ezra Keshet for discussion of and advice about the matters discussed
in this section, especially with respect to the ordering restrictions on stacked ‘because’ clauses that
I discuss in the latter half of the section, though I’m uncertain whether he’d endorse my exposition
of the material or my conclusions.
32The examples in (35) are adapted from Quirk et al. (1985), §8.25.
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pearing in all of these constructions is characteristic of what Quirk et al. (1985) call
adjuncts, a grammatical subcategory of adverbial phrases. The failure of epistemic
and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ to appear in any of them, then, would be evi-
dence that those uses are somehow grammatically or syntactically distinct from the
causal uses of ‘because’ in (35).33
(35) a. Hilda helped Tony because he was injured.
b. It was because he was injured that Hilda helped Tony.
c. Did Hilda help Tony because he was injured or because she wanted to
please her mother?
d. Hilda didn’t help Tony because he was injured but because she wanted
to please her mother.
e. Hilda helped Tony only because of his injury.
f. Hilda helped Tony because of his injury and so did Grace.
g. Why did Hilda help Tony? Because of his injuries.
In (35-b)–(35-g), we see the ‘because’ clause being the focus of a cleft sentence, being
the basis of contrast in alternative interrogation or negation, being focused by ‘only’,
coming within the scope of the pro-form ‘so did’, and being elicited by a question.34
Epistemic and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ are in fact not possible in some of
these constructions.
Consider an epistemic use of ‘because’.35
(36) a. He likes her, because he brought her moss.
b. ?It was because he brought her moss that he likes her.
c. (i) Does he like her because he brought her moss or because she’s nice
to him?
(ii) Does he like her, because he brought her moss or because she’s
nice to him?
d. (i) He doesn’t like her because he brought her moss but because she’s
nice to him.
(ii) #He doesn’t like her, because he brought her moss but because
she’s nice to him.
33According to Quirk et al. (1985), §15.21, the epistemic uses of ‘because’ fall in a distinct
grammatical category of style disjuncts, which coheres with the story I tell here.
34The description of the constructions given here is minimally adapted from Quirk et al. (1985),
§8.134.
35I am indebted to Eric Lormand for pressing me to be clear about the influence of comma
intonation and about the resulting complexity of the discussion in the following paragraphs.
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(iii) He doesn’t like her, because he won’t bring her moss and because
she’s mean to him.
e. (i) ?He likes her only because he brought her moss.
(ii) He likes her, only because he brought her moss.
f. (i) ?He likes her because he brought her moss and so does Grace.
(ii) *He likes her, because he brought her moss and so does Grace.
(iii) #He likes her, because he brought her moss and so did Grace.
(iv) He likes her, because he brought her moss, and so does Grace.
g. Why does he like her? Because he brought her moss.
(36-a) has a felicitous epistemic reading. But no epistemic reading is available in
some of the transformations that are characteristically possible for adjuncts. The
only reading of the construction in (36-b), for example, is causal: the construc-
tion itself grammatically excludes its being uttered with comma intonation, so no
epistemic reading of its ‘because’ clause is available. (I mark the example with a
question mark to highlight the implausibility of the causal reading.) (36-c-i) again
has only a causal reading, though it is not pragmatically bad because the question
can be answered by adducing a plausible reason for his liking her (namely, that she’s
nice to him). However, comma intonation does make a difference: (36-c-ii), uttered
with comma intonation, has an epistemic reading on which the speaker is offering
an interlocutor reasons to affirm that he likes her. (36-d-i) again has only a causal
reading. But with this construction comma intonation does not exactly help: only
the prejacent of (36-d-ii) comes within the scope of the negation. Its first ‘because’
clause thus cannot be the focus of alternative negation, so ‘and’ should be used
instead of the contrastive ‘but’ to conjoin the two ‘because’ clauses, as in the felici-
tous example (36-d-iii). That example, though, is just a different construction than
(35-d). The takeaway from (36-d) is thus that alternative negation is a construction
in which epistemic ‘because’ cannot appear. (36-e-i) has only a causal reading—
again an implausible one, as it happens. (36-e-ii) admits an epistemic reading of
its ‘because’ clause, on which the speaker offers a thin justification for his assertion
that he likes her. (36-f-i), which can only be uttered without comma intonation, has
only a causal reading. (I mark it with a question mark because it is only true in
those bizarre contexts where both he and Grace are psychologically abnormal, so that
they both like her because they brought her moss.) (36-f-ii), uttered with comma
intonation, is flatly ungrammatical: the pro-form ‘so does’ is within the scope of the
‘because’, rather than the other way around, and so its tense must match the tense of
‘brought’. Fixing the tense mismatch results in the grammatical but extremely im-
plausible (36-f-iii), the epistemic reading of which is true only if the conjunctive fact
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that he and Grace both brought her moss somehow justifies the speaker’s assertion
that he likes her. The ungrammaticality can also be repaired by forcing the pro-form
‘so does’ to take scope over only the prejacent, as I have attempted to represent
with the additional comma in (36-f-iv). The epistemic ‘because’ clause in (36-f-iv)
is then merely parenthetical. But the takeaway from (36-f) is just that we have a
construction in which epistemic ‘because’ cannot appear, namely, within the scope
of the pro-form ‘so did’.36 Finally, (36-g) is felicitous, provided that the interroga-
tive is an echo question. (Otherwise, the response will be infelicitous unless we are
again in the psychologically abnormal but now familiar context where his reason for
liking her is that he brought her moss.) To sum up, the discussion of (36-b), (36-d),
and (36-f) conclusively establishes that epistemic uses of ‘because’ are not adjuncts.
This might, however, just be a quirk of Quirk et al.’s definition of ‘adjunct’. The
fact that epistemic uses of ‘because’ fail to meet their definition of adjunct does not
immediately prove that we are dealing with a real grammatical difference here. But
our second source of syntactic evidence—ordering restrictions on stacked ‘because’
clauses—will confirm that indeed we are.
But first we should confirm that metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ also cannot be
adjuncts. Here our paradigm metalinguistic use of ‘because’ will be (37-a). I use the
foreshortened echo ‘reputed’ as the prejacent to bring out the ungrammaticality of
(37-b-i); using an echo of a full sentence as the prejacent can make the ungrammat-
icality less apparent but no less real, provided only that we attend properly to the
use/mention distinction.
(37) a. ‘Reputed’, because I have never seen it.
b. (i) *It was because I have never seen it that ‘reputed’.
(ii) It was because I have never seen it that I said ‘reputed’.
c. (i) ?‘Reputed’ because I have never seen it or because no one alive
has seen it?
(ii) ‘Reputed’, because I have never seen it or because no one alive has
seen it?
d. (i) Not ‘reputed’ because I have never seen it but because no one alive
has seen it.
(ii) #Not ‘reputed’, because I have never seen it but because no one
alive has seen it.
(iii) Not ‘reputed’, because I’ve seen it and because others have, too.
36Readers should not be worried by the difference in tense between ‘Hilda helped Tony’ and ‘He
likes her’. I am just exploiting the difference in tense between ‘He likes her’ and ‘he brought her
moss’ to show that ‘because’ has wider scope than the pro-form in (36-f-ii) and (36-f-iii).
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e. (i) #‘Reputed’ only because I have never seen it.
(ii) ‘Reputed’, only because I have never seen it.
f. (i) *‘Reputed’ because I have never seen it and so is the other secret
collection.
(ii) *‘Reputed’, because I have never seen it and so is the other secret
collection.
(iii) *‘Reputed’ because I have never seen it, and so is the other secret
collection.
(iv) *‘Reputed’, because I have never seen it, and so is the other secret
collection.
g. Why ‘reputed’? Because I have never seen it.
(37-b-i) is ungrammatical: it does not even have a causal reading. The ungrammat-
icality can be repaired by supplementing the mentioned material with a subject and
a verb of saying, as in (37-b-ii), which is grammatical but has only a causal read-
ing. I don’t have especially clear intuitions about the example in (37-c-i), though I
am inclined to think that it should be read causally with an understood subject ‘I’
and a verb of saying, along the lines of (37-b-ii). Given that reading of (37-c-i), it’s
pragmatically bad in most contexts. We typically don’t ask others why we said some-
thing. But it is felicitous as a rhetorical question in order to draw an interlocutor’s
attention to the question why the speaker chose ‘reputed’, or when uttered privately
to oneself. (37-c-ii) does have a metalinguistic reading, on which the speaker asks
why ‘reputed’ was chosen (presumably by someone else). (37-d) is precisely anal-
ogous to (36-d): (37-d-i) has only a causal reading; (37-d-ii) is pragmatically bad
because the scope of its negation does not include the conjoined ‘because’ clauses
and so does not license the contrastive connective ‘but’; and (37-d-iii) is felicitous
but just a different construction than the adjunct construction in (35-d), where the
‘because’ clause is the basis of alternative negation. (37-e-i) has a causal reading, but
its meaning is interestingly different than the meaning of the rather more plausible
metalinguistic reading of (37-e-ii). If (37-e-i) is true, then whoever said ‘reputed’
holds me personally responsible for gathering evidence that could confirm reputa-
tions. But for the metalinguistic reading of (37-e-ii) to be true, it is enough for my
lack of evidence to explain why I said ‘reputed’. I don’t have to be the arbiter of
confirmation for the metalinguistic reading of (37-e-ii) to be true, in the way that
I do have to be the arbiter of confirmation for the causal reading of (37-e-i) to be
true. With (37-f), we do not have to worry about tense mismatches as we did for
(36-f). But no matter how we manipulate the scope of the pro-form ‘so are’, the
sentences are ungrammatical, as long as the use/mention distinction is kept clearly
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in view. What (36-a) explains is the use of the word ‘reputed’, and that is not a
property that could apply to other secret collections, even if being reputed to be a
certain way is a property that they might share with whatever it is I haven’t seen.
Finally, (37-g), like (36-g), is felicitous as long as the question is an echo. Otherwise
the question itself is infelicitous. This is a small difference from (36-g), where the
question has a clear causal interpretation even if it isn’t an echo. But the important
point to draw from this elaborate consideration of (37) is just that the discussions
of (37-b), (37-d), and (37-f) conclusively show that metalinguistic uses of ‘because’
are not adjuncts.
What it means for causal-explanatory ‘because’ to be an adjunct, but for epistemic
and metalinguistic ‘because’ not to be adjuncts, is basically that the different uses of
‘because’ in the linguists’ taxonomy are syntactically different. That difference is, in
technical terms, a difference in what the ‘because’ clause attaches to. In slightly less
technical terms, epistemic and metalinguistic uses provide explanatory comments on
an entire sentence or act, while causal uses explain the content of the main clause.
This syntactic or grammatical ambiguity explains the absence of crossed readings
that we observed for (31) in the discussion of Conjunction Reduction.
(31) He likes her, because she’s nice to him and because he brought her moss.
We’ll build up to that explanation from a simpler case. Chomsky observed long ago
that, for the most part, we can form reduced conjunctions when and only when we
have two constituents of the same type, and that we can therefore use the possibility
of forming reduced conjunctions to help determine syntactic structure.37 Consider
the syntactically ambiguous sentences (38) and (39).
(38) Johan kicked the ball on the floor.
(39) Johan kicked the ball between the cones.
These sentences are ambiguous because the prepositional phrases ‘on the floor’ and
‘between the cones’ could specify either the location of the ball before Johan kicked
it or where it went after he kicked it; they exhibit a classic syntactic ambiguity.38
(40) thus has four readings.
(40) Johan kicked the ball on the floor and Johan kicked the ball between the
cones.
37See his 1957, §5.2. (He qualifies the claims there with ‘generally’ but does not say what, if any,
exceptions there are. Fortunately it won’t matter for present purposes.)
38The SEP article Sennet (2011) discusses a similar example at §3.2.1.
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For illustrative purposes, here is a description of one of its crossed readings: (40)
could mean that Johan kicked the ball that was on the floor so that it went between
the cones. But the reduced conjunction (41) has only two readings: both crossed
readings disappear.
(41) Johan kicked the ball on the floor and between the cones.
But ‘Johan kicked the ball’ is not ambiguous. Rather, the ‘and’ in (41) conjoins the
prepositional phrases and thereby forces them to attach to the rest of the sentence
at the same level. (To adopt a suggestive technical metaphor, they are merged with
one another before merging with the rest of the sentence.)
I claim that the same sort of thing is happening in (31). The ‘and’ conjoins the
‘because’ phrases and forces them to attach to the rest of the sentence at the same
level. Moreover, and crucially, the level at which epistemic and metalinguistic ‘be-
cause’ clauses attach differs from the level at which causal ‘because’ clauses attach.
(I claim that the difference persists even between causal and epistemic or metalin-
guistic readings of utterances with comma intonation, but I’ll wait until later to
argue for that claim.) The fact that epistemic and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’
do not meet Quirk et al.’s criteria to be categorized as adjuncts suggested that we
were dealing with this kind of grammatical difference. But we need not rely on their
characterization cutting the syntactic world at its joints. We have an independent
source of evidence of the difference in attachment height.
Restrictions on the order in which ‘because’ clauses can be stacked is that source
of independent evidence.39 Let’s start again with an easy case.
(42) Johan kicked the ball on the floor between the cones.
The prepositional phrases in (42) are stacked so that the interpretation of ‘on the
floor’ can restrict the interpretation of ‘between the cones’. If we interpret ‘on the
floor’ as modifying the NP ‘the ball’, then ‘between the cones’ can modify either the
NP ‘the ball on the floor’ or the VP ‘kicked the ball on the floor’. But if we interpret
‘on the floor’ as an adjunct modifying the VP ‘kicked the ball’, then ‘between the
cones’ has to modify the VP ‘kicked the ball on the floor’. That is, it’s not possible
for ‘between the cones’ to modify the NP ‘the ball’ or the NP ‘the ball on the floor’
if ‘on the floor’ modifies the VP ‘kicked the ball’. To put this in terms of attach-
ment height, if ‘on the floor’ attaches above ‘kicked’ by modifying the VP ‘kicked the
39See Bhatt and Pancheva (2006), §5.3 for an application of this kind of test to different varieties
of ‘if’ clauses.
64
ball’, then ‘between the cones’ cannot get back below ‘kicked the ball on the floor’
to modify an NP (namely, ‘the ball’ or ‘the ball on the floor’). It is instead forced
higher in the tree.
This example in mind, consider stacked ‘because’ clauses.
(43) You went to the casino because you’re addicted to gambling, because I saw
you.
The first ‘because’ phrase in (43) has to be interpreted causally, since there’s no
indication of comma intonation leading into it. The second ‘because’ phrase is most
naturally interpreted as an epistemic use of ‘because’, given the content of its ex-
planans phrase (‘I saw you’). But given that the first, causal ‘because’ clause attaches
low in the tree, there is no grammatical reason that a second ‘because’ clause can’t
also attach low enough to receive a causal interpretation.
(44) You went to the casino because you’re addicted to gambling(,) because your
addiction is compelling.
The availability of a causal interpretation of the second ‘because’ clause in (44), on
which it explains the explanatory connection between the prejacent and the first
‘because’ clause, makes this clear. Notice that the presence of comma intonation is
irrelevant to the possibility of interpreting the second ‘because’ clause as causal. All
that comma intonation does is make epistemic and metalinguistic readings possible.
Of course, if the second ‘because’ clause of (44) is uttered with comma intonation,
it can be read epistemically or metalinguistically. (Readers may find the truth-
conditions to have stopped being very intuitive at this level of complexity, but the
reading is grammatically available.) However, if a first ‘because’ clause is interpreted
epistemically or metalinguistically, a second ‘because’ clause can only get above it if
it, too, is interpreted epistemically or metalinguistically.
(45) You went to the casino, because I saw you because you’re addicted to gam-
bling.
On the only grammatical interpretations of (45), ‘because you’re addicted to gam-
bling’ modifies the S ‘I saw you’. (The parallel to this for (42) would be for ‘between
the cones’ to modify ‘on the floor’ directly, and then for the resulting complex prepo-
sitional phrase to modify either the NP ‘the ball’ or the VP ‘kicked the ball’.) But
causal ‘because’ cannot take scope over an epistemic use of ‘because’. In particular,
the second ‘because’ clause of (45) cannot modify the S ‘You went to the casino,
because I saw you’. Now, using comma intonation does allow a second ‘because’
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clause to scope outside a first epistemic or metalinguistic ‘because’ clause, but the
second ‘because’ clause cannot then get a causal interpretation.
(46) You went to the casino, because I saw you, because I am in the habit of
reporting my reasons for saying things.
The second ‘because’ clause in (46) is, as far as I can tell, metalinguistic. It does not
seem to be possible for a causal ‘because’ clause to take scope outside an epistemic or
metalinguistic use of ‘because’. In fact, I think the right thing to say here is that the
metalinguistic ‘because’ just is the causal ‘because’ when it gets high enough in the
tree, and I argue to that effect in the next section. But for now what is important is
that this is dispositive evidence of a difference in attachment height.
I said earlier that the difference in attachment height established here would ex-
plain the absence of crossed readings for (31).
(31) He likes her, because she’s nice to him and because he brought her moss.
Recall that (31) is uttered with comma intonation leading into the first ‘because’
clause. That intonational pattern forces the ‘and’ to conjoin the two ‘because’ clauses
before they attach to the S ‘He likes her’. The ConjP ‘because she’s nice to him and
because he brought her moss’ then attaches to the S ‘He likes her’ at some height
or other. The fact that it can only attach at one such height suffices to explain
the absence of crossed readings of (31), precisely because crossed readings require
different attachment heights.
The difference in attachment height established above also explains the need for
comma intonation in epistemic and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’. Epistemic and
metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ are so high in the tree that we might well think of
them as not even part of the same utterance as their prejacents. (More on this in
§3.4.2 below.) Comma intonation, then, is required to separate what we might think
of as an utterance of a prejacent and a second utterance that comments on it. But
rather than attempting to develop the right syntactic account of how this works here,
I want to turn my attention back to semantics, and offer some reasons to think that
epistemic and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’ really are semantically causal.
3.4 Unifying The Linguists’ Taxonomy
In this section, I argue that causal, epistemic, and metalinguistic uses of ‘because’
are not distinguished by an ambiguity in ‘because’. A better explanation is that
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metalinguistic and epistemic ‘because’ clauses are explanatory comments on salient
preceding acts or representations. Epistemic ‘because’ clauses explain, in particular,
how the speaker was in the position, at the time of her assertion, to make it. Since
metalinguistic ‘because’ can also be used to explain how the speaker was, at the
time of doing something, in the position to do it, epistemic uses of ‘because’ are
just a particular kind of metalinguistic use of ‘because’. So the difference between
epistemic and metalinguistic ‘because’ has nothing to do with the lexical entry or
related semantic facts for ‘because’ (§3.4.1).
Further, metalinguistic ‘because’ just is causal ‘because’ when it appears above a
certain height in a syntactic tree. The difference between these uses is thus in their
explananda. That is, metalinguistic and causal ‘because’ are in complementary dis-
tribution, which is to say that they are found in mutually exclusive environments,
and this will be enough to unify them (§3.4.2).
3.4.1 Epistemic ‘Because’ is Metalinguistic ‘Because’
Consider the metalinguistic ‘because’ clauses in (3) and (15).
(3) What are you doing tonight?—because there’s a movie on.
(15) (After knocking softly) Because I don’t want to wake their baby.
In these examples, what is being explained is (a feature of) the preceding act—the
speech-act in (3), and the manner of knocking in (15). The ‘because’ clauses are thus
comments on what has just occurred. The variety of metalinguistic uses to which
‘because’ clauses can be put, reflected also in (11)–(14) above, shows that ‘because’
clauses can be used to give explanations for a wide range of features of salient pre-
ceding acts.
But explaining a feature of a salient preceding act is just what the epistemic ‘because’
clause in (2) does, as well.
(2) He likes her, because he brought her moss for her terrarium.
In particular, it explains how the speaker is in a position to make the assertion. Of
course, metalinguistic ‘because’ can explain how the speaker is in the (non-epistemic)
position to do something, too.40
40‘Metarepresentational’ would probably be terminologically happier than ‘metalinguistic’ here;
see fn. 17 above.
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(47) (After making a half-court shot) Because I’ve practiced a lot.
The metalinguistic ‘because’ of (47) explains how the speaker was in the position to
make the half-court shot, at the time that he did it.
What makes the difference in (2)’s counting as epistemic rather than metalinguistic
is just that the speaker of (2) is explaining her being in a position to make an as-
sertion.41 There are many features of a speech-act that might require explanation:
its relevance, the speaker’s motivation and justification, etc. In a case where it’s not
common ground that the speaker is justified in making an assertion, an explanation
of the speech-act is thus naturally interpreted as explaining why the speaker believes
what she said. Imagine trying to explain, with an epistemic ‘because’ clause, an
imperative.
(48) Look for a man with a limp, because that’s what the evidence says we should
look for.
The ‘because’ clause in (48) explains how the speaker was in the position to make
the recommendation to look for a man with a limp. But its ‘because’ seems to
me to be metalinguistic. In general, on my view, epistemic uses of ‘because’ are
metalinguistic uses of ‘because’, where the explanandum is an assertion. Whatever
it is that accounts for metalinguistic ‘because’ clauses in sentences like (3), (15),
and (48) should also be able account for epistemic ‘because’ clauses. In the next
section, I argue that what accounts for the semantic contribution of ‘because’ in its
metalinguistic uses, and therefore also in its epistemic uses, is just the contribution
of its literal causal meaning.
3.4.2 Metalinguistic ‘Because’ is Causal ‘Because’
Imagine trying to explain, with a causal ‘because’ clause, some feature of a speech
act you have just made.
(49) What are you doing tonight? I’m asking you because there’s a movie on.
The ‘because’ clause of (49) explains why the speaker asked the question. But this is
just what utterances of (3) do.42 So here, where the explanandum of a metalinguistic
‘because’ clause is explicitly represented, the ‘because’ clause becomes causal. I claim
this is a general feature of metalinguistic ‘because’ sentences.
41Knowledge is, after all, much-discussed as the norm of assertion, so to be in a position to assert
something is to know it. (But see Williamson (2000), Ch. 11 for discussion.)
42In fact, (49) is modeled on what Sweetser (1990) claims the meaning of (3) is.
68
(13) ‘Mongeese’, because it sounds better than ‘mongooses ’.
(50) I said ‘mongeese’ because it sounds better than ‘mongooses ’.
(15) (After knocking softly) Because I don’t want to wake their baby.
(51) I knocked softly because I don’t want to wake their baby.
Apparent differences between causal ‘because’ and metalinguistic ‘because’, if this is
right, can be attributed to the linguistic contexts in which they appear. This is not
polysemy—at least, it is not the kind of polysemy that correlates with any semantic
complexity of ‘because’—in that the sense of ‘because’ used is precisely the same
in both cases. What accounts for the apparent difference in meaning is rather a
difference in what is being explained.
That difference in what is being explained reduces, I claim, to the difference in
attachment height established in §3.3. I said there that I would later explain why
a difference in attachment height persists even between the different readings of ut-
terances with comma intonation. Recall (28), which has both epistemic and causal
readings, as described in §3.1.
(28) He likes her, because he brought her moss.
I just claimed in §3.4.1 that all epistemic readings are really metalinguistic readings,
and I claimed in the introductory paragraphs of §3.4 that causal and metalinguistic
readings are complementarily distributed. So the epistemic (i.e., metalinguistic) and
causal readings of (28) had better have different explananda. I do not, however,
think that the difference between their explananda is a matter of some ambiguity
in the explanandum phrase ‘He likes her’. Rather, the difference is a matter of the
grammatical or syntactic structure that gives rise to the two readings. In the causal
reading, ‘because he brought her moss’ attaches directly to the S ‘He likes her’. But
in the epistemic (i.e., metalinguistic) reading, I now claim, it attaches even higher.
That is, I claim there are two non-isomorphic syntactic trees for (28). This might be
surprising, as it’s not immediately obvious that there could be a syntactic tree for
(28) with something higher than the S ‘He likes her’ to which the ‘because’ clause
could attach. But there are a number of ways that a syntactic account with this
feature might work out. If epistemic and metalinguistic ‘because’ clauses are part of
the same syntactic tree as their prejacents, they are plausibly modifying a speech-act
operator. Some philosophers may regard speech-act operators as dubious theoretical
entities. Those philosophers might prefer a view on which epistemic and metalin-
guistic ‘because’ clauses do not attach to the tree for their prejacents at all, instead
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constituting separate utterances and attaching to elided material like ‘I know that’
or ‘I said that’.43 Or they might rather attach to a free variable that gets saturated
by context.44 For present purposes, the details of the right syntactic account don’t
really matter.
What does matter is that causal uses of ‘because’ are in complementary distribution
with metalinguistic uses of ‘because’. The move I want to make here—explaining
away apparent differences in meaning by appealing to differences in what is being
explained—is reminiscent of Quine’s argument that ‘exist’ is monosemous.45 ‘Exist’
need not be treated as ambiguous between predicating spatiotemporal existence, as




Rather, material objects and numbers exist in a single sense. The fact that “some
very unlike things” exist is not evidence undermining the semantic unity of ‘exist’.47
Instead, Quine claims, apparent differences in the meaning of ‘exist’ are due solely
to differences in the things to which it applies themselves. And this is precisely
analogous to what I am now claiming about the apparent differences in the meaning
of ‘because’ as it appears in its causal, epistemic, and metalinguistic uses.
Let’s apply this analysis to an example from the wild.
43I should note that I doubt that any account in terms of elided material will work, because tag
questions like ‘don’t I?’, which should pick up elided material when uttered after a ‘because’ clause
attached to the elided material, fail to be felicitous. Thanks to Rich Thomason for the idea here.
An additional complication for this sort of view will be explaining examples like (15), where nothing
at all has been said prior to the ‘because’ clause.
44The syntactic suggestions made here and in §3.3 mirror the view of the relationship between
epistemic and root modality championed by Hacquard (2010) and endorsed by Kratzer (2012): an
epistemic modal is distinguished from the corresponding root modal in that a single uniform lexical
entry, written so as to be able to appear at multiple levels of a phrase tree, appears higher in the
phrase tree in the epistemic case than in the root case. So working out the technical details of one
of the present suggestions about ‘because’ looks to be a tractable syntactic project.
45It is also reminiscent of the argument in Goodenough (1956) from complementary distribution to
underlying semantic unity, which he advances by analogy with the cases of allophones in phonology
and allomorphs in morphology: see op. cit., 197. Schmerling (1978), 310, fn. 9 also alludes to
this kind of argument. See the discussion of ‘sort specific readings’ at Pinkal (1995), 94-97 for an




(54) Jann S. Wenner: Did you know [“I can’t get no satisfaction from the judge”
was a line from Chuck Berry’s “30 Days”] when you wrote [“Satisfaction”]?
Mick Jagger: No, I didn’t know it, but Keith might have heard it back then,
because it’s not any way an English person would express it. I’m not saying
that he purposely nicked anything, but we played those records a lot.48
The italicized text in (54) is a real-life example of a metalinguistic use of ‘because’.
The basic idea behind my view is that Jagger is there giving a causal explanation of
why he uttered the prejacent ‘Keith might have heard it back then’. That this is what
Jagger is doing is confirmed by his continuation in the last sentence of (54), where
he further clarifies the purpose of his utterance. But try to recover a straightforward
causal reading of the ‘because’ clause in the italicized text in (54). The sentence
would then be rather odd, as the fact that English people didn’t say ‘I can’t get no’
seems like it could have played no explanatory role at all in making it possible for
Keith Richards to have heard the Chuck Berry song at the relevant time in the past.
But that’s the reading of the sentence to which we are forced when we try to interpret
the ‘because’ clause as what we have been calling a causal use of ‘because’. That is,
we are forced to interpret the prejacent of causal ‘because’ clauses differently than
the prejacents of epistemic and metalinguistic ‘because’ clauses. Given the syntactic
differences between the different kinds of uses of ‘because’ we have been discussing,
there is simply no reason to posit, in addition, any lexical ambiguity for ‘because’
itself.
By this point, I hope to have convinced you that epistemic and metalinguistic uses of
‘because’ plausibly involve the literal, causal sense of ‘because’, the very same sense
that is operative in all of its standard causal uses. But this does not mean that all
uses of ‘because’ are causal. The next section considers some possible exceptions.
3.5 The Evidential Objection to Full Generality
In this section I discuss a potential residue of cases not covered above or elsewhere in
this dissertation. In particular, examples whose prejacents contain epistemic modals
are a plausible source of non-causal ‘because’ sentences. The word ‘because’ as it
occurs in these sentences would express not a causal explanatory relation, but a re-
lation of evidential support between the content of the prejacent and the content of
the ‘because’ clause.49
48Wenner (1995). Emphasis added. Thanks to Sara Aronowitz for the example.
49The class of examples I want to isolate here is distinct from the class treated under the heading
‘evidential because-clauses’ by Declerck et al. (2006), §10.6.4. He gives the following three examples:
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To be clear, many examples with non-epistemic modals in their prejacents are ac-
counted for elsewhere in this dissertation.50
(55) It’s possible that the vase will break because it’s fragile.
If the modal in (55) takes widest scope, the sentence says that it’s possible that a
certain causal explanatory relationship between the vase’s current fragility and its fu-
ture breaking holds. That reading requires only a standard causal use of ‘because’. If
instead the modal scopes over only the prejacent, then the sentence instead says that
the fragility of the vase explains the fact that it’s possible that the vase will break.
Fronting the ‘because’ clause, as in (56), isolates this reading against interference
from scopal ambiguities.51
(56) Because it’s fragile, it’s possible that it will break.
But the ‘because’ of (56) seems to me to be just the sense of ‘because’ used to com-
municate metaphysical explanations, namely, the metaphorical sense of ‘because’
discussed in chapters 2 and 4.
Evidential ‘because’ sentences with epistemic possibility modals in their prejacents
are not clearly felicitous.
(57) Your keys might be in the drawer(,) because I haven’t checked yet.
(58) Because I haven’t checked yet, your keys might be in the drawer.
(i) There must be someone in the house, because there is a light on on the second floor.
(ii) Next year the results will be somewhat better, because the economic climate will have
improved.
(iii) John will be caught, because he will set off the alarm.
But the second and third examples are causal: they say what will cause what. Declerck et al.
are misled by what I think is a badly misguided attempt to individuate uses of ‘because’ by an
associated tense. What they call ‘utterance-explaining because-clauses’, for example, need not,
contra their claims, use future tense: just see (3). The simple fact is that none of the categories of
uses tracks or is tracked by tense.
50I think the only such examples not accounted for have non-indicative prejacents: see fn. 6.
51Incidentally, fronting is also sometimes claimed to eliminate epistemic and metalinguistic read-
ings. See, e.g., Hirose (1991) and Kanetani (2006). This might also have been invoked above as
yet another piece of evidence that it is syntactic ambiguities that explain the differences between
the kinds of uses of ‘because’ in the linguists’ taxonomy. But I am not sure that the claim is
true. As I am about to say in the body, I think (58) has a metalinguistic reading despite having
sentence-initial ‘because’.
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Both of these sentences have causal readings. (Depending on how good your imag-
ination is, those causal readings may be false in all the contexts you can imagine.
But they’re still accessible.) (57), uttered with comma intonation, and (58) do have
detectable metalinguistic readings. On those readings, on the view defended above,
the sentences causally explain the speaker’s uncertainty about whether the keys are
in the drawer by adducing her not having checked yet.52 But I don’t detect what I’ve
called an evidential reading of either sentence, and it’s relevant that native speakers
typically don’t produce sentences like (57) or (58) anyway. (59) and (60) are much
more natural.
(59) Your keys might be in the drawer, but I haven’t checked yet.
(60) I haven’t checked yet, but your keys might be in the drawer.
Lest we be led astray by some artifact of the examples in (57) and (58), consider the
following plausible examples of evidential ‘because’ sentences.
(61) It might rain(,) because the sky is gray.
(62) Because we eliminated the alternative hypotheses, there must be water on
Mars.
(63) The butler must have done it because nobody else was home at the time.53
Depending on whether (61) is uttered with comma intonation, it sounds either causal
or metalinguistic to me. I detect no evidential reading either way. (62), which sounds
more natural, feels metalinguistic to me. That is, it feels to me like the ‘because’
clause functions to explain why the speaker says that there must be water on Mars,
rather than expressing a relation of evidential support between the elimination of
alternative hypotheses and (the epistemic necessity of) there being water on Mars.
We can eliminate this metalinguistic reading by embedding the ‘because’ sentence
in the antecedent of a conditional, thereby forcing the ‘because’ clause low in the
tree.54
(64) If there must be water on Mars because we eliminated the alternative hy-
potheses, then there is water on Mars.
52On Swanson (2006)’s understanding of epistemic ‘might’, what is explained by the metalinguis-
tic ‘because’ clause is the speaker’s giving the doxastic advice she gave.
53Thanks to Ezra Keshet for the example.
54Thanks to Boris Kment for suggesting this kind of example to me. Embedded epistemic modals
are rare—see the corpus study and its discussion in Hacquard and Wellwood (2012)—but it seems
to me clearly possible for us to interpret them.
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But the only obvious reading of the ‘because’ in (64) is causal. (Of course, the sen-
tence is false on that reading, but it’s still the only reading that’s available.) Uttering
the antecedent with comma intonation just revives the metalinguistic reading, by al-
lowing the ‘because’ clause to be understood as a parenthetical comment reminding
the audience why they might think that the antecedent is true.
(65) If there must be water on Mars, because we eliminated the alternative hy-
potheses, then there is water on Mars.
The best kind of evidential example, to my knowledge, is (63). It has a causal
reading, on which it says that the butler seized his opportunity to do it when he
did. (On that reading, ‘must have’ takes scope over ‘done it [when he did it] because
nobody else was home at the time’.) But it strikes me as also having a reading on
which the ‘because’ expresses a relation of evidential support between the content of
the ‘because’ clause and the content of the prejacent. (On that reading, ‘must have’
takes scope only over ‘done it’.) It thus has what I’ve been calling an evidential
reading. Now, the goal of this section was to isolate a residue of examples not
covered by the various discussions of ‘because’ elsewhere in the dissertation. This
has proved difficult, but not impossible. I suspect that we don’t actually standardly
use ‘because’ to express evidential connections. That is not to say that we can’t do
it; (63) seems to show that we can. I suspect that we are able to access evidential
readings via a (thus far non-conventionalized) metaphor. But the difficulty of finding
a large class of felicitous examples in which ‘because’ clearly expresses an evidential
connection might just reveal how very central causal explanation is to our practice
of asking ‘why’-questions and answering them with ‘because’ sentences.
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CHAPTER 4
A Causal Metaphor Account of Metaphysical
Explanation
Many metaphysical explanations involving grounding relations—the kinds of rela-
tions expressed by ‘in virtue of’ and similar phrases—are widely accepted, though
the intelligibility and utility of our grounding talk and concepts have been ques-
tioned.1 Attending to some linguistic and conceptual facts can shed light on this
dispute by showing how to make sense of metaphysical explanation, regardless of the
metaphysical legitimacy of grounding and fundamentality relations. A crucial fact
is that our explanatory language is not univocal: ‘why’ and ‘because’ have distinct
causal and metaphorical senses. Metaphysical explanations are expressed using the
latter, metaphorical senses of these words. They thereby exploit different concepts
than causal explanations. But this does not mean that our causal concepts are of
no help in illuminating metaphysical explanation. The metaphorical status of our
metaphysical explanatory terminology rather puts causal explanation, the basis of
the metaphor, in a central role. So while our explanatory concepts are not fully
general, they are unified by a common structure, paradigmatically exemplified by
causal explanatory relations.
Making clear the paradigmatic status of causal explanation for explanation in general
is a major benefit of the causal metaphor account of metaphysical explanation, but
what we want ultimately to know is what relations correspond to our explanatory
concepts. The facts about those concepts clearly matter here, but what is needed
are methods that directly reveal our conceptual structure together with an account
of how conceptual structure constrains metaphysical theorizing. This paper argues
against the common misconception that the exhibition of metaphysical difference
1See Hofweber (2009), Daly (2012), and J. Wilson (2014). Criticism of grounding is sometimes
logical positivist in spirit, though tempered by advances in our understanding of modal notions:
compare Carnap (1931) and Ayer (1940), §18 with Daly (2012), §2.4.
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is enough to reveal conceptual structure. Some differences just aren’t marked in
our thought. But it also assays a route in the other direction, from conceptual dis-
tinctness to metaphysical difference. The causal metaphor account of metaphysical
explanation traverses that route to put defeasible constraints on our metaphysical
theory vis-a-vis grounding-causation unity: if grounding were causal, we shouldn’t
have needed to resort to metaphor.2
This paper is structured in the following way: §4.1 introduces the polysemy of ‘be-
cause’ and reviews the relationship between metaphor and polysemy in natural lan-
guages. Since the polysemy account of ‘because’ requires treating the causal sense of
‘because’ as relatively unified, §4.2 justifies that treatment in light of the causal plu-
ralism debate. The justification turns on some methodological observations about the
relationship between words and concepts. Since the polysemy account of ‘because’
requires understanding the sense of ‘because’ that is used to express metaphysical
explanations as derivative from the causal sense, §4.3 exploits recent work by others
to describe the metaphor linking metaphysical explanation with causal explanation.
The main innovation here is to notice that extant accounts of the similarities be-
tween causal explanations and metaphysical explanations fit into the framework of
metaphor-generated polysemy, though the section ends with a bonus by offering a
proprietary explanation of the persistence of grounding skepticism. §4.4 discusses the
relationship between conceptual structure and metaphysical theory, and argues that
the semantic facts about ‘because’ lead us to a reason to prefer metaphysical theories
that do not treat grounding as a kind of causation. §4.5 wraps up by noting that
the result is a novel theory of explanation, according to which causal explanation is
explanation par excellence but not explanation per se.
4.1 Metaphor and Polysemy
Some comments on polysemy and the status of metaphorical senses are in order.
Polysemy is to be distinguished from univocality or—to introduce my preferred
terminology—monosemy, on the one hand, and homonymy, on the other. Monosemes
have only one meaning, while polysemes have more than one meaning. Homonyms
have unrelated meanings—cases of homonymy are really cases of distinct words that
happen to be articulated by the same syntactic strings and phonetic sequences—while
the meanings of polysemes are related to one another. A standard way of thinking
2The paper thus flirts with what Jackson (1998), 42-44 calls “immodest” conceptual analysis.
But it only flirts: in particular, I do not appeal to Moorean facts to argue that some metaphysical
view is false. I claim merely that annihilating distinctions we actually make is a cost of a theory
that does so.
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about the relatedness criterion is in terms of priority relations between the senses.3
On this standard view, one sense is basic, and the others are somehow derived from
it.4 To settle terminology, I use ‘ambiguity’ and related terms for a general category
that includes both polysemy and homonymy.
I argued in chapter 2 that ‘because’ is polysemous. To say that ‘because’ is pol-
ysemous is to say that it has multiple related meanings, and the meanings I distin-
guished in chapter 2 were a causal sense and a metaphorical sense. The causal sense
of ‘because’ is quite natural, in several respects. It is etymologically natural: the
etymology of ‘because’ suggests causation. It is psychologically natural: we repre-
sent events to ourselves with causal structure.5 It is metaphysically and semantically
natural: the world plausibly contains objective causal structure that carves the world
at its joints and is the most magnetic of possible referents.6 The metaphorical sense
of ‘because’, however, seems to be psychologically, metaphysically, and semantically
gerrymandered. It certainly cannot be read off of the etymology of ‘because’. Con-
sider the broad range of different non-causal explanatory and dependence relations
that seem to have little in common other than their non-causality.
(1) The pious is pious because it is loved by the gods.7
(2) . . . we are infallible only because we are final.8
(3) There’s a table in the room because there are simples arranged tablewise here.
(4) Bill is in pain because his C-fibers are sensitized.
(5) It was a foul because the referee called it.
(6) Michigan beat Kansas because the final score was 87-85 in Michigan’s favor.
3Some theorists (Apresjan (1974), Pustejovsky (1998)) understand the relatedness criterion
rather in terms of definitional similarities, though this approach has no way of accounting for
polysemy in cases where one of a polyseme’s meanings is semantically primitive (see Fodor and
Lepore (2002b) and the discussion in Rakova (2003), §9.4).
4Rakova (2003), ch. 1 surveys the appearance of this idea in major theories of metaphor since
the 1930’s. The standard view is not without its critics—including Rakova (2003)—but pursuing
the debate would take us too far afield. Suffice it here to say that the arguments Rakova (2003)
presents in favor of her “no-polysemy view” for polysemous adjectives do not transfer over to the
case of ‘because’.
5See Hilton (1990) and Hilton (1995) on the causal structure of our representations and the
conditions under which ‘why’-questions arise.
6See Lewis (1983, 1984) for the underpinnings of reference magnetism and, e.g., Sider (2011),
§3.2 for discussion.
7Derived from Plato, Euthyphro 10a.
8Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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(7) Ajax won because they finished with a better goal differential than PSV Eind-
hoven.
(8) ‘Dog’ means dog because dog→animal is valid.9
(9) That paper has a polysemous title because its title contains a polysemous
term.
(10) This is square because it’s a regular quadrilateral.
(11) This is red because it’s crimson.
(12) Holes in blocks of cheese exist because blocks of cheese exist.
(13) The singleton of Zutty exists because Zutty exists.
The explanantia named in these sentences variously make their explananda the case
((1), (2)); materially constitute their explananda ((3), (4)); provide necessary ((5))
or sufficient ((6)) or INUS ((7)) conditions for their explananda; are that partially
((8)) or fully ((9)) in virtue of which their explananda are true; are genus/differentia
characterizations of the species named in the explanandum ((10)); are determinates
of the determinable named in the explanandum ((11)); and are that on which their
explananda are feature ((12)) or constitutent ((13)) dependent.10 What unifies this
broad range of non-causal dependence relations into a single sense of ‘because’, this
paper argues, is that causation provides a model via the same metaphor for each of
these dependence relations.
Metaphor is but one of a variety of mechanisms linguists posit for the derivation
of additional senses.11 The idea that metaphor can be the basis for conventionalized
meaning has long been familiar to philosophers of language.12 A metaphor gives way
to literal meaning as the metaphor dies.13 To see how metaphor gives rise to distinct
9The antecedent of a conditional at Fodor and Lepore (2002b), 90.
10On INUS conditions, see Mackie (1974) and Strevens (2007). (Pace Mackie and Strevens, the
explanans of (7) can be an INUS condition but not a cause of Ajax’s winning Eredivisie.) On the
distinction between feature and constituent dependence, see Koslicki (2012).
11See Traugott (1989) for historically documented cases of semantic change that seem best ex-
plained by the conventionalization of conversational implicatures rather than by metaphorical pro-
cesses; Dirven (1985) and Bartsch (2002) for discussions of metaphor and metonymy as productive
of polysemy; Fauconnier and Turner (2003) for conceptual blending; and Aitchison and Lewis (2003)
for bleaching.
12Nerlich (2003) documents this idea—and its widespread acceptance—in early modern figures
including Locke and Leibniz.
13See Goodman (1968), II.5 and Traugott (1985). Even Davidson, who was famously skeptical
about assigning semantic content to metaphors, recognized that dead metaphors yielded ambiguity:
see Davidson (1984b), 252-253. (Davidson argues that, in dying, the metaphor loses its force.
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conventionalized meanings, consider ‘leg’. Its basic sense, let us suppose, is anatom-
ical. Parts of tables are not in the intension of that anatomical sense, so ‘leg’ in the
anatomical sense cannot be used literally to refer to parts of tables. It is somehow
too specific to apply literally to table legs. Nevertheless, someone who is familiar
only with the anatomical sense of ‘leg’ could nevertheless be expected to make sense
of talk about table legs. In order to do so, she would retain as much of the anatomical
sense of ‘leg’ as is consistent with its application to tables.14 Thus, while anatomical
legs are what support and move the bodies of animals equipped with them, she would
take table legs to be the parts of tables that support them. (Features of a basic sense
abstracted away in order to interpret a metaphorical use can still exert their force,
long after a metaphor dies. Imagine an animation of a table that can move. Of
course you imagine it walking on its legs.) Moreover, if our speaker found herself
in a community of speakers that habitually used ‘leg’ to refer to table legs, she’d
soon hear a furniture-related sense of ‘leg’. That is, ‘leg’ for her would take on a sec-
ond literal meaning. Thus metaphorical sense extension generates polysemy when a
word becomes conventionally applied to referents that its literal sense does not cover.
To see how metaphorical sense extension applies to our case, we have to see (i)
what the basic sense is and (ii) how it applies to the new area. Dealing with (i) will
occupy us in the next section, and then we will be able to turn to (ii) by indicating
the similarities exploited by the metaphor in §4.3.
4.2 How Not To Be A Causal Ambiguist
I take there to be a unified causal sense of ‘because’. But it is not obvious that all
causal explanations have much in common. In fact, Weber et al. (2005) advance
a pluralism for causal explanation, according to which there are multiple different
forms of causal explanation, each relating to a different kind of “underlying causal
structure” backing the explanation. An argument from this difference in forms of
causal explanation to distinct causal senses of ‘because’ would not be entirely novel.
It would rather recall the causal pluralism debate, where causal pluralists have char-
acterized multiple distinct causal concepts, which are then (sometimes) taken as
Thus it can fail to occur to us, for example, that ‘table legs’ might once have been evocatively
metaphorical.) According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who argue that the vast majority of
our concepts are metaphorically derived from a sharply limited stock of experiential concepts,
conventionalization of a metaphorically extended sense is consistent with the metaphor continuing
to live.
14Some metaphor theorists take this quite literally: for them, metaphor is precisely a matter of
deleting semantic features of literal senses. See Levin (1977) and Cohen (1993).
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grounds for believing that ‘cause’ is ambiguous.15 Readers familiar with the causal
pluralism literature might even worry that the existence of multiple distinct causal
senses of ‘because’ would follow from the ambiguity of ‘cause’. I’m not sure the
worry is well-placed—why isn’t it just a root fallacy?—but I’m happy to grant the
entailment to my opponent. It’s safe for me to do so because, despite what some
causal pluralists might have you believe, ‘cause’ isn’t ambiguous.16
This is not to say that causal pluralism, taken as the thesis that causal relations
are not metaphysically uniform and therefore require multiple distinct analyses, is
false. Indeed I take it that causal pluralists have in at least some cases correctly
distinguished different causal notions. But ‘cause’ doesn’t denote any particular one
of those notions to the exclusion of the others. Our ability to make conceptual dis-
tinctions in general does not require our words to pick out more specific concepts
to the exclusion of less specific concepts. Theoretically precisified concepts are only
in special cases the meanings of the words of natural languages.17 Proper attention
to our use of ‘cause’ shows that none of the precise concepts of cause on offer in
the causal pluralism literature qualifies as one of its disambiguations in the sense
relevant to its meaning. Proper attention instead vindicates monosemy accounts.18
15The conceptual waters are muddied here by what are, by my lights, rampant category errors.
Hall (2004) borrows the Scholastic and Deleuzian phrase ‘univocal concept’, whereas it is linguistic
items (e.g., words) that can be the bearers of univocality and related properties. The category
error breeds confusion, as the following list of examples amply demonstrates: Longworth (2006),
§4.4 attributes a polysemy thesis to Hall (2004). Hitchcock (2007) provides a taxonomy of positions
in the causal pluralism debate while taking “the central tenet of causal pluralism to be the claim
that ‘cause’ and its cognates have multiple senses” (op. cit., 201). Godfrey-Smith (2009) claims
that ‘cause’ is univocal and emphasizes the distinction between pluralism in our “thought and talk”
and pluralism in “the phenomena that our thought and talk is about,” but assumes that ambiguity
would follow from our having distinct causal concepts. Thus op. cit., §3 criticizes Hall’s two concept
view by contrasting our use of ‘cause’ with our use of the polysemes ‘mad’ and ‘funny’.
16This might sound contentious to readers of the semantics literature. Lakoff (1970), one of
the first presentations of the method employed in chapter 2 to show that ‘because’ is polysemous,
applied that method to argue for the recognition of distinct intentional and non-intentional senses
of various verb phrases. Mel’cˇuk (2012), ch. 5 explicitly claims that ‘cause’ is ambiguous between
agential and non-agential meanings. But the tests simply don’t support the ambiguity claim.
17Cf. Tarski (1944), §14, where it is presupposed that concepts have clear, sharp boundaries
despite the vagueness and ambiguity of natural language. Concepts, I think, can be just as inde-
terminate as the words that express them.
18The causal pluralism literature itself suggests multiple kinds of monosemy account, including
the ‘amiable jumble’ account of Skyrms (1984) (see also Healey (1994), section VIII), the thin
concept account of Cartwright (1999, 2004) (building on Anscombe (1971)), the epistemic account
of Williamson (2006), and the ‘essentially contested concept’ account of Godfrey-Smith (2009). The
disjunctive account of Longworth (2010) would seem to qualify as well, though Longworth seems to
endorse the inference from plurality of concepts to ambiguity (compare the denial of the ambiguity
suggested by Hitchcock (2001) at Longworth (2006), 90 with the assertion that Hall (2004) is a
polysemy account at Longworth (2006), 93).
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After I make this argument, I will present a parallel argument that causal explana-
tion pluralism provides us with no reason to think there are multiple causal senses
of ‘because’, either.
Causal pluralists make a variety of distinctions between kinds of causation.19 For
the moment I propose to take Hall (2004) as my representative causal pluralist, since
the relevant issues can be made quite clear in discussing his view. According to
Hall, we do not have a “univocal concept” of causation; rather, there are distinct
concepts of production and counterfactual dependence. The production concept is
(non-exhaustively) characterized by a number of intuitive theses about causation.
(14) Transitivity: If event c is a cause of d, and d is a cause of e, then c is a
cause of e.
(15) Locality: Causes are connected to their effects via spatiotemporally con-
tinuous sequences of causal intermediates.
(16) Intrinsicness: The causal structure of a process is determined by its in-
trinsic, non-causal character (together with the laws).20
The counterfactual dependence concept is simple counterfactual dependence: c causes
e just in case, had c not occurred, e would not have occurred.21 Hall argues that
counterfactual dependence comes into conflict with Transitivity, Locality, and
Intrinsicness, the theses that characterize production, concluding that counterfac-
tual dependence and production are simply different causal concepts.
Hall seems to accept that his claim about the existence of two causal concepts would
entail that ‘cause’ is ambiguous.22 He directly commits himself to there being a coun-
19To provide some examples not discussed in the text, Sober (1984) and Eells (1991) distinguish
(probabilistic) type causation from (probabilistic) token causation. Hitchcock (2001) distinguishes
having ‘component’ effects from having ‘net’ effects and claims that causal claims are ambiguous
between the two.
20These theses are given at Hall (2004), 225.
21Counterfactual dependence was thought, from the time of Lewis (1973), to be the heart of
an analysis of causation. But simple counterfactual dependence is not, by itself, adequate to the
analysis, as cases of overdetermination and preemption show. In fact, preemption also turns out to
undermine any hope that distinguishing between production and simple counterfactual dependence
yields an exhaustive, if disjunctive, treatment of event causation, as Hall himself recognizes in
connection with the escort plane case discussed below.
22See op. cit., 255-256, where Hall acknowledges a connection between multiplicity of concepts
and ambiguity. He introduces Tim Maudlin’s example of various kinds of biological and adoptive
mothers which can be conceptually distinguished despite the apparent univocality of ‘mother’. But
rather than taking the opportunity to foreswear any ambiguity claim about ‘cause’ or get clearer
about the relationship between conceptual distinctions and ambiguity, he excuses himself from
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terfactual dependence sense of ‘because’.23 It is unclear, though, what the claimed
possibility of distinguishing different kinds of causation has to do with the semantics
of ‘cause’ or related terms. Our ability to distinguish different breeds of dogs does
not establish that ‘dog’ is ambiguous. The fact that we can kick with our left and
right feet does not mean ‘kick’ is ambiguous between a sense for right-footed kickings
and a sense for left-footed kickings. Rather, when we call something a dog or say
somebody kicked something, we are not making maximally specific statements. We
can convey more information about what exactly is the case by saying something
more precise, by calling the dog a miniature dachshund or saying the person kicked a
soccer ball with her left foot. But to say something less than maximally precise is not
to say something ambiguous, at least not as linguists or semanticists understand that
term. To return to Hall’s causal pluralism, the counterfactual dependence “sense” of
‘because’ is at best a precisification of a broad causal sense, as are the counterfactual
dependence and production “senses” of ‘cause’.24
If Hall’s production and counterfactual dependence are two concepts of causation,
the broad causal sense is a third. But this third, I claim, is the concept expressed by
the unambiguous English word ‘cause’. That none of the precise concepts described
in the causal pluralism literature is a genuine sense of ‘cause’ can be seen from our
linguistic practice. I will mention two features of our linguistic practice that support
the monosemy of the English noun ‘cause’ here, though the stock of evidence to
follow can be reproduced for the English verb ‘cause’, and could easily be enlarged
for both the noun and the verb.25 First, an ambiguity hypothesis along the lines of
Hall’s distinction makes predictions about truth-conditions that are not borne out
by the facts. To see this, consider first the truth-conditional behavior of a genuinely
ambiguous term. Following Godfrey-Smith (2009), I’ll use ‘mad’. Imagine (17) and
(18), said of an insane philosopher who is happily laughing.
adjudicating the issue.
23Op. cit., 269: “Even when you choose to avoid a certain course of action because it would result
in your having helped produce the evil deed, the sense of ‘because’ is clearly that of dependence.”
24Hall’s conflation of precisifications with senses is not limited to his paper’s main causal plurality
claim. Early on, he assumes “that there is a clear and central sense of ‘cause’. . . in which causes
and effects are always events” (op. cit., 227). But this too is a mere precisification of a sense: see
Jenkins (2008) on the semantic generality of ‘cause’ with respect to ontological category.
25I do not discuss translational evidence because, to my knowledge, none of the distinctions de-
scribed by causal pluralists have been explored cross-linguistically, though I’d be more than a bit
surprised to learn that different languages had different words for, e.g., production and counter-
factual dependence. (Kripke (1977) counts that hypothetical surprise as evidence of monosemy,
though I would be equally surprised if anyone were bowled over by this kind of evidence.) I also
do not discuss reduced conjunctions here, but any reader not convinced by the indicators discussed
here may see the second chapter for a blueprint that could be followed to test ‘cause’.
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(17) That gleeful philosopher is mad.
(18) That gleeful philosopher is mad, but he’s not insane.
(17) has a reading on which it’s false, since angry people aren’t gleeful. It also has a
reading on which it’s true, since, as we are imagining, the philosopher in question is
insane. On the angry reading of ‘mad’, (18) is again false—angry people still aren’t
gleeful. But on the insane reading of ‘mad’, it’s straightforwardly self-contradictory.
Now consider a case of production without counterfactual dependence, say, where
Billy throws a rock that shatters a vase, though Suzy also threw a rock that would
have shattered the vase had Billy not thrown his rock.
(19) Billy’s throwing of the rock was the cause of the shattering of the vase.
(20) Billy’s throwing of the rock was the cause of shattering of the vase, but it
would’ve been shattered even if he hadn’t thrown it.26
If there were a specific counterfactual dependence sense of ‘cause’, there would be a
reading of (19) on which it’s false, and a reading of (20) on which it’s contradictory.
But there are no such readings, precisely because there is no specific counterfactual
dependence sense of ‘cause’.
Second, we do not need to disambiguate causal claims before we understand them.
We might attempt to precisify a causal claim, even (colloquially) asking what our
interlocutor means by her causal claim.27 But when we do so, we are typically seek-
ing the grounds of her claim rather than trying to disambiguate it. At best, Hall
has isolated, in his notions of production and counterfactual dependence, ways of
making causal claims true.28 It may be relevant to our dialogue whether the cause
she cites produced the effect in question or is merely something on which it depends.
But finding out what makes it the case that the cause cited is a cause is not the same
thing as finding out that it is a cause in one sense or another. Of course, there may
be natural language expressions corresponding to the production or counterfactual
dependence concepts, and if there aren’t, nothing would prevent us from coining
terms for the concepts. But ‘cause’ expresses a more general concept that counts
among its paradigm cases not one or the other of paradigm cases of production and
26This example is inspired by the discussion of disambiguation through cooccurring material in
Sadock (1972).
27Godfrey-Smith (2009), §3 also makes this point in discussing Hall (2004).
28Hall himself is open to this possibility (recall fn. 22). Strevens (2013) takes Hall’s invitation to
reformulate his view as distinguishing between kinds of causation instead of concepts of causation,
and adopts talk of kinds of causation as ways our causal assertions are ‘made true’. See also Leitgeb
(2013), §5 for a discussion of explication that treats it as an obviously revisionary project.
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paradigm cases of counterfactual dependence, but both.
Metaphysical heterogeneity does not in general underwrite ambiguity. We can dis-
tinguish four categories of words with respect to the metaphysical heterogeneity of
their referents and ambiguity. Some words are polysemous (or homonymous), having
distinct senses that denote metaphysically different kinds of things.29 ‘Book’ falls in
this category. It is polysemous between concrete object and abstract text senses.
The different senses track metaphysically different kinds of things. Other words are
monosemous, having a single sense that denotes just one kind of thing. ‘Electron’
falls in this category. It univocally denotes electrons. Yet other words are monose-
mous but disjunctive, having a single sense that denotes metaphysically different
kinds of things. ‘Jade’, as philosophers commonly think of it, falls in this category.
To be jade is to be jadeite or nephrite, but ‘jade’ requires no disambiguation. Its sin-
gle sense is just disjunctive.30 This third category of words is enough to give the lie
to any form of causal pluralism that infers ambiguity from metaphysical difference.
But still further words are monosemous and have a metaphysically heterogeneous
intension but a non-disjunctive sense. ‘Jade’ in an imagined pre-discovery history
where nobody knew jadeite and nephrite were different substances falls in this cate-
gory.31 So, I claim, does ‘cause’.
‘Cause’ does not fit neatly into any of the first three categories described above.
As Hall and other causal pluralists have argued, ‘cause’ can denote different kinds of
things, like ‘book’ and ‘jade’, but unlike ‘electron’. It is nevertheless monosemous,
like ‘electron’ and ‘jade’, but unlike ‘book’. But ‘cause’ is not just disjunctive in the
way that we might think ‘jade’ is. A case described by Hall suggests that ‘cause’
is not restricted to denoting relations of either production or simple counterfactual
dependence. In the case, one of two fighter planes escorting a successful bombing
mission shoot down an enemy fighter. Had the enemy fighter not been shot down,
the bombing mission would not have succeeded. We judge that the escort plane’s
shooting down of the enemy fighter is among the causes of the mission’s success. The
escort plane’s shooting down of the enemy fighter does not, however, produce the
success of the mission: it is too far away from the site of the bombing to do that
29Strictly speaking, I should deny that some words are homonymous; only pluralities of words
can be homonymous. I’ll stick to polysemes in the body for ease of exposition.
30For confirmation that disjunctive senses are compatible with monosemy, see Roberts (1984).
Roberts argues that the difference between ambiguity and monosemy is the scope of a disjunction.
31Philosophers sometimes talk as though people at some point didn’t know—or still don’t know—
that ‘jade’ applies to two different substances: see, e.g., Putnam (1975b), 160. This is implausible,
since jadeite and nephrite are different colors, are found in different places, have different hardnesses,
etc.: see LaPorte (2004), 94-100; Hacking (2007); and Oderberg (2007), 164-165.
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(recall Locality). Further, the description of the case goes on to specify that, had
the escort plane not shot down the enemy fighter, the other escort plane would have.
So the success of the mission does not counterfactually depend on the escort plane’s
shooting down of the enemy fighter. To sum up, the escort plane’s shooting down
of the enemy fighter is a cause of the success of the mission without producing it
and without the success of the mission counterfactually depending on it. So ‘cause’
cannot just denote the relation that holds whenever there is production or coun-
terfactual dependence. (Any such account of ‘cause’ would be intensionally, even
extensionally, inadequate.) So ‘cause’ is not just disjunctive like ‘jade’, at least not
along the joint mapped by Hall’s distinction between production and counterfactual
dependence.
The stronger claim that ‘cause’ is not disjunctive like ‘jade’ along any such joint
may also be defended. I take it that the meaning of ‘jade’ is really the disjunction
jadeite or nephrite. Competent speakers of English may not know that there are two
kinds of jade, just as many of them do not know exactly what it takes for something
to be an elm tree. Semantic externalism comes into play here for ‘jade’ as it does
for ‘elm’.32 But semantic externalism does not seem to justify the identification of
some disjunction as the meaning of ‘cause’. Speakers do not become more compe-
tent with ‘cause’ through acquaintance with the causal pluralism literature in the
way that speakers gain real mastery of ‘elm’ or ‘jade’ through acquaintance with
the relevant botanical or mineralogical facts. (Metaphysicians do not, in virtue of
anything in the causal pluralism literature, get to correct native speakers on when
to use ‘cause’.) Further, it is unclear what would privilege any particular disjunction
identified through the causal pluralism literature to be the disjunctive meaning of
‘cause’. Nothing said in that literature obviously makes production or counterfactual
dependence a better candidate disjunctive meaning of ‘cause’ than type causation or
token causation. It seems that any such disjunction will get the meaning of ‘cause’
right only intensionally. In at least this respect, then, ‘cause’ is more like ‘electron’
or ‘jade’ during the imagined pre-discovery period than like ‘jade’ now: it just means
cause.
I suspect what is really going on with ‘cause’ as a monoseme with a metaphysi-
cally heterogeneous intension is that it has a collection of metaphysically heteroge-
neous paradigm or prototype cases. This collection includes, presumably, productive
causes, causes on which their effects counterfactually depend, type causes, token
causes, and all the rest of the kinds of causes distinguished in the causal pluralism
32See Putnam (1975b).
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literature. (Actually, given that production and counterfactual dependence often go
together, it may just be that the collection includes paradigms that exemplify both
of Hall’s precisified concepts.) What makes the action of the escort plane in Hall’s
example count as causal is that it is close enough to paradigm cases of causation. For
one thing, it bears a close resemblance to causes on which their effects counterfac-
tually depend, since the success of the mission does counterfactually depend on the
enemy fighter being shot down somehow or other, and the escort plane’s action is one
way for the enemy fighter’s being shot down to happen. For another, the escort plane
produces an omission on which the success of the mission counterfactually depends.
Ideally, the class of constellations of prototype causes with which competent speak-
ers of English are familiar would be specifiable in a way that explains not only the
metaphysically heterogeneity of the intension of ‘cause’ already noted, but also the
host of normative and other considerations that many psychologists think influence
our causal judgments. That agents are magnets for causal attribution, that temporal
order of events matters to causal attribution, and that various normative consider-
ations play a role in causal attribution might all be explained this way.33 Perhaps
this is too great an explanatory burden for a class of constellations of prototypes to
bear. I certainly have no intention of defending a prototype theory of concepts here.
I am just registering the suspicion.
To return to the dialectic, we have seen with ‘cause’ that monosemy is no bar to
metaphysical heterogeneity in kinds of causes. It is now time to apply this lesson to
pluralism about causal explanation. I make the point with respect to two notions of
causal explanation, which I will call (i) etiological explanation and (ii) evolutionary
explanation.34 Etiological explanations say how some state of affairs happened. Evo-
lutionary explanations say why a system evolves to a state. The precise definition
of each kind of explanation is not of any particular importance for present purposes,
so many details will be glossed over in what follows. In particular, I rely on an intu-
itive grasp of notions of causal interactions, interference, and triggering. Particular
spellings out of these notions may have consequences for the exhaustiveness of the
33Causal attribution is an enormous field of research in social psychology, but the classic works for
the sliver of that literature relevant here are Heider (1958) and Kelley (1967). On agents as magnets
for causal attribution, see Hart and Honore´ (1959) (an entry from the philosophy literature) and
Brickman et al. (1975). On temporal order, see Brickman et al. (1975). On the role of normativity,
see for example Hilton and Slugoski (1986), Alicke (1992), Knobe and Fraser (2008), Alicke et al.
(2011), and Sripada (2011). Note, however, that some philosophers think that at least some of
these effects are just performance errors: see Pinillos et al. (2011) and Dunaway et al. (2013).
34The terminology (viz., ‘etiological’ and ‘evolutionary’) is due to Weber et al. (2005). Note that
what I am calling ‘etiological explanation’ differs from how Salmon (1989), §3.8 uses that label.
‘Evolutionary’, for its part, is intended in the sense in which state spaces evolve rather than as a
reference to the explanations of evolutionary biology.
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classification of causal explanations considered here.35 But I hope that the discussion
here will have already provided the blueprint to deal with any remaining cases.
Etiological explanations, then, explain an object x’s having a property P at a time t
by adducing a causal interaction at an earlier time t′ in which x took on the property
P and noting that no causal interactions interfere with x’s having P between t′ and
t.36
(21) The window is broken now because a baseball crashed through it earlier.
The sentence in (21) communicates an etiological explanation. The window’s being
broken now is explained by the causal interaction during which it was broken. The
window’s not having been fixed in the interim is not mentioned in (21), as it is char-
acteristic of ‘because’ sentences that they do not need to mention the omission of
interference to be true.37
Evolutionary explanations explain an object x’s having a property P at time t by
adducing a causal interaction at an earlier time t′ in which x took on a suite of prop-
erties Q1, . . . , Qn which jointly triggered an evolution resulting in x having property
P at time t.38
(22) The vessel contains a homogeneous mixture of fluid A and fluid B now be-
cause heated fluid B was added to the vessel earlier.
The sentence in (22) communicates an evolutionary explanation. The vessel’s con-
taining a homogeneous mixture now is explained by its having had a heated (relative
to fluid A) fluid B added to the vessel earlier. It is worth spelling out how the sentence
in (22) qualifies as providing an evolutionary explanation. The suite of properties
35The proper definition of ‘causal interaction’, for example, has been subject to much debate.
See, e.g., the debate carried across Salmon (1984a, 1994, 1997) and Dowe (1992, 1995). Weber
et al. (2005), for their part, adopt a definition of causal interaction which has, as a consequence, the
ruling out of beliefs as playing an etiological explanatory role for actions, which then requires them
to treat such explanations under the heading ‘causal explanations without descriptions of causal
interactions’. But with respect to any plausible precisification of ‘causal interaction’, semantics is
like the honey badger: it don’t care.
36This is a simplification of a definition at Weber et al. (2005), §2.2.4, though my talk of ‘in-
terference’ replaces Weber et al.’s talk of ‘spontaneous preservation’, of which they give a formal
definition at §2.2.3.
37This is not to say that it is not characteristic of fully spelled out explanations that they include
the specification of such omissions. See, e.g., Weber et al. (2005), §2 as well as Strevens (2008), ch.
3.
38This is a simplified and generalized version of a definition at Weber et al. (2005), §3.2 of what
they call ‘spontaneous evolution explanations’. I drop the spontaneity condition, which would rule
out the stock market example I discuss below, as irrelevant for present purposes.
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Q1, . . . , Qn taken on by the vessel when the fluid was added includes the property of
containing liquid with a particular temperature gradient and, if fluid A and fluid B
have different densities, the property of containing a liquid with a particular density
gradient. The liquid with those temperature and density gradients then evolved into
a homogeneous mixture. (22) can only be understood to be true by someone who is
aware of the connection between combining liquids of different temperatures at one
time and homogeneity of the mixture at a later time.
For a slightly more complicated example, consider how to explain price changes in
markets. Typically an event occurs that results in a mismatch between the current
price and the equilibrium price. We can think of such an event as a causal interaction
in which the market takes on a suite of properties. Such events include changes in
production costs and all the other typical causes of changes in supply or demand
curves listed in introductory economics textbooks. The suite of properties taken on
includes, most importantly, a difference in the levels of supply and demand at the
current price. This sets in motion an almost arbitrarily complex process that issues
in the establishment of a new price: sales and warehouse inventories are tracked,
meetings are held, decisions are made.39 Again, ‘because’ sentences expressing this
kind of evolutionary explanation typically adduce the causal interaction responsible
for the initial suite of properties, but not the causal pathways of the subsequent
evolution.
(23) The stock price is $50 now because the earnings report was good.
The event responsible for the initial causal interaction that produced the difference
in supply and demand is cited in (23). Earnings reports move stock prices, we may
suppose, by moving the supply and demand curves for stocks. But the causal details
of the process by which the stock price moves to $50 are not mentioned in (23), even
though the process might unfold in an incredible variety of ways. This is a general
feature of evolutionary explanation, then, and not one confined to evolutionary ex-
planations with relatively predictable paths of evolution like the one communicated
by (22). It can suffice to cite events that set a process in motion in order to explain
a later state of the process.40
The foregoing comments suffice to draw a distinction between etiological and evolu-
39See Strevens (2008), §7.41.
40The indifference of evolutionary explanations to causal details renders them difficult to incorpo-
rate in theories of causal explanation—see Strevens (2008), §7.41 and §12.3 and Weatherson (2012),
§§4-5—but we’ll see that there is no associated ambiguity in ‘because’ presently.
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tionary explanation. No careful analysis of the two notions has been attempted here,
but it should now be possible to see that ‘because’ is not ambiguous between them.
Consider first the truth-conditional behavior of ‘because’. Holding fixed the facts
that make at least one reading of (21) true, there’s no alternative ‘disambiguation’
of (21). The same holds of (22) and (23). If, moreover, ‘because’ had a specific
etiological explanation sense, there would be a reading of (22) on which the vessel
takes on the property of containing a homogeneous mixture of fluid A and fluid B
when the heated fluid B is added to the vessel. Given that reading of (22), there
should be a contradictory reading of (24).
(24) The vessel contains a homogeneous mixture of fluid A and fluid B now be-
cause heated fluid B was added to the vessel earlier, but the vessel did not
take on the property of being a homogeneous mixture when the heated fluid
B was added.
But of course there is not a contradictory reading of (24). Further, cross-linguistic
evidence does not support an ambiguity claim for ‘because’ along the lines of the
etiological explanation-evolutionary explanation distinction.41 As with ‘cause’, we
find here a unified causal sense of ‘because’.42
41I discuss the cross-linguistic evidence for ‘because’ in chapter 3.
42Astute readers will have noticed I have avoided the controversial class of equilibrium explana-
tions. The following example, inspired by Sober (1983), is representative of the class.
(i) The sex ratio in many species at reproductive age is 1:1 because any departure from that
ratio would induce reproductive advantages for the minority sex.
Unlike the evolutionary explanations discussed in this section, (i) does not proceed by citing an
event that set a process in motion. It explains the obtaining of an equilibrium condition by appeal
only to laws governing the dynamics of the system in equilibrium. So not only are the causal
details of the process leading from some initial conditions to an equilibrium state neglected by
such explanations, but even the initial conditions from which the system evolved are neglected by
these explanations.
Whether equilibrium explanations are causal explanations is controversial. Sober (1983) ar-
gues that they are just not causal, though Strevens (2008), §7.41 defends the causality of
equilibrium explanations against Sober’s criticisms. (See Weatherson (2012) for a critical appraisal
of the success of Strevens’s account.) But note that such explanations are only acceptable as
answers to indicative ‘why’-questions (as opposed to ‘why should’-questions) if the explanandum
actually came about through causal influences connected to the putative explanans. If in the
actual world the sex ratio in many species if 1:1 because an omnipotent God made it that way and
is keeping it that way, then (i) is false even if it’s true that, should God stop keeping it that way,
forces of natural selection would.
This is something like an argument that equilibrium explanations are causal, although I am
uncertain whether it is the causal sense of ‘because’ that covers equilibrium explanations. The
judgments that have to be made using my preferred strategies for individuating senses are elusive.
For example, since there is no time attached to the explanans phrase, the strategy of checking
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The dialectical purpose of the extended discussion of pluralism and the relationship
between metaphysical heterogeneity and ambiguity in this section was to establish
that there’s a unified causal explanatory sense of ‘because’ to serve as the basis for
the causal metaphor that gives rise to the polysemy of ‘because’ by extending its
meaning to cover metaphysical explanations. We are now ready for the metaphor.
4.3 The Causal Metaphor
What it takes to describe the metaphor depends in part on the theory of metaphor
adopted.43 But on standard views of metaphor there must be some substantial sim-
ilarity between what is denoted by a basic sense and the phenomena to be compre-
hended under a metaphorical sense. What I want to do in this section is to exhibit
that there is enough similarity between the senses for metaphor to be a plausible
explanation of the extension of ‘because’ to the sense that covers metaphysical ex-
planation, on standard views of metaphor. The important point will be that the
similarities described here suffice to illuminate how the sense of ‘because’ covering
metaphysical explanation fits the story according to which metaphor gives rise to
polysemy.
To begin with, it’s worth noting that we deploy terminology from our causal dis-
course in our discourse about metaphysical dependence. We have already seen that
we use ‘because’ to communicate metaphysical explanations. We also use other
causal idioms to talk about metaphysical dependence and metaphysical explanation.
(25) The pious being loved by the gods makes it the case that it is pious.
whether something analogous to (24) is self-contradictory is not open to us. However, if there
were a sense of ‘because’ that required any kind of citation of initial conditions or causes, there
would be a reading on which (i) is not true even on the condition that the equilibrium explanation
is true. I certainly don’t detect such a reading. The question is actually of some independent
interest, since what it takes for an explanation to count as a causal explanation is itself a matter
of some controversy: compare the comments about trivializing the notion of causal explanation
at Sober (1983), 202-203 with Skow (2013b). So it would not be entirely unwelcome to have a
demonstration that the ‘because’ of (i) is not the causal ‘because’ of (21), (22), and (23).
The uncertainty here does not affect anything substantive in this paper, since it’s possible
for polysemes to have more than two senses. It’s also possible that the metaphorical sense of
‘because’ that covers metaphysical explanations will turn out to cover equilibrium explanations (as
well as, it may turn out, other explanations of or by laws).
43Even the possibility of giving any precise specification of the semantic content of a metaphor
is controversial. Davidson (1984b) famously argued that the literal meaning of a metaphor is the
literal meaning of the words contained in it, and that any apparent metaphorical content is merely
a matter of thoughts provoked in us by the metaphor.
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(26) Zutty’s existence explains the existence of the singleton containing him.
(27) That this is square follows from its being a regular quadrilateral.
(28) This is red by virtue of being crimson.
It is not, however, necessary to use causal idioms to talk about metaphysical depen-
dence, nor does every facet of causation apply to metaphysical dependence.
(29) There being simples arranged tablewise here is just what it is for there to
be a table here.44
(30) Bill’s pain is nothing over and above his C-fiber sensitization.45
(31) That paper has a polysemous title in virtue of its title’s containing a poly-
semous term.
The occurrence of a cause is not what it is for an effect to occur, and an effect is
something over and above its cause. Further, while ‘by virtue of’ is a common causal
idiom, ‘in virtue of’ is something of a philosopher’s locution.46 Still, the pattern of
facts here suggests that there is at least a partial overlap in how we think about
metaphysical explanation with how we think about causal explanation.47
Recent entrants in the literature show that we can do better than this mere sugges-
tion. We can elaborate in some technical detail a host of properties that causation
and grounding, the relations respectively backing causal and metaphysical explana-
tion, have in common.48 Both relations are structurally similar: both are (claimed
to be) partial orders to which we can apply the sophisticated formalism of structural
equations models. Both relations have metaphysical bite: they back explanations,
support counterfactuals, and frighten logical positivists. Both relations inspire the
same kinds of suggestive description: they are ‘generative’, ‘productive’, ‘building’
44This sentence should be able to express a grounding claim if Rosen (2010) is right about the
grounding-reduction link, but see Audi (2012), §V for dissent. (Pace Rayo (2013), I do not take
the locution ‘is just what it is’ to express a symmetric relation.)
45Here see Audi (2012), §VI for dissent about whether this sentence can express a grounding
claim.
46Garner’s Modern American Usage even deems ‘in virtue of’ archaic: see Garner (2009), 845.
As far as I can tell, its use is limited to legal, philosophical, and theological contexts.
47The pattern of facts here is the pattern exhibited by what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) call
structuring metaphors; a cognitive linguist confronted with this pattern of facts might say that
causation structures our understanding of metaphysical dependence.
48See A. Wilson (2013) and Schaffer (2014) for some of the elaborations. I just give the gist here.
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relations.49 Some even argue that grounding and causation are subsumable in a
metaphysically important sense under some more general notion.
Causal explanation and metaphysical explanation also permit similar partial ex-
planantia in ‘because’ sentences. Just as we can sometimes say that the match lit
because there was oxygen in the room, we can sometimes say that Ajax won because
the season is over. Just as the presence of oxygen is a background condition that
makes it possible for striking the match to cause it to light, the season ending is
a background condition that makes it possible for a goal differential to ground a
league championship. In both cases, the relevant ‘because’ sentences can felicitously
communicate the background conditions to an inquirer who lacks only the knowledge
that the background condition obtained.
None of the foregoing similarities, however, could suffice to establish the metaphysi-
cal unity of metaphysical explanation and causal explanation in the face of the causal
metaphor account of metaphysical explanation. Recall how metaphor gives rise to
polysemy. When a word or a phrase is used metaphorically in a sentence, its con-
ventional, literal meaning is somehow too specific to apply. But, as long as there
are similarities between the literal intension of the word or phrase and the objects,
properties, or relations the sentence is about, speakers are able to make sense of the
resulting metaphor. With long enough exposure to such uses, the metaphorical use
may become conventionalized. But the important thing for present purposes is that
the metaphorical use is based on some discernible similarity between the objects,
properties, or relations literally denoted by the word or phrase and those at issue
in the metaphorical use, while also presupposing that there are differences between
them. If it weren’t for the differences, there would be no need for a metaphor. In
our case of interest, we saw in chapter 2 that the causal sense of ‘because’ does not
denote metaphysical explanatory relationships. The host of shared properties men-
tioned above is nevertheless basis enough for a metaphorical extension of the causal
meaning of ‘because’. We are thus able to make sense of ‘because’ sentences like
(1)–(13).
The metaphorical status of the sense of ‘because’ that covers metaphysical expla-
nation may provide ammunition for grounding skeptics.50 Schaffer (2014) provides
49Schaffer (2014) calls them ‘generative’ and ‘productive’. Bennett (forthcoming) classes causa-
tion with specific grounding relations under the heading ‘building relations’ (but cf. Bennett (2011),
93-94 for a less unifying discussion).
50In particular, the considerations here might be taken as a supplement to the arguments that
grounding is unintelligible in Daly (2012), §2.6.
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paradigm cases of grounding, various suggestive analogies, and a formalism for han-
dling grounding claims, and then challenges the skeptic to “say what more is needed”
to clarify the notion.51 But if our only way of understanding the paradigm cases is via
the suggestive analogies and via the formal similarities between grounding and cau-
sation, then grounding itself is understood only via a causal metaphor. Metaphor, of
course, is just the sort of thing that eludes precise characterization—recall again the
Davidsonian deflation of the semantic content of metaphors. What more is needed
may just be the one thing we can’t have: a real definition.52
4.4 From Semantics to Metaphysics
We have now seen the basis for the claim that the sense of ‘because’ that covers
metaphysical explanation is metaphorical. That linguistic claim explains the poly-
semy observed in chapter 2. Further, if the polysemy claim and its explanation are
right, it will be of special interest to the philosopher if it tells us something about
the relationship between causal and metaphysical explanation. Insofar as words ex-
press concepts, we can take the linguistic difference between senses of ‘because’ to
reveal an underlying conceptual distinction between causal explanatory concepts and
metaphysical explanatory concepts. That conceptual distinction might be reflected
by some metaphysical difference between causal explanation and metaphysical expla-
nation, but it might equally be a distinction without a difference. For it to bear on
metaphysical questions requires an account of the relationship between our concep-
tual structure and the world. The argument of §4.2 was that metaphysical differences
related to distinct precisifications of our concepts did not guarantee semantic ambi-
guity. We are now trying to see how semantic ambiguity could lead us to believe in
metaphysical differences.
Let’s see how the relationship between semantics and metaphysics works in some
more ordinary cases. In some cases, we have distinct words for what are essentially
the same kinds of things. Thus ‘astronaut’ and ‘cosmonaut’, at least as they were
used during the Cold War, differ in extension. Their meanings incorporate inten-
tional gerrymandering: astronauts were American, cosmonauts were Soviet. The
distinction hung on through the end of the Cold War, with ‘cosmonaut’ being re-
served for Russians (and other Roscosmos space-travelling personnel, like Latvian-
born cosmonaut Aleksandr Kaleri). As other nations developed space programs, the
51Op. cit., 2.
52Of course, if grounding is really a primitive, no real definition will be forthcoming. But then
grounding skepticism should be no surprise, given the plausibility of our being able to interpret it
only via a metaphor.
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gerrymandering exerted its force. Thus we now have ‘taikonaut’, ‘spationaut’, and
‘vyomanaut’. The terms ‘ruby’ and ‘sapphire’ mark similarly gerrymandered distinc-
tions within the natural kind corundum: rubies are the red ones, while a piece of
corundum of any other color is a sapphire. In neither case does metaphysically deep
unity override patterns of use that follow metaphysically shallow joints. In other
cases, we insist on semantic unity in the face of deep metaphysical difference. Con-
sider again our example ‘jade’ (as it’s used now, not as it was used in an imagined
pre-discovery past). We can assume the chemical differences between jadeite and
nephrite are reflected by their metaphysical grounds, so ‘jade’ indeed covers very
different sorts of things. These are all cases where semantics is misleading as a guide
to metaphysics: we make distinctions without a deep difference when it comes to
space travelers and corundum, but elide real differences in our talk about jade.
A more interesting kind of case involves metaphysical unity exerting its force to
determine word meaning. Thus despite the fact that people might have used ‘mam-
mal’ or ‘ape’ in a way they thought excluded whales and people, respectively, from
their intensions, biological facts overrode those patterns of use. It took no change
in the meaning of ‘mammal’ or ‘ape’ for us to recognize that whales are mammals
and that people are apes, but only the discovery of certain evolutionary facts.53 Le-
gal cases also exhibit the resistance of word-meanings to gerrymandering. Justice
Alito, for example, recently wrote that the admission that non-profit corporations
can count as ‘persons’ suffices to require that the meaning that covers non-profit
corporations also cover for-profit corporations:
This concession effectively dispatches any argument that the term “per-
son” as used in RFRA does not reach the closely held corporations in-
volved in these cases. No known understanding of the term “person”
includes some but not all corporations. The term “person” sometimes
encompasses artificial persons (as the Dictionary Act instructs), and it
sometimes is limited to natural persons. But no conceivable definition
of the term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not
53See Kripke (1980), 138. Dupre´ (1993, 2006) and LaPorte (2004, 2010) claim that meanings do
change in cases like this. According to LaPorte, for example, what Putnam, Kripke, and others
would consider discoveries are in fact merely occasions for scientists to make decisions about how
to stipulate meanings. This strikes me as neglecting the role of semantic intentions: if what we are
trying to pick out with our use of a word is something scientifically natural, then indeed we can
discover its intension to be something other than what we might originally have taken it to be. See
here Putnam (1975b) and Burge (1979). But LaPorte does seem to have a point with respect to
certain identity statements, like ‘water = H2O’: whether or not we count heavy water (D2O) as
water is plausibly a matter of deference to stipulation by experts. The same goes for what we count
as a planet.
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for-profit corporations. Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 378 (2005)
(To give th[e] same words a different meaning for each category would be
to invent a statute rather than interpret one).54
Justice Alito here notes a pressure not to interpret words as having gerrymandered
meanings. But the legal meaning of ‘person’ according to which both ‘natural per-
sons’ and corporations are persons is itself extremely gerrymandered. This gerry-
mandering is allowed, the story goes, only because it is made explicit in the law.
Under the Dictionary Act, “the wor[d] ‘person’. . . include[s] corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals.” Ibid.; see FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.
S. , (2011) (slip op., at 6) (“We have no doubt that person, in a
legal setting, often refers to artificial entities. The Dictionary Act makes
that clear”). Thus, unless there is something about the RFRA context
that “indicates otherwise,” the Dictionary Act provides a quick, clear,
and affirmative answer to the question whether the companies involved
in these cases may be heard.55
This shows that any gerrymandering made sufficiently explicit in a linguistic inten-
tion can take hold.56 Doubtless there are groups of speakers of English who insist
on using ‘ape’ in a way that would make ‘men are apes’ false in their dialect if
they could isolate themselves well enough. Doubtless Ishmael spurns Linnaeus and
invokes Jonah sincerely enough that ‘whales are fish’ expresses a true proposition
in his idiolect.57 There is probably a possible world where Dupre´ succeeds in his
campaign to revise our use of ‘fish’ so that it makes sense to call whales ‘mammalian
fish’. But in the more usual case, where people use ‘ape’, ‘fish’, and ‘person’ in order
to pick out biologically or legally natural kinds, considerations of naturalness can
override our mistakes about the intensions of those terms.58
What we’d really like, though, is an argument from semantic distinctness to meta-
physical distinctness. It would be nice to have an argument that polysemy only
occurs in cases of difference. After all, if a single meaning were adequate to the uses
54Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. (2014), at 20.
55Ibid., at 19.
56Eli Hirsch has been making an argument to this effect in his exchanges with Ted Sider for years:
see, e.g., Hirsch (2005, 2008).
57See Moby Dick, Ch. 32 for the spurning and invoking, and Hirsch (2005), 94-95 for discussion.
Thanks to Gordon Belot for pressing me on the relationship between the considerations about
‘because’ I have been pursuing here and how we learn about fish, with apologies for the possibility
that the approach may have turned out to be just what he feared it was.
58Manley (2014) puts this point in terms or more or less provisional referential intentions.
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to which a word is put, polysemy should not arise. There are a few different classes
of polysemes against which to test this idea. The different senses of synaesthetic
adjectives, which apply across multiple sense modalities—think here of ‘bright’ and
‘hot’—denote distinct properties. Our best explanations of at least some synaesthetic
adjectives do find an underlying neurophysical similarity responsible for their multi-
modal uses. The culinary use of ‘hot’, for example, may well be grounded in the
fact that capsaicin, the chemical responsible for sensations of spicy tastes, activates
a receptor that is also activated by painful heat.59 But nevertheless capsaicin and
high kinetic energy are quite different sorts of things. The different senses of double-
function adjectives, which have both physical and psychological meanings—think
here of ‘soft’, ‘sweet’, and ‘bitter’—also denote distinct properties.60 Polysemous
nouns like ‘book’, which has abstract and concrete senses, and ‘chicken’, which has
animal- and meat-specific senses, again denote distinct kinds of things. The pattern
holds for words that get used metonymically despite the fact that their metonymic
uses are not encoded in the lexicon: here I am thinking of ‘the ham sandwich’, used
to refer to the person who ordered the ham sandwich, and the like. In all of these
cases, polysemy reflects an actual metaphysical difference.
So the fact of polysemy (at least typically) suggests underlying difference. We might
even say that mastery of a polysemous word requires distinguishing between what is
denoted by its distinct meanings. A speaker really has not mastered our use of the
word ‘book’ if she thinks it can only apply to concrete objects. (“I can’t read your
book—it’s at your house!”) The world could nevertheless fail to cooperate with such
distinctions: what is required by semantic competence is not guaranteed to track
truth.61 It could happen that an extremely natural, joint-cutting kind of relation,
or even an extremely natural, joint-cutting particular relation, turns out to back
both metaphysical explanations and causal explanations. In that case, we should
think that metaphysical explanation is a kind of causal explanation (or vice versa),
that grounding and causation are species of the same genus, or even that we should
identify metaphysical explanation with causal explanation, identify grounding with
59See Caterina et al. (1997) and Clapham (1997). See Rakova (2003), Chs. 3, 4, and 10 for
a polemical discussion of the implications of this kind of neurobiological fact on how we should
account for polysemy.
60It seems implausible that some underlying neurobiological similarity will unify the physical and
psychological senses of these words, though Rakova (2003), Chs. 5-6 and pp. 148-149 takes an
opposing view. But note that the distinctness of physical sweetness and psychological sweetness
would withstand the discovery of such a similarity.
61Compare here the idea that sentences might be analytic but false in Tappenden (1993) and
the idea that conceptual competence with vague predicates requires accepting ‘tolerance principles’
that lead to sorites paradoxes developed in Eklund (2002, 2005).
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causation. But our default position should be to recognize the distinction encoded
in the polysemy of our explanatory language.
We are overdue for a methodological reminder. The causal metaphorist, who thinks
that causal explanation provides the basis for a metaphor used to talk about meta-
physical explanation, and the unificationist, who thinks that metaphysical expla-
nation just is a species of causal explanation (perhaps because grounding just is a
species of causation) can agree that causation and grounding, the relations backing
these kinds of explanation, are similar in lots of ways.62 Pointing to any particular
similarity bolsters both cases equally. It adds to the stock of similarities the causal
metaphorist can invoke. It also adds to the evidence of underlying sameness the uni-
ficationist can invoke. But to bolster both cases equally is to bolster neither at all as
against each other. Further, insofar as the causal metaphorist can point to polysemy
in our explanatory terminology of the kind I argued it exhibits in chapter 2, it looks
like the unificationist is out of luck. Unless, that is, the unificationist can point to
overriding metaphysical considerations, of the sort operative with ‘mammal’, ‘ape’,
and ‘person’.
The reason metaphysical considerations were overriding in those cases is that the
terms ‘mammal’, ‘ape’, and ‘person’ are used with an intention to refer to a relatively
natural kind. The same applies, presumably, to ‘because’, ‘cause’, and ‘grounding’.63
But it should now be clear that the unificationist bears the burden of showing that
metaphysical considerations force us to unify causal explanation and metaphysical
explanation. The linguistic facts make the alternative position—the position that
distinguishes them and treats causation and causal explanation merely as the basis
for our (now conventionalized, but once) metaphorical talk of grounding and meta-
physical explanation—the view to hold in the absence of countervailing evidence. (It
is relevant here that we do not, and cannot truly, say that grounds cause the entities
62A. Wilson (2013) is the prime example of a unificationist. He argues that accepting the identity
‘grounding = metaphysical causation’ has simplicity on its side. But it’s unclear to me how simplic-
ity considerations should favor his view. He may only have one primitive—causation—but he posits
distinct kinds of it. If the distinction between the kinds is primitive, the resulting view isn’t simpler
in any important sense than a view that posits two primitive relations: causation and grounding.
If the distinction between the kinds is not primitive, the difference between his view and a view
that just recognizes causation and grounding as different sorts of things seems terminological. It’s
also unclear to me why it’s supposed to be plausible that it could make sense to think of grounding
as metaphysical causation. The label ‘metaphysical causation’ suggests to me relations like God’s
sustaining us through time on certain early modern views, or the relationship persons bear to God
according to Spinoza, or Kantian noumenal affection. I can see no non-metaphorical reading of
‘causation’ on which it could make sense to think of, say, material constitution as metaphysical
causation.
63Perhaps only in virtue of our tacit quintessentialism: see Leslie (forthcoming).
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they ground.)
It’s unclear where the unificationist could find countervailing evidence. In fact, I
think a case can be made for distinguishing grounding and causation, and so for
distinguishing causal and metaphysical explanation. I don’t, however, think the case
can rest on differences between the restrictions imposed on relata of the relations.64
The fact, if it is one, that grounding is a synchronic relation while causation is a
diachronic relation does not establish that they more than nominally distinct. After
all, if there were just one relation—call it ‘generation’—we might just call generation
‘grounding’ when it relates entities at the same time and ‘causation’ when it relates
entities at different times. We might also call identity ‘Umer-identity’ when it relates
Umers and ‘Jon-identity’ when it relates Jons—but nothing follows about the prim-
itives to which our metaphysical theory should be committed. There is, in general,
no reason to think differences in relata reflect metaphysically significant differences
in relations. Rather, grounding-causation unity would commit us to somewhat im-
plausible semantic equivalences. If we use ‘causes’ and ‘grounds’ with the linguistic
intention of picking out maximally natural relations, it could turn out that ‘p causes
q’ and ‘p grounds q’ mean the same thing. But since intuitively they do not, we have
reason to prefer a theory that distinguishes them.
4.5 Causal Explanation in Proper Perspective
The last point I want to make concerns the relationship between causal explana-
tion and metaphysical explanation, if everything I have said above is correct. If the
sense of ‘because’ that covers metaphysical explanation is indeed based on a causal
metaphor, then causal explanation really is explanation par excellence. Causal ex-
planations are paradigms for non-causal, metaphysical explanations, and provide the
basis on which we understand the latter kind of explanation. Their centrality to ex-
planation, then, is not just a matter of their importance to science, but of their
importance to our explanatory practices as a whole. I argued in chapter 3 that ap-
parently non-explanatory uses of ‘because’ were causal-explanatory uses after all. I
supplemented that argument here with an explanation of the polysemy established
in chapter 2 that takes our very conceptual competence with metaphysical expla-
nations to be parasitic on our understanding of causal explanation. This reveals
the centrality of causal explanation to our explanatory practices as a whole. The
semantic investigation of ‘why’ and ‘because’ thus brings into focus, in a new way,
the truly paradigmatic status of causal explanation.
64Here I side with Schaffer (2014) against Koslicki (forthcoming) on how to distinguish relations.
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